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Abstract 
 
This thesis describes the development of the HI-risk method to assess socio-technical 
information security risks. The method is based on the concept that related organisations 
experience similar risks and could benefit from sharing knowledge in order to take 
effective security measures. The aim of the method is to predict future risks by 
combining knowledge of past information security incidents with forecasts made by 
experts. HI-risks articulates the view that information security risk analysis should 
include human, environmental, and societal factors, and that collaboration amongst 
disciplines, organisations and experts is essential to improve security risk intelligence in 
today’s information society.  
The HI-risk method provides the opportunity for participating organisations to register 
their incidents centrally. From this register, an analysis of the incident scenarios leads to 
the visualisation of the most frequent scenario trees. These scenarios are presented to 
experts in the field. The experts express their opinions about the expected frequency of 
occurrence for the future. Their expectation is based on their experience, their 
knowledge of existing countermeasures, and their insight into new potential threats. The 
combination of incident and expert knowledge forms a risk map. The map is the main 
deliverable of the HI-risk method, and organisations could use it to monitor their 
information security risks.  
The HI-risk method was designed by following the rigorous process of design science 
research. The empirical methods used included qualitative and quantitative techniques, 
such as an analysis of historical security incident data from healthcare organisations, 
expert elicitation through a Delphi study, and a successful test of the risk forecast in a 
case organisation. The research focused on healthcare, but has potential to be further 
developed as a knowledge-based system or expert system, applicable to any industry. 
That system could be used as a tool for management to benchmark themselves against 
other organisations, to make security investment decisions, to learn from past incidents 
and to provide input for policy makers. 
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 1 
1 Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
The research described in this thesis investigates information security in healthcare and 
proposes a new approach to assess information security risks. This chapter describes 
how the research topic was chosen and what the research aims to deliver. Furthermore, 
it is stated why the scope focused on healthcare specifically. The research process steps 
and how they relate to the arrangement of the text in the thesis are briefly outlined, as 
well as how engagement with other researchers and professionals contributed to the 
results.  
1.2 Motivation 
The researcher initiated the research project after working for several years as a 
consultant in information security for a diversity of commercial and non-profit 
organisations. From this experience, it was learned that in many cases, the number of 
information security incidents does not diminish after the implementation of detailed 
policies, consistent auditing, and certification of organisations against international 
security standards. The experience also learned that incidents tend to occur 
unexpectedly for an organisation and that organisations often are not adequately 
prepared to respond. However, many incident scenarios are not unique and also 
materialise in similar organisations. In a competitive market, businesses do not usually 
share security incident information, which may lead to situations where one keeps 
reinventing the figurative wheel and spending budgets on preventive and corrective 
measures of control that may not be effective. The motivation to start the research was 
grounded by this experience and it was the aim of the researcher to investigate the idea 
that organisations could benefit from sharing information security knowledge, 
especially about security incidents. 
Several trends in the field support this line of thinking. During the course of the 
research, the European data breach notification regulation for electronic communication 
service providers was further strengthened with specific rules in 2013 (European 
Commission, 2013). These rules contain practical guidelines to ensure that in the event 
of a data breach, customers are informed, the authorities are notified and that the 
problem is solved at a pan-European level. Further calls have been made, for instance 
by the European Privacy Association, to expand this notification regulation to other 
sectors as well (Cleghorn, 2013), although, as pointed out by the World Law Group 
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(2013), the patchwork of laws around the world regarding data breach notifications is 
challenging. The notification of data breaches to the public and authorities could 
contribute to knowledge of how to organise the response to security incidents across an 
industry. 
Another indicator of the interest in shared information security incident intelligence is a 
growing popularity in the use of risk and threat landscapes. Parallel to the research, 
several reports from respected organisations were published of this kind. These reports 
have in common that they try to map threats and risks on a scale that goes beyond one 
single organisation or region. One example is a technology focused threat landscape 
report from the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) (ENISA, 
2013) and the other is the Global Risk Report from the World Economic Forum (2012). 
Both reports have different scopes but they both support the thought that shared data 
about risks and incidents provides important knowledge to information security 
professionals. 
ENISA published their threat landscape report early in 2013. This report is based on 120 
reports from security industry and publicly available data and provides a view on 
observed technological threats, threat agents and threat trends. A threat landscape 
differs from a risk landscape. A risk embraces threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood and 
impact and is on a much higher level of abstraction. The global risk landscape from the 
World Economic Forum (2012) not only shows aggregated risks, but also shows how 
these risks relate to each other. One of the maps in the report shows a critical connection 
between technology risks and society and geopolitics. The forum considers cyber 
security as a key risk. It states that “cyber security is not a problem that any one 
organisation, private or public, can solve alone” (p. 46), which is a statement that has 
guided this research.  
The underpinning philosophy of this thesis is that multi-sourced threat landscapes, when 
combined with assessments of other risk factors such as vulnerabilities and lessons from 
past incidents, have the potential to contribute to the reliability of risk landscapes and 
forecasting. Therefore, organisations should not keep information security incidents as 
their secrets. Sharing knowledge and lessons learned will improve everybody’s 
resilience to threats and this in turn is essential to contain global cyber unrest. This 
thesis aims to contribute to knowledge in this upcoming field of information security 
risk and threat intelligence.  
 3 
1.3 Aim and objectives 
At the outset of the research, the aim was the generic goal of exploring information 
security risks and to contribute to the knowledge of information security risks by 
producing a new method to analyse information security risks. The main aim of the 
research was to investigate the possibility of stepping away from traditional information 
security risk assessment approaches, which are aimed at individual organisations and 
systems, and to design a novel approach that would make a contribution to the 
knowledge of information security risks industry-wide. The approach should enable 
organisations to learn lessons from each other and to unite in the prevention of recurring 
information security breaches that could harm individuals.     
The experimental approach of this research, the extensive literature review presented in 
chapters 2 and 3, and the engagement with experts and other researchers during the 
course of the research, led to further refinement of the general aim into specific 
objectives of the novel risk assessment method: 
1. To gather and to evaluate information security incidents that occurred in multiple 
organisations and to discover the most frequently occurring scenarios. Knowledge 
about information security incidents must be included in the risk analysis because 
sharing lessons from the past contributes to the general knowledge of information 
security (Lips, Taylor & Bannister, 2005). Furthermore, sourcing risk information 
from multiple locations has shown an improvement in reliability or the forecast in 
other methods (Elevant, 2011). On top of that, it is assumed that systems and 
organisations do not exist in isolation. Assets and their social, physical, technical 
and human environment are entangled and pervasive and therefore the scope is 
unlimited (Rouse, 2008). Risks should therefore be reviewed in relation to the wider 
network. 
2. To analyse the contribution of social, technical and environmental risk factors to 
information security incidents. The causes of risks and incidents are not limited to 
certain elements and are likely to occur in combination with each other (Crinson, 
2008, PerAda, 2010). 
3. To involve experts to identify and evaluate future risks and trends, as expert 
elicitation is a proven method for scenario building and forecasting (Padma et al., 
2009; Rowe & Wright, 2001). 
4. To express risks in a manner that can be used for policymaking and management 
decisions. The presentation of risks in scenarios proved capable of contributing to 
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the understanding of the risk by those involved in the risk assessment and therefore 
is preferred above the presentation in words only (Gürbüz et al., 2009; Lund, 
Solhaug & Stølen, 2011).  
The novel method should be applicable to different industries, but for this thesis the 
focus was specifically on healthcare. 
1.4 Scope 
Healthcare was chosen as the main domain because it is a very diverse industry that 
comprises a wide range of processes and information. Healthcare is at the heart of the 
most innovative technological research and development and its security should protect 
the most private and vital information of all of us.  
Information security in healthcare and in other industries concerns us all. We (as 
patients, as healthcare consumers, as family and friends of patients) need to have trust in 
the level of respect, protection and quality of care that our information receives from the 
people and organisations that we share it with. Our daily life is becoming inseparable 
from our digital selves when we pay electronically for medication, goods, and services, 
or when we communicate online or seek information. Our digital identity is a valuable 
asset that we would like to protect.  
In healthcare and beyond, information security is also an economic issue: security 
incidents cost money. The 2013 information security breaches survey report, 
commissioned by the Department for Business Innovation & Skills (2013), estimates 
that small businesses suffer an average of £35,000 to £65,000 per incident, while in 
large organisations the average cost goes up to £850,000 per incident. According to this 
report, the median number of breaches suffered by large organisations in a year is 113, 
so the total costs could be millions of pounds each year. These numbers suggest that 
information security incidents are expensive and measures to prevent these incidents are 
worth the investment.  
Information is critical for many processes within healthcare. Issues with confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of health information could affect us all, as it can lead to 
damage to health, life and trust in care. As perceived risks of confidentiality breaches 
increase, patients might avoid care (Myers et al., 2008). Patients could become 
concerned that a breach of confidentiality may lead to embarrassment, stigma or 
discrimination. A published example of this is the banker who also sat on a county 
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health board in the U.S. and who gained access to patients' records. He identified 
several people with cancer and called in their mortgages (Patientprivacyrights, 2013). 
Furthermore, issues with the integrity and correctness of patient information could lead 
to medical errors. For instance, a study of the implementation of a computerised 
physician order entry system, discovered that users create workarounds when 
encountering usability problems with the system (Niazkhani et al., 2011). These 
workarounds influence the integrity of the data. The researchers observed that at the 
time a decision needed to be made, the user relied on memory about the patient to write 
out prescriptions and not on the data in the system, leading to an increased number of 
errors. Finally, patient information and healthcare information systems need to be 
available and accessible for healthcare staff to provide care. Healthcare infrastructure is 
considered as a critical infrastructure: an essential asset that needs to be available for the 
functioning of society. Baker, Waterman and Ivanov (2010) state that all over the world, 
critical infrastructures are under constant cyber attack. These attacks can cause 
disruptions in healthcare information systems. According to the conclusions of the 
American Medical Informatics Association’s health policy conference, these 
“disruptions in care and security challenges […] could result in the loss of public trust, a 
loss that may extend beyond the government to healthcare institutions and even 
providers” (McGowan, Cusack & Bloomrosen, 2012, p. 462). 
Correct and accessible information about a patient, in electronic or other forms, can 
save lives (NHS National Institute for Health research, 2013, Hillestad et al., 2005). 
Advances in technology have made it easier to provide and share medical and health 
information, but at the same time have raised questions in society about confidentiality, 
integrity and unauthorised access (Appari & Johnson, 2010, Meingast et al., 2006). 
Approaches to information security and information security risk analysis have so far 
not led to systems and processes that are free from security issues, resulting in on-going 
media and industry reports of security breaches.  
Many methods to manage information security risks exist, but only a few have been 
developed specifically for healthcare. Furthermore, risk analysis methods for healthcare 
organisations have only sporadically been researched and are limited to “anecdotal 
evidence” (Appari & Johnson, 2010, p. 300). As will be argued in this thesis, these 
methods can be criticised for being time-consuming for participants and for not 
extending beyond the imaginary boundaries of a system, department or organisation. 
The relationship with contextual risk factors is often ignored, with some exceptions for 
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legislation and compliance. These discrete-entity or contained-system methods provide 
little help in explaining or predicting the occurrence of security incidents. It has long 
been recognised that problems with information systems occur often because of social 
relations and dependencies with users, resource controllers and other actors who appear 
outside the boundaries of the entity (Kling, 1987). However, risk analysis methods have 
not evolved alongside that belief and seek individualistic explanations of risks, even for 
complex, connected and distributed information processing activities. Furthermore, 
these methods include neither the lessons learned from past incidents, nor future 
expectations of experts in the field.  
The main deliverable of the research reported in this thesis is the Health Information 
(HI)-risk method to assess (identify and monitor) information security risks in 
healthcare. HI-risk provides insight into the most frequently occurring information 
security incidents and gives an indication of future trends in information security risks. 
This information contributes to the knowledge of individual organisations and policy 
makers on a regional level.  
1.5 Research overview and thesis structure 
The research process was organised following the process for Design Science Research 
(Peffers et al., 2008). The process contained 5 steps as illustrated in Figure 1-1. The 
design started with the identification and definition of the problem and the search for 
possible solutions. Issues with traditional perspectives on information security in 
general, and suggestions for wider socio-technical approaches of information security 
were researched by means of a literature study, which is presented in chapter 2. This 
chapter explains the different views on information security risks and controls. These 
differences cause confusion about what information security entails and why it 
continues to deliver unsatisfactory and partial solutions. It is argued that information 
security is a multi-disciplinary and socio-technical topic of study, characterised by the 
entanglement of people, organisations, information and communication technology 
(ICT), and the environment (e.g. physical environment, geographical environment, 
politics, and society).  
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Figure 1-1 Research steps and reference to thesis chapters. 
 
In addition, specific healthcare information security problems and directions for 
solutions were researched and reported in chapter 3. This research step studied the 
literature on healthcare information security governance, information security policy, 
risk assessment methods, and the risks associated with confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information. It is shown that risk assessments are: often performed based 
on the traditional philosophy of contained systems; do not share knowledge across 
organisations within the same network; and are not fit for the modern complexity of 
healthcare. This causes a gap in knowledge about the actual information security risks 
in healthcare. Furthermore, it suggests that the foundations of risk controls, i.e.  
governance and policy, are suffering from inconsistency and from a low acceptance 
level. 
The third research step, the design and development of the method, are presented in 
chapters 4 and 5. The design of the mixed methods approach to develop and implement 
the HI-risk method is specified in chapter 4. The methods included a survey, data 
analysis, a Delphi study and a case study with interviews and observations.  
Chapter 5 presents the HI-risk method and demonstrates the strengths from existing 
methods on which it was developed. The method contains: an incident register; an 
analysis of scenarios; expert forecasting; and the final output is a risk map that shows 
the expected information security risks in healthcare. 
•Literature study (Chapter 2 and 3) 
1. Problem identification and 
motivation 
•Literature study (Chapter 2 and 3) 
2. Definition of the 
objectives of the solution 
•Iterative design of classification (Chapter 5) 
•Design of survey, Delphi study and case study (Chapter 4) 
3. Design and development 
•Survey, data analysis, Delphi study (Chapter 6) 4. Demonstration 
•Case study with observations, data analysis, interviews 
and survey (Chapter 7) 
5. Evaluation 
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The design of the incident register builds further upon existing security threat and 
vulnerability classification models. Existing models focus usually on a specific 
knowledge area or specific types of security problems. In the HI-risk method, classic 
computer security taxonomies from authors such as Parker (1998) or Howard and 
Longstaff (1998) are combined with a classification of human error categories (Liginlal 
et al., 2009), an overview of target patient information elements (Asaro et al., 1999), a 
typology of confidentiality breaches in healthcare (Brann & Mattson, 2004) and patient 
safety elements of organisational culture (Carthey & Clarke, 2010). This combined 
classification of socio-technical security risk and incident factors supports the structure 
of a database that holds an information security incident register. 
From this data, calculating the co-occurrence of incident factors results in a list of the 
most frequent incident scenarios. These scenarios are presented to a panel of healthcare 
and security experts, and they state their opinion about possible future occurrence of 
these scenarios in a three-round Delphi study. They also add important insight into new 
risks that are likely to occur in the future. The knowledge from the incident scenarios is 
combined with the experts’ insight into a forecast for the future. This forecast is 
presented on a risk map.  
The fourth step in the research was the demonstration of the method. Chapter 6 presents 
the results of how the method was put to practice. During this phase, the proposed steps 
in the method were performed. Data about information security incidents in healthcare 
was collected from NHS Care Trusts or Health Boards in the United Kingdom by means 
of a Freedom of Information request. This approach delivered information about 2,108 
incidents. The incidents were added to the combined incident register, and the expert 
panel reviewed the most likely scenarios during the Delphi study. This resulted in an 
information security risk forecast for healthcare.  
The fifth step in the research was the evaluation of the method. In chapter 7 the results 
from a case study validate the reliability of the risk forecast. It is shown how the 
forecast on the risk map compared to the actual incidents that happened in a healthcare 
organisation.  
The final chapter 8 discusses the results, the study’s contribution to knowledge and 
suggestions for further research. 
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1.6 Engagement with the research community and produced papers 
During the course of the research, there were several opportunities to present the 
research and to engage in relevant discussions about the research topic. These 
discussions provided valuable insights from scholars from different academic 
backgrounds and from different countries.  
The first collaboration occurred within the faculty with a research project that focused 
on technological risk assessments within healthcare. The researchers took the 
opportunity to work as a team to design a survey to collect data about information 
security incidents in healthcare. This collaboration is described in more detail in section 
4.4.2.2 of this thesis and resulted in a joint paper (Smith, Buchanan, Thuemmler, Bell & 
Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2010)
1
 on information governance and patient data protection. 
A second opportunity came through an invitation to participate in a workshop of the 
Pervasive Adaptation (PerAda) project, funded by the European Commission under the 
7th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7). 
PerAda is part of a project which aims to integrate, coordinate and increase the visibility 
of research carried out in the fields related to collective adaptive systems. The aim of 
the event was to determine key challenges in security, trust and privacy as they relate to 
pervasive adaptation. The presentation focused on the socio-technical information 
security risks and the human factors (PerAda, 2010). Feedback from other participants 
and information gathered from the presentations of other speakers proved inspirational 
for the comprehension of the magnitude of the scope of information security risks, 
which are omnipresent in today’s society of pervasive systems. The workshop 
contributed to the understanding of the limitations of the performance of risk 
assessments within pre-defined scopes, as will be further discussed in section 3.6 of this 
thesis. 
Indications of possible research directions to improve the reliability of information 
security risk forecasts were taken away from the E-society conference in 2011. At the 
time of the conference, the research into existing methods and their strengths and 
weaknesses had just finished, and a paper about this was presented at the conference 
(Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2011). The aim of attending this conference was to gather 
requirements for the HI-risk method. In particular the research presented at the 
                                                 
1
 This paper was published using the researcher’s married name Hazelhoff Roelfzema.  
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conference that was related to collaborative data gathering (crowd sourcing) of current 
events, in order to analyse trends and to predict the future direction of these trends, was 
used in the development of the HI-risk method. Details can be found in chapter 5 of this 
thesis.  
Finally, a paper related to the research results was produced after the Delphi study (as 
detailed in chapter 6 of this thesis) (Van Deursen, Buchanan & Duff, 2013). This paper 
made it in the top 5 of Elsevier’s most downloaded articles and was awarded with a 
certificate as shown in Figure 1-2. 
 
Figure 1-2 ScienceDirect certificate of most downloaded articles 
  
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the research and provided some background into the project. 
The next chapter aims to clarify the concept of information security, and describes in 
more detail how information security is perceived differently by researchers and 
professionals from different backgrounds. Chapter 2 leads to a conceptual framework 
that defines information security in the light of this thesis. Thereafter, in chapter 3, the 
concept of information security will be related to healthcare and its specific issues. 
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2 Conceptions of information security in the information society 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a background chapter to explain the concept of information security that 
underpins this thesis. It was deemed necessary to include this chapter because 
information security is a topic of study in different disciplines, which approach different 
aspects and work from different conceptions. However, as will be argued in this 
chapter, it requires multi-disciplinary collaboration to solve shared security problems. 
This chapter combines the different perspectives into the socio-technical theoretical 
framework that forms the foundation of the research. A more specific literature review 
on healthcare information security issues is presented in chapter 3.  
2.2 Traditional conceptions 
Information security became a common research topic at the end of the 1960s and early 
1970s when the first publications relating to computer security and data security 
appeared. Before that, most papers were produced under government contract as 
reports, rather than conference papers, and therefore these were not widely disseminated 
among the general computing community (NIST, 2002). In the following decades, 
discussions about security spread outside the computing community to organisation and 
management disciplines, social and behavioural sciences, and sociologists. Nowadays, it 
is a central item in the public media, a topic of international relations and warfare, and it 
causes global anxiety amongst governments, organisations and the public alike. 
Many regard the publication of the Rand Report R609-1 from the RAND Corporation 
as one of the seminal works in the early days of information security. The Task Force 
which wrote this report, under the authority of the U.S. office of Defense Research and 
Engineering, had the assignment to study and recommend hardware and software 
safeguards that would satisfactorily protect classified information in computer systems 
(Ware, 1970). The security philosophy in the report was based on closed environments: 
“cleared users working with classified information at physically protected consoles 
connected to the system by protected communication circuits”” (p. vi). The vision was 
that assets needed to be protected from uncontrolled access and information should not 
get out either. The aim of information security was to protect equipment from theft, 
damage or modification. The risks were mere technology risks, and controls aimed to 
protect the data in the systems. Furthermore, the report stated that security was best left 
to the experts:  
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The security problem of specific computer systems must, at this point in time, be 
solved on a case-by-case basis, employing the best judgment of a team 
consisting of system programmers, technical hardware and communication 
specialists, and security experts (p. v).  
In the 1980s and 1990s the innovations in communication technology changed the way 
that organisations were connected to each other and to their employees. E-commerce, 
remote working or outsourcing of services require a corporate ICT network to be 
accessible from outside of the logical boundaries of the organisation. Many publications 
about the role of people in the security of systems appeared from the 1980s onwards. 
However, Hitchings reported in 1995 that his survey amongst the top 1000 businesses 
and all local authorities in the UK found that although organisations were becoming 
more security conscious, there had been no advantages to the management of security 
techniques and the understanding of the role of human factors (Hitchings, 1995).  
Many studies of human security behaviour followed from then. For instance, Straub and 
Welke used behavioural theories in their much-cited work about coping with security 
risks in systems (Straub & Welke, 1998). They found evidence that training and 
supporting reference material positively contributes to the awareness of managers and 
staff on how to properly protect and manage information assets. Awareness and 
behaviour of employees in organisations remains a popular research topic ever since.  
When ICT systems started to connect to each other, information security practitioners 
promoted the opening up of the organisation’s computer networks in order to allow 
controlled and secured communication instead of keeping it closed and secured. In the 
U.S. General Accounting Office guidelines (1998), it is stated that:  
Security is increasingly being viewed as an enabler: a necessary step in 
mitigating the risks associated with new applications involving Internet use and 
broadened access to the organization’s computerized data. As a result, security is 
seen as an important component in improving business operations by creating 
opportunities to use information technology in ways that would not otherwise be 
feasible (p. 23). 
Opening up connections between networks makes it difficult to maintain the traditional 
philosophy of containment. Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) argue that “maintaining a 
security perimeter around information processing activities” (p. 145) creates problems 
when organisational structures become more entangled with each other, as it is hard to 
define the boundaries of each organisation. However, classifications related to human 
behaviour and organisational culture persist in differentiating between insider behaviour 
and external attackers. It is frequently claimed that insiders are the biggest problems of 
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information security (Baker, 2008, Baker et al., 2011, BERR, 2008, CSI, 2011, Verizon, 
2012). 
Recent developments in areas such as outsourcing of ICT services, mobile technology, 
cloud computing or management of large and complex data sets, have raised 
government and public discussions about boundaries, legislation, warfare, ethics and 
responsibilities. Information security is no longer an exclusive activity for computing 
experts. It has become a multi-disciplinary topic in which, as suggested by Von Solms 
(2010), the role of information security experts may change towards facilitating and 
educating governments and the public about risks and controls.  
2.3 Socio-technical conceptions 
Socio-technical studies receive growing attention within information security studies. In 
socio-technical approaches, it is believed that social constructs and technical 
infrastructure constantly respond to and shape each other. Socio-technical approaches 
envision that organisations should be designed as a balance between: 
1. The technical subsystem: the technology to produce work -hardware, equipment, 
and technology- but also the techniques, methods, configurations, procedures and 
knowledge used by organisational members to acquire inputs, transform inputs into 
outputs and provide outputs or services to clients or customers. 
2. The social subsystem: employees, knowledge, skills, attitudes, values and needs, 
reward systems and authority structures. 
3. The environment: customers, suppliers, rules and regulations, which govern the 
relations of the organisation to society at large.  
Adler and Docherty (1998) state that classical socio-technical systems approaches, 
focus on the stable internal aspects of the system with a lack of interest in the external 
environment. However, as Heller (1997) points out, the original studies from a socio-
technical perspective focused predominantly on the micro level of systems, but the 
meso level (an industrial sector) and macro level (which could be a range of 
phenomena) were never disregarded. The socio-technical system was described as an 
open system with boundary roles that have to be sensitive to the external world. The 
environment should be an integrated part of sociotechnical studies. The social part of 
socio-technical is not limited to the managerial and organisational practices, but refers 
to the influences of technology and informatics on the entire economy and ways of life. 
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In a socio-technical system, the technical, social and environmental subsystems need to 
work in harmony. When changes are made to the social system (i.e. the reporting 
structure, cultural changes, etc.), the technical system is impacted through things such 
as information sharing or training. These changes may also affect the organisation’s role 
in the community as well as the relations between customers and suppliers. Because 
technical changes are the most popular form of organisational improvement, their effect 
on the social system and the environment has been well observed. Communication and 
reporting structures in the social system can be changed dramatically by changes to the 
technical system. Socio-technical research is important to the management of 
information security as it acknowledges the importance of social and human factors in 
security management. The security of the technical system is created and challenged by 
the social system through users. The security of technical systems is also influenced by 
the environmental system through legislation and customer demands. When a security 
incident affects a technical system, the social and environmental system can be affected 
as well: staff will not be able to perform their tasks, the customers will not receive their 
service or the public will lose trust in a provider.  
Orlikowski and Scott (2008) relate difficulties with the sociotechnical approach to 
technology in organisations to the assumption that humans and organisations are 
separate dimensions from technology. They argue that a new stream of research is 
coming to the fore to enhance the socio-technical approach, which they call 
relationality. In this view, humans/organisations and technology exist only through their 
intra-relating entanglement. They suggest that examples of this kind of research 
approaches are Actor Network Theory (ANT) and sociomateriality. ANT (Latour, 2005) 
is not a theory to explain why networks are formed as they are, but a method to explore 
the relations within heterogeneous networks, including the social as well as the 
technical. It maps relations that are simultaneously material (between things) and 
semiotic (between concepts). ANT assumes that many relations are both material and 
semiotic. Sociomateriality (Orlikowski, 2010; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008) challenges the 
assumption that technology, work, and organisations should be conceptualized 
separately, and advances the view that there is an inherent inseparability between the 
technical and the social. Leonardi (2012) defines sociomateriality as “the enactment of a 
particular set of activities that meld materiality with institutions, norms, discourses, and 
all other phenomena we typically define as social” (p. 43). 
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A few recent information security studies can be classified in this research stream. For 
instance, Hedström, Dhillon and Karlsson (2010) used ANT to analyse a computer hack 
in an organisation. They state that their findings reveal not only the usefulness of ANT 
in developing an understanding of the (in)security environment at the case study 
organisation, but also the ability of ANT to identify differences in interests among 
actors. They found that by using ANT, it was possible to see the heterogeneous network 
around a security breach, embodying human as well as non-human actors. Furthermore, 
it made it possible to identify the associations that link the different actors together 
forming the network.  
Crinson (2008) advocates the sociomaterial understanding of information systems and 
points out that security risks are evolving and conditional, and that is where security 
analysts should engage. The focus should not be on separate technical and human 
factors, but on how the demands of working with information systems impact upon, and 
in turn are reconfigured themselves by, material practice within a particular 
organisation. He criticises the socio-technical approaches, as in his opinion, they remain 
focused on the insider-outsider duality. Furthermore, he argues that these studies tend to 
interpret the term socio-technical as the interaction of people with information systems 
security or the interaction between people and organisational policies. According to 
Crinson, by definition these approaches are falling short when analysing threats to 
security because they separate the human from the technology and exclude many 
external (macro-level) variables. Assessing threats to the security of information 
systems is not an evolving process based upon a rational process of risk assessment of a 
component’s technical features and predicted human operator responses, rather it is a 
complex and highly unpredictable process that has to be alert to emerging practices.  
Sociomaterial approaches are also criticised. Mutch (2013) doubts the value of certain 
aspects of the sociomaterial approach as opposed to more traditional approaches. He 
states that what is needed is a refreshment of existing knowledge of socio-technical 
systems rather than seeking new approaches. He refers to the formative work of Trist 
(1963) that shows sensitivity to broader social and cultural structures. This point has 
also been made by Heller (1997) who argues that socio-technical systems have always 
been seen as open system, existing within and interacting with its environment. 
The new streams of research approaches are perhaps a response to the underdeveloped 
attention to the external systems of the socio-technical concept. The new relationality 
approaches try to fill in the gaps in knowledge that they see in socio-technical 
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approaches. In that respect, the traditional and modern approaches complement each 
other and do not necessarily replace each other. 
2.3.1 Conceptions of risks and controls in the technical subsystem 
Developments in technical security mechanisms and artefacts ran parallel with the 
developments in computer and communication technology. These artefacts can be 
pieces of hardware or program code within a single machine, distributed systems or 
networked systems and the applications that run on them. Some examples include 
logical access systems, audit trails, encryption systems, antivirus software, firewalls, 
and intrusion detection systems. The innovative research and development of these 
artefacts is mainly the domain of mathematics, software engineering, computer science 
and management information systems.  
Security practitioners recognise that the security of systems needs to be managed during 
the development stage of an artefact and that it needs maintenance after the 
implementation. Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) surveyed the methods for risk analysis 
and for selection of measures to control those risks that are used by security 
practitioners. They concluded that professionals use mainly checklists, risk analysis, and 
evaluations to design and maintain technical security controls. Checklists help to 
identify every possible control that may be implemented. Checklists are strongly related 
to audit, evaluation and standards. Many checklists were developed for analysts to 
check the system and to determine the necessity of existing controls and the possibility 
of implementing new ones. Risk analysis methods suggest that negative events can be 
prevented and information systems can be made secure if countermeasures are 
developed and implemented in a logical sequential manner. Evaluation methods aim to 
measure security against standards in order to give the system in scope a grading or a 
certificate.  
Different international guidelines for information security management have been 
proposed, including the ISO/IEC 15408-1: Evaluation Criteria for Information 
Technology Security (2009), Control Objectives for Information and Related 
Technology (COBIT) 5 for Information Security (ISACA, 2012), ISO/IEC 21827: 
Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (2008), and the ISO/IEC 
27000 series (2009), and its derivatives. They have in common that they aim to help 
organisations with their security certification processes. The implementation of these 
generic standards in organisations assumes that they are valid across multiple 
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organisations and industries and pay little attention to the environment of the individual 
organisation. Such standards do not address the organisation’s own, and unique, 
information security needs, but prescribe universal or general procedures (Siponen & 
Willison, 2009). This creates the risk that information security is not applied in areas 
where it is needed. Furthermore, these standards and guidelines are based on the 
assumption that the implementation of technical security controls and procedures will 
fulfil the requirement of organisations to experience less security incidents. Some 
evidence supports this idea (Abdullah Al-Awadi, 2009), but it requires thorough 
monitoring, auditing and surveillance of the systems and its users.  
Normative literature emphasises the importance of periodic reviews and audits of the 
security controls. Some researchers suggest that regular monitoring of information 
security controls can improve the overall effectiveness of an organisation’s information 
security policy (Ransbotham & Mitra, 2009; Steinbart et al., 2012). However, the 
effectiveness of audits has also been criticised for testing only the compliance to the 
organisation’s own security framework and for not testing the quality of the security 
itself. It has even been stated that “information security standards focus on the existence 
of processes, not on their content” (Siponen, 2006). Furthermore, it has been stated that 
periodic audits do not take into account the temporal dimension, focus heavily on 
system controls and do not include observation of users or comparison of results over 
time. Members of the organisation learn over time how to bypass technical controls 
(Colwill, 2009) and how to pass compliance assessments and adapt their organisational 
practices, causing gaps between the framework and the actual practices (Coles-Kemp, 
2009), which in return will go unnoticed. 
The technical approach to design and implement security controls traditionally 
considered that a system has strict boundaries. The conception was that if a subsystem is 
secure, it allows the rest of the system to be secure as well. However, recent 
publications demonstrate the on-going advances in security solutions, which focus on 
system-boundary crossing technology. Examples are solutions for computer and 
network abuse and misuse (Buchanan, 2011); for privacy issues caused by mobile 
technology (such as location tracking) (Buchanan, Kwecka, & Ekonomou, 2012); for 
the sharing of sensitive information between networks (Uthmani et al., 2010); or for the 
protection of data in cloud computing (Fan et al., 2011). These technological controls 
shape our view on security, and in turn these technologies are shaped by our political, 
cultural and philosophical standpoints (Coles-Kemp, 2009) and should not be 
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researched and developed in isolation, but embedded in their wider social context. This 
has impact on the scope of risk analysis and on the applied methods. 
2.3.2 Conceptions of risks and controls in the organisational and business 
subsystem 
The organisational and business perspective on information security draws from 
management studies to describe economics, security management or governance 
(Anderson, 2001; Anderson & Moore, 2006; Coles-Kemp, 2008;  Coles-Kemp, 2009; 
Collmann, 2001; Fitzgerald, 2012; Gerber & von Solms, 2005; Keller et al., 2005), and 
from human-behavioural studies to improve awareness and training (Herold, 2011; 
Khan, et al., 2011; Shaw et al., 2009; Straub & Welke, 1998). 
From a business view, the information in the networks needs to be secured because this 
information and the related knowledge (or intellectual property) of the organisation 
have an economic value. Information security risks are seen as business risks, which can 
be measured, e.g. in terms of stock prices. Several studies found that information 
security has the power to affect company value (Campbell et al. 2003; Goel & Shawky, 
2009; Khansa et al., 2012; Morse, Raval, & Wingender Jr., 2011). 
Information security controls from the business perspective include the traditional 
personnel and administrative-procedural safeguards, as defined in the earlier mentioned 
RAND report, which nowadays are part of the Information Security Management 
System (ISMS) (ISO/IEC, 2009; Whitman & Mattord, 2010). The widely used BS ISO 
27000:2009 (ISO/IEC, 2009) standard for information security describes how security 
should be managed through an ISMS. In terms of the standard, “management of 
information security is expressed through the formulation and use of information 
security policies, standards, procedures and guidelines, which are then applied 
throughout the organization by all individuals associated with the organization” (p. 8). 
Furthermore, central to the ISMS is the continuous organisational process (Plan, Do, 
Check, Act cycle). In this process, the organisation first establishes objectives and 
makes plans (sets targets). Then, the organisation sets to do what was planned. 
Subsequently, the achievements are measured and compared to the planned objectives. 
Finally, corrective and improving measures are taken to ensure better compliance with 
the plan. The ISO standard promotes a “holistic management of information security” 
(p.11), however, it does not explain what is meant by holistic, nor does it provide a 
definition of the term holistic management.  
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Coles-Kemp (2008) performed a range of case studies of these ISMSs across the public 
and healthcare sectors over a five-year lifespan. She identified that information security 
management literature generalized a number of “assumptions that did not always hold 
true” (p. 40). For instance, “it was assumed that an ISMS is structured top-down, both 
in terms of its organisational hierarchy and in terms of its policy structure” (p. 40). This 
top-down approach “is designed to manage structure, stable environments which can 
standardize the majority of their activities and fits with the ownership hierarchy that is 
typical of such an environment” (p.40). In reality, as Coles-Kemp found in her case 
studies, organisations are rarely stable and information security can be managed 
bottom-up as well. She found in her field studies that in Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI), the root of the PKI hierarchy creates the certificate policy and has therefore 
control over the security and makes the information security management decisions. A 
second assumption in the literature is that strategic decisions are “only made at the top 
of an organisation” (p. 42). However, the study found that strategic direction is not 
necessarily introduced top-down, and that an organisation should accommodate 
strategic, operational and administrative security decisions at a variety of levels within 
an organisation. The third misconception is that any changes to the policy must be 
processed by the ISMS so that the changes can be calibrated and that the organisation 
remains secure. In the operational environment, as was observed in the research, it is not 
always possible to use a formal change control process. Furthermore, not all forms of ad 
hoc decision-making result in wrong security controls. The case studies demonstrated 
that in some instances ad hoc decision-making was a valid way of managing security. 
The findings of the case studies demonstrate that ISMS implementations suffer from 
simplified views of power, decision-making and control. Coles-Kemp concludes that 
the design of an ISMS can be unfocused and that the link between the external context 
(the organisation and society) and the internal context (the information security 
mechanism) is often overlooked and marginalized in favour of a focus on the 
information security mechanisms. The reality of emerging security practices based on 
ad hoc decision making calls for more research in order to provide a better 
understanding how humans and security management frameworks interact. The 
constantly emerging security controls suggest the adaptability and regulation of 
information security mechanisms.  
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2.3.3 Environmental subsystem risks and controls 
In the socio-technical approach, the environmental subsystem is often related to 
legislation, government or customers. The requirements of these actors can influence 
the way the organisation operates and what it produces. Additionally, in information 
security approaches, there is some attention to the physical surroundings of an 
organisation. The environment can limit and shape the organisation’s information 
processing. For example, the geographical location of an organisation defines the 
possibility of acts of nature influencing the ability to communicate and process 
information. This, in turn, defines requirements for the security of the built environment 
and for the security of the underlying technical infrastructure. Furthermore, the 
environment in terms of social-geographic and demographic figures, has the ability to 
influence the social and technical subsystems in terms of possibility of robbery, theft, 
burglary and so on.  
Physical and environmental security is an element of information security, which is not 
often discussed in depth in information security studies. The scope of physical security 
is to protect the physical surroundings of information processing activities. This means 
the people; the building and its facilities; the hardware and communications; and the 
environment around the building. Physical security also extends to the employee’s 
home. Working from home on the business network and mobile working create 
requirements for security controls at the remote location. The handbook of the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), an agency of the U.S. Commerce 
Department, describes how physical controls aim to protect against interruptions in 
computer services, physical damage, theft, unauthorised disclosure of information and 
loss of control over systems (NIST, 1996). Methods to select controls to protect against 
these risks are often based on checklist or risk assessments. The international standard 
ISO/IEC 27001 suggests that physical controls include backup power supplies, fire 
controlling equipment, access control to the building, and clear desk policy. These 
controls are meant for a specific perimeter, and do not include the wider environmental 
and socio-geographical context. Some risks remain uncontrolled when following only 
this standard’s suggestions.  
The social environment is an element that is not often included in information security 
risk analysis methods. Local crime rates in the neighbourhood could influence the risk 
of staff being robbed of their information carrying devices (laptops, tablets, 
smartphones) at the car park or whilst walking to their transportation. Cozens, Saville 
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and Hillier (2005) reviewed the core findings from place-based crime prevention 
research and found that a growing body of research supports the assertion that crime 
prevention through environmental design is effective. The architecture of the built 
environment and urban planning could have a direct relationship with crime and 
security and defines the security risk and the fear of crime in the community where an 
organisation is placed.  
Moral laws and information ethics are becoming new areas of interest for information 
security researchers studying environmental controls. This is where academic fields 
such as psychology, philosophy and sociology could contribute to the understanding of 
the handling of secrets by persons and social groups and how people are affected by the 
loss of secrets (e.g. by loss of face, embarrassment, loss of trust, loss of membership of 
a group, stigma, loss of image and so on).  
Thompson and Kaarst-Brown (2005) use examples of socio-cultural studies that studied 
the role of secrecy in different social groups and secret societies such as Native 
Americans and the Ku Klux Klan. These studies show that individuals within these 
societies feel that the information about the group must not be known to outsiders. 
Obtaining access to secrets is a sign of trust in the individual member and the 
information serves as social lubricant to maintain the cohesiveness of the unit and to 
signal identity in the group. The betrayal of the secrets is a major offence and could lead 
to termination of the membership. These type of studies have not been extensively 
researched in relation to information security, which could be a satisfactory line of 
inquiry for the future as it may provide insights into compliance to policy and 
perception of security.  
Dourish and Anderson (2006) explored the social context of privacy and security. They 
argue that people have constantly changing information needs, which are subject to on-
going revision and re-interpretation. Information management, in their view, is a way in 
which social actions are achieved. Therefore, any privacy and security requirement must 
be grounded in an understanding of the specific social and cultural context within which 
the activity is taking place. Furthermore, they propose that the concerns for risk, danger, 
trust, secrecy, identity, morality, and power are collectively giving meaning to 
information activities. They state that “security and privacy are ways in which people 
collectively understand the world” (p.338). They are social products rather than natural 
facts. In their approach, they do not seek to automate security in technological artefacts, 
but “to support the human and social practices through which the whole complex of 
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phenomena –privacy, security, risk, danger, secrecy, trust, identity, morality, power, and 
so forth- are managed and sustained” (p. 338).  
The environmental and social context of information security expands to governments 
and relates to topics such as information policy, diplomacy and international relations 
(Choucri, 2012; Choucri & Goldsmith, 2012; Gady & Austin, 2010; Mueller, Schmidt 
& Kuerbis, 2013). For example, the resilience of critical infrastructures is a matter of 
national security. President Obama stated that: “Organizations should cooperate more 
with each other and with governments, and even governments should work together 
internationally to secure information held in computer networks and to protect critical 
infrastructures” (Obama, 2011). However, international cooperation on this front is still 
in its infancy and is mainly military funded. Particularly in countries that have 
experienced significant downsizing of (conventional) military forces, cyberspace has 
attracted a considerable interest in the new opportunities for the military to play in what 
has become framed as “information warfare and information operations” (Eriksson & 
Giacomello, 2007, p. 178). In a way, this resembles the early days of information 
security when computing was mainly a military problem.  
Examples of international collaboration are the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence, an organisation that originated from military initiatives and aims 
to coordinate help after a major cyber attack, or Computer Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs), who aim to handle incident response. The first CERT was developed by the 
U.S. Defence Advanced Research Project Agency in 1998 and now the system has 
expanded worldwide, with more than 250 organisations dealing with Internet security 
problems. Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime is one of the more formal initiatives to 
foster international cooperation by harmonising criminal laws, and investigative and 
prosecutorial procedures around the world. Although it has not yet managed to have all 
member states sign the convention, it represents a cooperation that had not previously 
existed. The G8 sub-group on High-Tech Crime is another large-scale international 
network that maintains network of contacts for high tech crime and an international 
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) directory, but this initiative does 
not operate within clear legal frameworks, making it difficult to cooperate (Hathaway et 
al., 2012; Helms, Constanza & Johnson, 2012).  
Global cooperation and Internet governance is problematic, yet vital for information 
security. According to Beck (2007), such cooperation “must be constructed” (p. 186), as 
he states that it will not automatically appear. However, the emerging international 
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security discourse, conferences, research centres, and so on, may suggest a wide interest 
in cooperation, without the power struggles. Here lies a role for information security 
experts to act professionally, to support governments and to inform the public (von 
Solms, 2010). Beck calls this macro-ethics: “Social groups and firms coordinate their 
activities, offer competing assessments of risk and create new identities, laws and 
international organisations in economies, society and politics” (p. 15). 
Van Dijk (2012) relates information security issues to politics and power, by discussing 
them in a book chapter with that name. He finds it remarkable that discussions about 
computer network vulnerabilities are reduced to aspects of technical security and the 
protection of confidentiality and privacy, as he states: “It is about the stability of the 
entire social system working with new ICTs” (p. 96). He argues that “the most 
fundamental values of society are at stake: social equality, democracy, freedom, safety, 
quantity and quality of social relations and the richness of the human mind” (p. 3-4). 
Maybe, as a result of the slow pace at which governments are able to organise 
themselves in this area, or as a result of the need for knowledge or even fear, many 
initiatives arise from the industry, academia and public sector organisations. As many 
organisations struggle with the security of their data individually, although sometimes 
seeking help from branch organisations, institutions, consultants or international 
standards, the calls for more regional and national cooperation are getting more 
frequent, indicating that information security is an international issue in our modern 
society and should be researched, approached and governed as such.  
Information security controls in the environment are also related to public policy on 
human interaction and the risks to privacy, freedom of speech, equality, fairness, dignity 
and other human rights. Braman (2011) sees information policy as the strategic solution 
to frame and understand the effects of the laws and regulations involving information. 
Furthermore, according to Orna (2008), information policy also provides the essential 
context for organisational information policies, which cannot be understood without it.  
Questions have been asked on how society will control these issues. On a national level, 
steering and policy are lacking (Choucri & Goldsmith, 2012; Duff, 2012), and the law is 
unclear on how to handle cyber crime (Hathaway et al., 2012; Helms et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, discussions about information ownership and liability for fraud and 
confidentiality breaches are only just beginning.  
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Duff (2012) even argues that information policy could possibly play an important role 
to protect democracy and equality by ensuring equal access to information. According 
to Duff, the state has been allowing a free market in information, which has 
implications for society and the democratic rights of individuals to access information. 
He proposes the implementation of certain political and moral principles to ensure a just 
state that prevents inequality within society (a disparity between information-rich and 
information-poor) and to ensure an equal access to and a justified storage of personal 
data. The state should represent the moral convictions of people about how they wish to 
have their selves and their digital selves treated.  
In contrast, Castells (2011) expresses his opinion against Internet policy (p.115) and his 
disappointment in networks regarding the topic of global Internet governance. He 
observes that governments are trying to regulate control over the Internet and to enforce 
that control through traditional categories of law and order. Castells argues that controls 
over the Internet are not likely to be effective when they are not directed towards 
specific corporations or organisations. He argues that the liberalisation and deregulation 
of Internet is based on capitalism and state control, and has led to the formation of 
global multimedia business networks where “business interest prevails over state 
interest” (p.116). 
Governments have to play a crucial role. Information policy is an important component 
in the deliberations of national governments and international public bodies, yet it is 
much less immediately visible than other areas of public policy (Rowlands, Eisenschitz, 
& Bawden, 2002). At its highest level, information policy comprises all the laws, 
regulations and public policies that encourage, discourage or regulate the creation, use, 
storage and communication of information. Historically, information policies have 
evolved in direct response to the emergence of specific technologies, such as print, 
telephony, radio or value added and data services. For example, as was observed by 
Porat (1977), privacy policy is often “reduced to decisions regarding control of and 
access to information technologies” (p. 211). To improve this, he states that neither the 
policy (or ideological) perspective nor the technology perspective alone can solve 
privacy problems, but that the two must work together. 
Related to information security, the process of international cyber security diplomacy 
proves to be delicate. States with a major influence on international relations such as the 
U.S., Russia, China and the European Union, considered in this connection as a ‘super 
state’, accuse each other of hacking, attacking and spying on citizens. The Internet, 
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which has traditionally been governed from a market principle and self-regulation, has 
become the centre of international power struggles. The protection of critical 
infrastructures depends now on global policy versus self-regulation and global hierarchy 
versus collaboration. The traditional laissez-faire principle now leads to discussions 
about state control, responsibility and information policy.  
Perhaps in the future, our society and politics can evolve towards or can construct a 
“global solidarity” (Beck, 2007) to protect information. A unified and adaptive global 
‘management’ of states, formed by a coalition of different groups from society and 
businesses provides an opportunity for information security experts to gain influence 
and to become part of a secure digital future. If our globalizing society can manage to 
keep trust in its people and institutions, by changing the social, moral, reputational, and 
institutional pressures as well as the security systems, then, in the future, governance 
and compliance may be substituted by ‘trustworthiness’ and security by ‘trust’ 
(Schneier, 2012). 
Information policy discussions are thriving at the time of writing of this thesis. The 
media are currently covering the alleged worldwide spying of the U.S. government on 
citizens through the Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and 
Management (PRISM). It is currently the centre of an international diplomatic row, and 
time will tell if this issue has the potential to stimulate a new wave of security 
discourse, information policy and citizen empowerment. 
2.4 Information society  
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the literature on information security has not 
made an explicit step towards an information security risk analysis outside of the 
technical, business, and legal context. It was therefore necessary to explore information 
society literature, to make sense of information security risks associated with the 
environmental subsystem. These large-scale theories help to better understand the 
relationship between technology and social changes. The goal of the following 
exploration is not to engage in the discussion about whether or not we live in an 
information society (or whether this term is the correct expression to describe modern 
ways of life), nor is it pursued to provide an extensive literature review of all the great 
society thinkers from the last century. The aim of the next sections is to point out some 
sociological discussions, often indexed under the term information society, which can 
contribute to the understanding of the social risks of weaknesses in information security, 
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as a contribution to where the traditional views run short. Three schools of thought were 
considered important sources to relate information security to society: Ulrich Beck’s 
work on the Risk Society, Manuel Castells’ analyses of Network Society, and 
sociological views on Surveillance.  
2.4.1 Risk society 
In the late 1980s, it was thought that the safety of the information society was at stake. 
Society became fragile because it was at the mercy of technology. Questions were asked 
about preserving the accumulated knowledge of mankind and protecting against the 
risks coming from mankind itself. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992, 2002a, 
2002b, 2006, 2007) was searching for answers to these problems. Beck recognised a 
paradox in modern society. He stated that risks may be increasing due to technology, 
science and industrialism rather than fading away as a result of scientific and 
technological progress. Our society is a world risk society, created by modernity. 
Although Beck’s work is not explicitly about information security, he provided thoughts 
on risks and how new risks were forming in society which can contribute to the 
discussions about information security in society.  
Beck saw risk as the new form of wealth. Modern society in his eyes did not focus any 
more on the creation and distribution of wealth, but on the creation, distribution and 
mitigation of risk. Where the industrial society was structured around economic 
inequality and wealth, the risk society is structured around risk. In Beck’s vision, risk 
affects all members of society, but only the rich are able to buy their way out of risk, by 
fleeing from affected areas, buying more expensive, safer foods, and safeguarding their 
interests against risk.  
The United Nations (2013) reported that 80% of cybercrime acts originate in organised 
and specialised activity, and the organisation of cybercrime reflects patterns of criminal 
groups in the conventional world. Risks are buyable; an attacker who has gained access 
to a company network may decide to sell the access credentials to another attacker who 
has a specific interest in this organisation. As suggested by KPMG (2012), there exists 
an underground economy that contains ‘hackers for hire’, which offer their specific 
knowledge to any party that requires it for an advanced attack. In this online 
underground economy passwords and (software) tools are traded. Furthermore, 
knowledge of risks can be seen as a resource that is being traded in, exchanged, moved, 
used and abused in our economy and politics. The threats of organised cybercriminal 
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groups and organised ideologically/politically motivated cyber groups that aim to incite 
hatred, violence, and intimidation through the Internet present a real risk to the 
economic and social stability of society.  
Risk affects social structures in several ways. Beck uses the example that risk goes over 
borders (global warming does not respect national boundaries) and can affect remote 
parts of the world, just as sheep in Wales were contaminated by radiation from 
Chernobyl. From this view, it is possible to draw a parallel to the entanglement of 
computer systems with society. For instance, when a computer virus in an email system 
starts spreading itself to all the contacts stored in that system, other computers in distant 
geographical locations can be affected, and can be disrupted as well. This becomes 
especially important when considering the risks associated with critical infrastructures. 
Much information security literature explores the security of critical infrastructures such 
as communication (Ericsson, 2010), water (Sterbenz et al., 2010) and electricity 
supplies (Farrell, Zerriffi, & Dowlatabadi, 2004). The infrastructures are vulnerable 
because they are highly dependent on networked information systems. On top of that 
they are interdependent; should one infrastructure fail because of an accident, a natural 
event, or an intentional act, it could bring down other infrastructures as well. The impact 
of such events on national and economic security and the potential effect on global 
economic areas such as banking and finance, oil production, road and air transportation 
is far reaching (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001). Risk society thinking can help to 
understand the way information security risks affect more than just the system 
component that is under review or under attack.  
In Beck’s perspective, positions in society are influenced by the means and possibilities 
to avoid risks, to cope with risks and to create risks. According to Anderson (2003) 
information security experts could potentially gain a lot of power as state security 
advisors as well as in criminal organisations when they have the knowledge to use risks 
as a weapon. For example, the Stuxnet worm has infected at least 50,000 computers, 
mostly in Iran, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. It has shown up in an Iranian nuclear 
plant in Bushehr and a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, which got some experts 
speculating that the worm was built specifically to sabotage the Iranian nuclear industry. 
It was noted by Chen and Ubu-Nimeh (2011) that the sophistication of the malware and 
the insider knowledge of the systems affected lead to agreements amongst all reports 
examining Stuxnet on the likelihood of at least one government’s involvement in its 
development.  
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Technological developments have made it possible for people to perform actions 
without being able to understand the consequences. The meltdown and explosion of the 
Chernobyl nuclear generating facility, for example, had consequences far beyond any 
emergency scenarios imagined by the engineers who designed and built the plant, 
having an impact upon not just local citizens but on entire populations across national 
borders and inter-generationally, with the incalculable cost of deformities and birth 
defects. Stuxnet affected many other networks in different countries than the intended 
targets. Information security incidents have the potential to accidentally affect many 
different assets and actors in the world.  
Beck observes a paradox of deepening scientific progress on the one hand, but greater 
risk on the other. Advances in science and technology simultaneously increase the 
technical controls over certain hazards while, at the same time, these same advances can 
lead to the emergence of global and far-reaching risks. The loss of control over these 
risks in terms of their social management potentially poses the greatest social harm and 
could threaten our very social order.  
2.4.2 Network society 
Castells’ trilogy The Information Age (1996, 1997, 1998) presents his observations and 
analysis of the society that we live in. Castells points out, without claiming to be 
exhaustive in his description, that one of the key features of society is the “networking 
logic of its basic structure” (1996, p.21). He defines a network as a set of interconnected 
nodes. These nodes can be anything: a stock exchange market; a state; a mobile phone; 
or a location. The distance (or intensity and frequency of interaction) between two 
points (or social positions) is shorter (or more frequent, or more intense) if both points 
are nodes in a network than if they do not belong to the same network. Important nodes 
absorb more relevant information and process it more efficiently. Distance (physical, 
social, economic, political, cultural) for a given point or position varies between zero 
(for any node in the same network) and infinite (for any point external to the network). 
This means that networks could be connected on a planetary scale. The boundaries 
between networks are constantly changing and these changes influence social practices 
and organisations; they could even redefine society. Social networks have always 
existed in society, but what Castells sees as revolutionary for modern times, is the 
technology. This technology enables digital communication networks and thus 
organises society to reap the benefits of new technology.  
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When exploring information security in society from Castells’ point of view, there are 
some features of the network society that are particularly relevant. Amongst these are 
the changing identity of individuals, the flexibility of employment, the power within 
networks, and globalization.  
In the network society, networks cooperate or compete with each other (Castells, 2000). 
Castells states that networks are: 
appropriate instruments for a capitalist economy based on innovation, 
globalization, and decentralized concentration; for work, workers, and firms 
based on flexibility and adaptability; for a culture of endless deconstruction and 
reconstruction; for a polity geared toward the instant processing of new values 
and public moods; and for a social organization aiming at the supersession of 
space and the annihilation of time (p. 502).  
Cooperation between networks is based on the ability to communicate between them. 
This ability depends on the existence of codes of translations and inter-operability 
between the networks and on access to connecting points (switches). “Switches 
connecting the networks (for example, financial flows taking control of media empires 
that influence political processes) are the privileged instruments of power” (p. 502). 
Competition depends on the ability to outperform or disrupt competing networks. 
Competition may also take destructive forms by disrupting the switchers of competing 
networks and by interfering with communication protocols. The inclusion or exclusion 
in networks configures the dominant processes and functions in our societies. In the 
vision of Castells, the power lies with those who decide the rules for inclusion and 
exclusion. He states that the convergence of information technologies has created a new 
material basis for these processes and “this material basis […] shapes social structure 
itself” (p. 502). 
Because organisations are networked with other organisations, they can create 
productivity growth through technology and transformation of labour. Outsourcing of 
services leads to changes in employment. Employees are flexible, change jobs more 
often and become mobile. Castells suggests that, even where the corporation is a 
transnational giant, hierarchies are being pulled down, and power is shifting to those 
information workers who operate on the networks, fixing deals here and there, working 
on a project that finds a market niche, owing more commitment to people like 
themselves than to the particular company which happens to employ them for the time 
being. Flexible workers and working conditions are created through outsourcing and 
subcontracting, facilitated by technology.  
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This observation has implications for information security. Flexible working and job-
hopping employees could impose a risk to the security of the valuable assets of an 
organisation. The diminishing of the segregation of work and private life caused by the 
use of electronic devices, could easily lead to the storage of company information on 
personal devices. These devices are taken to the home, into the social life and to the 
next employer. Furthermore, investments in security controls such as training of 
employees in security procedures and awareness are expensive and could be perceived 
by management as a waste of funds if the staff is likely to change employment soon. 
Controlling information security within the organisations of outsourcing partners, 
located in different geographical environments, in different cultures and operating under 
different laws is a challenging task.  
Castells observes that organisations operate in networks and their systems and networks 
tend to integrate. KPMG (2012) identifies an example of a typical information security 
risk in these integrated networks in the form of a chained attack. These are attacks 
performed by cyber criminals when they attack an organisation in order to gain access 
to another organisation via a trust relationship. Organisations that are attacked may not 
be the end target; they are used as a stepping-stone to get to the end goal. Furthermore, 
after or even during a security breach, the speed at which the news travels (through 
Internet, mobile phones or mass media) can quickly damage the reputation of an 
organisation or government and could even lead to quick mobilisation of groups of 
people, hacktivists or hobbyists to even further damage the information technology 
networks.  
The Internet has facilitated richer and faster communication throughout the globe. 
Citizens, organisations and governments are getting more and more connected. This 
communication is not secure, nor private, unless specific controls are used. Meanwhile, 
the knowledge and technology to intercept, access, read, steal, monitor or delete 
information from computer networks is becoming available to an increasing number of 
people, empowering them to perform attacks on computer networks (and thus on the 
social structures that they represent). Internet based systems are leading to information 
security concerns on a larger scale than ever before. According to Internet World Stats, 
in June 2012, more than one third of the world population is using the Internet. The 
Internet has been described as the “lifeblood of modern economy” (Quigley & Roy, 
2012). New Internet-related technologies will continue to emerge and trigger new 
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technology-based security problems and solutions. In Castells’ vision, the Internet is a 
tool of management of new forms of life. 
The role and influence of the mass media is changing as well, influencing political 
opinions and behaviour. Castells mentions that social groups could turn to Internet-
based mobilisation or to aggression such as hacktivism, crime and fraud. On a macro 
level, this potentially affects corporations and multinationals, governments and regions. 
Social groups can use Internet-based social media even to enable a revolution. One 
example is the eighteen day long revolution in Egypt in January 2011. Castells (2012) 
analyses that the social media not only provided a communication infrastructure, but 
also had given the public a feeling of being together, enabling them to overcome their 
fears. On top of that, Internet companies and private television channels and global 
satellite channels disconnected themselves from the media networks owned by the state. 
Therefore, the party lost access to media and lost their power to influence people 
through the media.  
2.4.3 Surveillance  
The year 2001 led to many discussions that explicitly demonstrated the integration of 
micro level security issues and macro level thinking about society. After the terrorist 
attack on U.S. targets on 11 September 2001, the discussions about the relation between 
surveillance, security and privacy increased. Surveillance studies and information 
security are closely related. Surveillance can be interpreted as physical watching, but 
much policing and intelligence surveillance is digitised. Lyon (2007) states that 
surveillance is the “focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for 
purposes of influence, management, protection or direction” (p. 14). Furthermore, he 
writes that surveillance is accepted by most people when its purposes are clear and 
linked with safety and security or when allowed by the person’s own choice (such as in 
social networks). It becomes less comfortable when personal data that was collected for 
a specific purpose (e.g. to register for a specific service or product), is used for a 
different purpose (to sell or to deny other products services).  
Lyon and Wood (2012) relate security and surveillance in a way where surveillance is a 
means, a method or practice and security is the goal or intended outcome. This may be 
true when the focus is on national security, but the relationship between information 
security and surveillance is more complex than that. Sometimes surveillance is the 
method, but from an information security perspective, it can also be the goal. 
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Furthermore, the two overlap, sometimes as similarities, sometimes as contradictory 
forces. 
A direct relationship of surveillance studies with the field of information security is 
found in the concept of identity management. Identity management entails the settings 
and strategies for access to data, systems, Internet sites or certain services, and these 
strategies overlap with physical border controls, with biometric passports and other 
means of identification and verification.  
Biometrics refers to technologies for measuring and analysing human body 
characteristics such as fingerprints, voice patterns, facial patterns or eye retinas and 
irises, used to create a certainty about a person’s identity. Jain et al. (2006) state that this 
technology can lead to cultural, societal or religious resistance. Furthermore, as argued 
by Holvast (2009), it can mean an attack on one’s privacy when the collection takes 
place without consent and without transparency about the purpose for which the data is 
used.  
Identity management in the information security field focuses on solutions to provide 
access to systems and data to only those individuals who are authorized to do so. Digital 
and biometric identity details can be tracked and used for selective disclosure of 
information and services. There are some concerns about possible use of identities for 
(price) discrimination of consumers and for social sorting. When many corporations 
simultaneously rely on such methods it reinforces social and economic inequalities 
(Lyon, 2007). Information security research into solutions for privacy-enhancing 
technologies focuses on hiding personal data during transactions, but these solutions are 
not always sufficient (Acquisiti, 2008). Another concern is that the theft of one’s digital 
identity can lead to fraud and abuse of the identity to buy products or services or even to 
commit crimes. The inconvenience and economic loss suffered by victims often 
happens without the victim’s knowledge and can take several years to straighten out. 
From the perspective of an employer there is a need to monitor and control the security 
of important business data. Traditional information security threats of malicious 
software such as spyware, keystroke loggers, backdoors and viruses are surveillance 
tools as they can be used to monitor a user’s activities and to access data stored on a 
computer. On the other hand, these surveillance tools can also be used as an 
implementation of information security to monitor employees. Measures such as 
firewalls, network traffic monitoring, audit trails, logging of user activity, logging of 
 33 
email and Internet activities are surveillance options that are embedded in most 
computer networks to prevent security incidents, to control user behaviour, and to 
benefit forensic investigations in case an incident occurs. Within organisations these are 
increasingly accepted forms of surveillance, although usually no consent is sought from 
the employees under surveillance (Lyon, 2007). This privacy-invasive software is a 
potential threat to the individual’s right to be left alone, and does not always stand in 
court as evidence in the case of employee-employer disputes.  
Another issue can be found in the physical security of the workplace. Information 
security measures in the physical environment are often implemented to perform 
surveillance of people accessing the premises (through CCTV or key logs on doors), but 
in turn these surveillance measures can lead to information security issues. An example 
is when a camera is pointed at a keypad or computer screen and as such able to oversee 
passwords and access codes. As a result, surveillance and information security can be 
opposing forces. 
The Internet provides for numerous forms of surveillance. The individual consumer 
does not always have the means to oversee the implications of their online actions. This 
is illustrated by the personal data that is shared willingly in social networking sites. 
Marketing companies create maps of social networks based on the data from these sites. 
Trottier (2012) states that these maps are then analysed to extract useful information 
such as personal interests, friendships and affiliations, wants, beliefs, thoughts, and 
activities. With these maps, social media become both a resource for and a target of 
police surveillance, intelligence services, and corporations.  
Some argue that the responsibility for the security of the personal data involved should 
lie with the providers of mobile, Internet and email services. From an information 
security perspective, these providers have to ensure that they protect this kind of 
personal data against unauthorized disclosure, damage and loss. On the other hand, they 
have to disclose it when the state or police requests it, and it is not always clear to the 
individuals involved which of their data is being requested or shared.  
The on-going development in the storage of enormous amounts of personal data and the 
possibilities of data analysis, feed discussions on how to create appropriate protection 
within the technology as well as discussions on a higher level in the organisation’s 
boardroom on how to protect privacy and avoid discrimination (Custers, Calders, 
Schermer, & Zarsky, 2013). Big Data is a problem as well as an opportunity for those 
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conducting surveillance. According to Lyon (2012), it is making surveillance less 
“about direct human relationships or even about human-organisation relationships but 
as one of a number of ways in which social relationships are increasingly mediated by 
software codes” (p 321).  
In this area, surveillance studies and information security share a problem. Privacy and 
data protection laws are inputs for information security to set boundaries for data access 
and sharing, and they are a counterweight to excessive surveillance. But these laws are 
often difficult to interpret in concrete measures, they differ in regions and compliance is 
difficult to audit. Data protection principles need to be applicable to a wide range of 
contexts and data sets, however the finer details are not defined. This leads to different 
interpretations and difficulties implementing the policy and principles into practice 
(Hoffman & Podgurski, 2007; Myers, Frieden, Bherwani, & Henning, 2008). As Lyon 
(2007) puts it: 
Globally, there should be agreements on the appropriate handling of personal 
data, not just to ensure higher levels of security or to increase the speed of 
commercial transactions, but because the issues are intrinsically important. These 
are not mere ‘business risks’ […], but matters of democratic practice, social 
justice and moral obligation. Personal data pertain to human beings whose life-
chances and choices are affected for good or ill (p. 176). 
2.5 Conceptual synthesis of the perspectives on information security  
The previous sections showed that traditional information security risk perceptions are 
limited in explaining risks that affect more than one organisation and its business, ICTs 
and staff. It was argued that the global entanglement of people, ICTs, organisations with 
cultural norms and ethics calls for risk approaches that are wider than technology or 
business risks. An information security risk is not ‘a thing’ that can be singled out and 
contained. It is partly related to perception of dangers and annoyances and norms and 
values.  
The concepts discussed in this chapter are brought together in the conceptual framework 
of the views of information security in Figure 2-1. The box in the centre of the figure 
illustrates the traditional technical line of security thinking, as discussed in sections 2.2 
and 2.3.1 of this thesis. The box shows that technical information security is the domain 
of computer science, mathematics and electronic engineering. In this view, information 
security risks are technology risks that threaten systems. These risks can be contained 
through the installation of artefacts and mechanisms and through the use of standards 
and checklists. 
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Around the centre, the growing insight from business, sociological, political and human 
theories complement the technical scope. These different streams strengthen and inspire 
the field. Information security thinking has expanded from the concept of containment 
to socio-technical complexity. This does not mean that one could replace another: the 
different perceptions are complementary to each other and all of them are needed to 
understand contemporary information security. Information security risks include the 
whole of technology risks, business risks and society risks. A technology risk (such as 
the risks that a critical infrastructure stops working because of a technical issue) could 
cause a business risk (when organisations relying on the infrastructure cannot complete 
their production). In turn these risks could cause risks to people and groups in society. 
To illustrate the disappearing boundaries around environments and systems, the box 
around the technical area has dashed lines and the text on the outside is not framed at 
all, as a symbol of the pervasiveness of information security issues.  
The outside area of Figure 2-1 is related to risks in society. As discussed in Section 2.4, 
these can be identified and better understood by studying information society discourse. 
From studying the works of information society thinkers such as Beck, Castells, van 
Dijk, and Lyon, it was identified that the scope of information security risks is global 
and infinite, through the connections in socio-technical networks. Furthermore, the risks 
can be economic (influencing stock markets), personal (identity theft, social inequalities, 
damaged social relations), political (bringing down governments, or damaging 
international relations), and have the potential to influence basic human rights (the right 
to be left alone, freedom of speech). Following information society theory, the 
conclusion is that the perception of societal information security risks is likely to be 
socially constructed by international power -and power struggles-, (lack of) public 
information policy, mass media and culture.  
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Figure 2-1 Conceptual framework of the perspectives on information security 
 
The multi-disciplinary origin of information security controls is illustrated in the green 
text in Figure 2-1. Controlling information risks affects ICT systems, networks, people, 
and social groups. Controls can take any form, such as technical artefacts, building 
security, peer pressure, ethical norms, policies, cyber diplomacy and so on. These can 
be inflicted upon elements (an ICT system, an organisation or a human) in a system by 
governments or by managers, or they can emerge as security events occur. For instance, 
the research of Coles-Kemp (2008) showed that controls constantly emerge from ad hoc 
decision-making, parallel to formal change processes and thus that security management 
can be seen as an adaptive system.  Security controls aim to create robust systems, and 
they alter themselves in response to threats. If one security incident affects a certain 
element (an ICT system, an organisation or a human), other units can respond due to 
their interdependence with the disrupted unit. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter elaborated on the socio-technical view on information security risks that 
underpins this thesis. Several schools of thought were considered and brought together 
in a conceptual framework of socio-technical information security. The framework 
guides the exploration of the risk scenarios in this thesis and indicates the different areas 
to consider when assessing information security risks. These areas include human 
factors (e.g. behaviour, motivation, ICT skills and so on) and factors from the 
environment (such as public policy, social norms and ethics, crime rates, building or 
neighbourhood security and so on). In the literature and in practice, these areas are often 
approached in isolation and information security literature that combines these areas is 
scarce. The aim of chapter 2 was to provide background information of the socio-
technical aspects of information security and to make a contribution to the knowledge of 
how it relates to information society. 
The remainder of the thesis focuses on information security in healthcare organisations 
specifically. Therefore, chapter 3 reviews the literature on practical issues with 
information security in healthcare. The literature review seeks to answer why controls 
from society and management, such as governance and policy, and technology or 
process focused risk assessments do not always deliver satisfactory results.  
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3 Information security risks in healthcare 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on information security risks and controls in 
healthcare. It is shown that the foundations for risk controls, governance and policy, are 
suffering from inconsistency and from a low acceptance level. Furthermore, it is shown 
that risk assessments are based on the traditional philosophy of contained systems, 
which are not fit for the modern complexity of healthcare. This causes a gap in 
knowledge about the actual information security risks and these are further explored by 
examining issues with confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. It is 
concluded that there is a gap in knowledge about unwanted information security events. 
Furthermore, the proposed controls for these security events are suffering from issues as 
well. Examples are given of how this situation can lead to public loss of trust in 
healthcare, financial loss, discrimination, constraints on patient empowerment, unclear 
and unfair information ownership, and issues with quality of care, billing and patient 
safety. 
3.2 Overview of the literature search 
As was stated in chapter 2, information security should be studied from various angles. 
Therefore, literature databases from different knowledge areas were searched. These 
areas included health, social science and computing. A more detailed description of the 
research method and the literature databases can be found in chapter 4 (research 
methods) and Table 4.4. 
The literature review focused on more recent literature, however some older 
publications were traced through references in these works and added when deemed 
relevant or when they appeared to be influential. Many publications cover models and 
frameworks for technical security policies or the development of technological artefacts. 
However, in line with the scope of this thesis, only publications were selected that were 
relevant for the research question.  
The literature review focused on the following topics: 
1. Information security controls (governance and information security policy). 
2. Information security risk assessment methods. 
3. Issues and risks to the information security goals of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. 
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The search terms were based on these topics and related terminology. The field of 
information security is very wide and interdisciplinary. During the literature survey, it 
appeared to be easy to get distracted by related topics, and as a consequence, to get lost 
in the enormity of related issues and topics. The framework illustrated in Figure 3-1 
supported and structured the literature review. The numbers in Figure 3-1 relate to the 
section numbers in this thesis where the different topics are discussed. 
 
Figure 3-1 Literature search topics 
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3.3 Information security governance 
Recent influences from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and the Basel Framework for 
internal control in banking (1998) put corporate governance, with requirements for 
accountability, internal control and (operational) risk management, to the fore. 
Governance requirements made top management and boards of directors personally 
accountable for the ICT systems on which they base their planning and decisions.  
These developments led to the development of the field of information security 
governance (Fitzgerald, 2012; Moulton & Coles, 2003; von Solms & von Solms, 2008). 
The difference between governance frameworks with the traditional ISMS frameworks 
is that information security governance has a strong focus on fraud prevention (von 
Solms, 2006), information security economics (Anderson, 2001; Anderson & Moore, 
2006, 2009; Schneier, 2008) and accountability (IT Governance Institute, 2006).  
Governance models treat information as a business asset with a monetary value, like 
other assets such as money, human resources and facilities. The international standard 
ISO 27002 states that “Information Security is the protection of information from a 
wide range of threats in order to ensure business continuity, minimize business risk, and 
maximize return on investments and business opportunities”. The Department of Health 
in the UK (2012) follows this business-like approach by stating that information must 
be seen as “core to the business of health and care” (p. 15). The Department sees that 
information has the potential to improve quality of care, decision-making and 
efficiency. This potential can only be met if information is available to those who need 
it and when they need it; if the information is correct and complete; and if it is 
communicated in line with national and organisational policy. 
The economic balance between investments in security controls and the potential risks 
they are likely to cover is now one of the most influential factors for management 
decisions. In modern management, information security incidents need to be prevented 
in order to prevent liability claims, but the investment in security mechanisms should be 
proportional to the potential risks. Anderson (2003) proposes a new definition of 
information security: “a well-informed sense of assurance that information risks and 
controls are in balance” (p. 310).  
Information security in the NHS in the UK is integrated in the information governance 
framework. The governance model for the NHS, as stated by the Department of Health, 
includes the provision of information to patients, patient consent, records management 
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(including paper records), information security and confidentiality, and information 
quality (Donaldson & Walker, 2004). As a part of their governance activities, NHS 
organisations are expected to establish and manage information governance 
programmes and to develop and maintain corporate or local policies. The local policy 
should address the information security components such as risk management methods 
and incident identification; recording; reporting; resolution; and management 
arrangements. The ultimate aim is “to demonstrate that an organisation can be trusted to 
maintain the confidentiality and security of personal information” (Health and Social 
Care information centre, 2013).  
A key element of governance is accountability. Top management is seen as the 
ultimately responsible entity for the wellbeing of the organisation, and should thus 
accept the responsibility for information security as part of corporate governance (von 
Solms & von Solms, 2008). Governance requires senior directors’ understanding of the 
risks and the opportunities and to gain assurance that these are properly and 
continuously managed. In contrast to that, lack of top management involvement has 
been suggested in the past to be one of the biggest drawbacks in obtaining effective 
information security in organisations (Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, & Wei, 2003; Kotulic & 
Clark, 2004; Whittaker, 1999).  
Furthermore, accountability is a hard requirement to fulfil after the erosion of 
organisational perimeters. In a situation of networked organisations, it is hard to prove 
for top management that they are in control of the business assets that are outsourced to 
business partners, vendors, or subcontractors. In the words of Colwill (2009):  
New security threats emerge from these third parties, which are neither 
completely outsiders nor completely insiders. A single outsourcing transaction 
can change the status of many hundreds of ‘outsiders’ to ‘insiders’ and may blur 
the distinction between a company’s employees and third party personnel: they 
may be granted logical and physical access levels on par with an organisation’s 
full time employees (p. 190).  
Healthcare governance models tend to limit themselves to privacy of patient data 
(Department of Health and Human Services, 2013; Stahl, Doherty, & Shaw, 2012). 
However, information security in general is not limited to personal data. Corporate data 
such as copyright, trade secrets, news under embargo, intellectual property, strategic 
business information or price sensitive financial data are within the scope of 
information security. The ISO 27799:2008 for Healthcare Information Security 
Management focuses on personal health information, but identifies other data that needs 
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protection, such as pseudonymized data; statistical and research data; clinical/medical 
data, including clinical decision support data (e.g. data on adverse drug reactions); data 
on health professionals, staff and volunteers; information related to public health 
surveillance; audit trail data; and system security data for health information (ISO/IEC, 
2008 p. 7).  
The concept of leadership and governance is relatively new in health, and there is little 
consensus on how to define, model or measure stewardship of the health system 
(Brinkerhoff & Bossert, 2008). Case studies, action research or other research on the 
effects, results or application of information security governance frameworks in 
individual healthcare organisations could not be retrieved by the researcher nor by the 
consulted topic librarian, suggesting a gap in knowledge in this area.  
Outside of the healthcare literature, information security researchers have investigated 
various dimensions of information security governance. Steinbart et al. (2012) suggest 
that there are three streams in such research. One stream of research has examined ways 
to improve end user compliance with an organisation’s information security policies. 
The second and third streams focus more on economic issues such as the value of 
investments in information security and stock market reactions to information security 
initiatives and incidents. They acknowledge a gap in research into operational issues.  
Although there are still unanswered questions about the effects of governance, 
organisations are trying to control information security risks from an operational 
perspective. For this reason, the research literature on two specific operational issues of 
information security governance in healthcare was further investigated: information 
security policy and information security risk assessment methods.  
3.4 Information security policy 
An information security policy is a specific policy, which states management 
commitment to security, a definition of information security, and sets out the 
organisation’s approach to managing information security. The international standard 
for information security management (ISO/IEC 27002:2005) specifies that it should 
contain a brief explanation of the security policies, principles, standards and compliance 
requirements of particular importance to the organisation, for example: 
1. compliance with legislative and contractual requirements; 
2. security education requirements; 
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3. prevention and detection of viruses and other malicious software; 
4. business continuity management; 
5. consequences of security policy violations; 
6. a definition of general and specific responsibilities for information security 
management, including reporting security incidents; 
7. references to documentation which may support the policy, e.g. more detailed 
security policies and procedures for specific information systems or security 
rules users should comply with. 
For healthcare organisations additional requirements are identified in the ISO 
27799:2008 standard. The healthcare information security policy should contain 
statements on: 
1. the need for health information security;  
2. the goals of health information security;  
3. compliance scope; 
4. legislative, regulatory, and contractual requirements, including those for the 
protection of personal health information and the legal and ethical 
responsibilities of health professionals to protect this information;  
5. arrangements for notification of information security incidents, including a 
channel for raising concerns regarding confidentiality, without fear of blame or 
recrimination. 
The information security policy is seen as one of the most important measures to 
prevent security incidents. However, many reports of incidents or security breaches still 
occur, suggesting the policies are suffering from some deficiencies (Doherty & Fulford, 
2005; HIMSS Analytics, 2012; Information Commissioner's Office, 2010). The 
literature survey revealed that there are a number of common themes within policy 
issues. These themes are the style and wording of policies; support and feedback; 
training; norms and ethics; and national policy.  
3.4.1 Style and wording 
One suggested cause of problems with policy is the style and wording of the 
information security policies. Some policies can be as long over a hundred pages and in 
a technical writing style and they are likely to be ignored  (Gold, 2010). A shorter 
policy gets across the message about the need for information security to a much wider 
audience than a larger guide would. 
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Stahl et al. (2012) performed a critical discourse analysis of 25 NHS information 
security policies. They used a methodology to identify truth, legitimacy, sincerity and 
clarity. In their analysis, they looked for evidence of ambiguity, confusion or lack of 
explanation, which might ultimately make it difficult for a policy’s messages to be 
clearly and uniformly interpreted by members of staff. It became clear that the there was 
a significant amount of ambiguity, in particular regarding the policies’ objectives and 
intended targets, as well as significant evidence of the use of jargon and unfamiliar 
language. Examples of such jargon are “self-regulatory practices” or “best practice” 
(p.86). The use of obscure and technical jargon could potentially stabilise existing 
dominant management hierarchies. Furthermore, they found that many of the NHS 
policy documents are written with an ideological undertone that management has the 
right to tell other members of the organisation how to behave, to implement surveillance 
(in order to check on that behaviour) and to sanction those who do not comply. For 
example, they found that it was common to state that failure to adhere to the policy 
“may result in disciplinary action or dismissal or lead to involvement of police service” 
(p.85).  
However, as was found by Guo and Yuan (2012), sanctions do not positively influence 
the information security behaviour of staff. Their research into the effectiveness of 
sanctions on information security violations found that a policy enforcing strategy has 
limited effect. They found that enforcing becomes non-significant when an influencing 
strategy is used. Employees can be educated to hold themselves accountable for their 
actions. The authors suggest that there should be a focus on the link between 
employees’ actions and business risks. Another tactic is to use role models who 
understand security issues and help to advocate policy compliant behaviour. Guo and 
Yuan furthermore discovered that the more senior the position of an employee, the more 
likely this person is to violate security rules. This conclusion may indicate an interesting 
topic for future research, as information security governance is expected to be driven by 
senior executives. 
In terms of wording, it appears difficult to maintain a consistent and clear writing style. 
Organisations often use their own words to describe what information security means to 
them. For instance, the Information Governance Toolkit from the NHS defines 
information security as: “Protecting information and information systems from 
unauthorised access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification or destruction” 
(Department of Health, 2010b). Yet, the same toolkit also publishes a code of practice 
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for Information Security Management, in which the definition is: “The preservation of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information; in addition, other properties 
such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability   can also be 
involved” (Department of Health, 2007). This exhibits that even within organisations it 
can be difficult to maintain a consistent and understandable point of view. 
Stahl et al. (2012) conclude their analysis of NHS policies with a number of 
recommendations to the design of information security policies. They state that the most 
important lesson that authors of policies must learn is that their policies must be locally 
derived and created, with participation of the largest group of readers and users. It is 
recommended that policies use accessible language and terminology and that employees 
are provided with a separate set of specific guidelines. Concrete examples of issues are 
helpful to demonstrate the relevance of the policies. Finally, technical content for 
specialist audiences should be kept in separate documents. 
3.4.2 Support, feedback and training 
Renaud and Goucher (2012) investigated how employees in a health board perceived 
and experienced information governance policies. They interviewed well-intentioned 
employees who may behave insecurely due to reasons other than deliberate malice. The 
research found a number of key issues. Staff often felt subjugated by policies. The 
policies were created without any opportunities for staff to influence the content or to 
provide feedback. Staff felt powerless in the face of sometimes operationally difficult 
policy directives. Furthermore, they felt a lack of support in implementing policy, 
regardless of how operationally incompatible the policy might be. Motivations to 
comply with the policy and to complete tasks effectively and efficiently sometimes 
conflicted. The researchers proposed a mediation through recognition and rewards for 
secure behaviour, the implementation of an incident response process, communication 
between policy makers and operational staff during the creation of policy, and to ensure 
that policy is fair and equal to all members of staff.  
Clinical staff tends to prioritise the quality and continuity of patient care over the 
following of time-consuming security protocols. The Australian researchers Fernando 
and Dawson (2009) investigated how a variety of healthcare workers, nurses and 
doctors practice privacy and security activities in their routines. They found that privacy 
and security practices are negatively influenced by lack of training, amount of time 
consumed to perform the security procedure, poor configurations in information 
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systems, lack of integration between information systems, scepticism about the 
information systems and the people who deliver support, and the natural healthcare 
environment (such as outdated building structure and fittings, complex regulatory and 
budget issues). Governance, rules to follow and ICT security settings are perceived as 
an increase of the workload of clinicians and cause scepticism and workarounds.  
Hedström et al. (2011) compared information security policy with staff behaviour in a 
Swedish hospital and found examples of how staff modify or ignore the prescribed rules 
in their daily work if they thought that the procedures were not efficient or did not 
provide enough accessibility to information for their colleagues. Furthermore, they 
concluded that physicians or counsellors do not always write all confidential details in 
the patient record, as they prioritised the patient’s privacy over availability and integrity 
of information.  
A review of 54 papers about the implementation of data protection policy in healthcare 
by De Lusignan et al. (2007) revealed that policies may be misinterpreted or necessary 
actions not taken if they are not specific, clear or directly relevant or if it does not 
address the specific tasks of the institution. The researchers state that when the finer 
details of the data protection principles are not defined, this leads to different 
interpretations and difficulties implementing the principles and policy into practice. 
Furthermore, they found that organisational policies also tend to get in trouble when 
organisational structures change. It can take months before a policy is updated to reflect 
the new structure, roles and responsibilities and thus leaves the organisation at risk. 
Security procedures need to be embedded into every practice, as they found that staff 
will not support inconvenient security controls. Although staff understands and accepts 
data protection principles, many do not accept personal responsibility for data security. 
The researchers indicate that staff training, as a means to increase awareness and 
acceptance of responsibility, shows variable successes. Increasing knowledge alone is 
not enough and some researchers suggest that establishing social norms and involving 
staff in the development of policy is more effective to encourage implementation.  
Training and awareness are often seen as key to influence staff behaviour and policy 
compliance. In her Ph.D. thesis on information security management systems, Coles-
Kemp (2008) argues that organisational learning is an on-going process and all the 
information security management processes contribute to this learning activity. 
Traditional information security training is a form of single-loop learning or 
maintenance training: concerned with how best to achieve goals and objectives. It plays 
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an important role in ensuring that an organisation knows how to perform procedures and 
follows policies. However, she found that more control over security is possible when 
staff has more information about updates within the organisation and its processes. 
Coles-Kemp suggests that reflexivity or double-loop learning, enables the application of 
a learning situation back to the individual’s context and thereby challenge the user’s 
perceptions that have been formed and is therefore fundamental for information 
security.  
Healthcare staff as computer users and their information processing tasks and skills is 
widely researched in the areas of medical informatics, health informatics and health 
information management. Healthcare staff needs to “be information able as information 
is at the heart of the clinical process” (Abbott et al., 2004, p. 77). Computing skills are a 
significant factor in the acceptance and efficiency of use of information technology in 
healthcare (Ward et al., 2008). Staff have to remember security procedures and 
mechanisms, such as locking their screens, password changes, password complexity and 
not discussing patient cases in front of others. Security skills have become important 
with the introduction of computing technology, as well as under the influence of the 
empowerment of patients demanding secure treatment of their personal data. The 
attitudes, norms, values and security knowledge have become an important aspect of the 
skill set of a healthcare employee. Education in the use of IT for health care 
professionals at undergraduate and postgraduate or continuing education levels is 
identified as an important aspect influencing a positive attitude in health care staff to 
information technology (Ward et al., 2008) and this effect may stretch into a positive 
attitude towards information security if this is included in educational programmes. 
The technological developments in healthcare have not only led to a change in the 
requirements for the skill set of healthcare practitioners, they have also led to the 
development of the new profession of health informatics. According to the NHS Careers 
website, it is estimated that health informatics is one of the fastest growing professional 
areas within healthcare since its emergence in the last 25 years. Health informatics is 
concerned with the development and improvement of the organisation and management 
of information. The aim is to improve the well-being and quality of care for patients, 
their families and carers, and the general public, through the use of information and 
ICTs (Bath, 2008). Job-titles in this area vary and include: chief information officer; 
clinical informaticist; information management staff; health records and patient 
administrators; knowledge management staff; clinical informatics; or project manager. 
 48 
All these professionals are potential advocates of good security behaviour and could 
function as the role models such as those suggested above by Guo & Yuan or De 
Lusignan et al. 
3.4.3 Norms and ethics 
The literature review of De Lusignan et al. (2007) revealed a strong emphasis in 
research on the development of technological measures to implement legislation. 
However, they suggest that a multi-faceted approach – looking at organisation, 
personnel and professional issues – may be more effective. The authors advocate the 
development of an enforceable code of practice for health informatics professionals to 
enhance trust and take-up of data protection policies, although they recognise that 
different social contexts and ethical viewpoints between countries may make it 
complicated to establish this.  
Others also found that it is potentially more likely that employees follow the 
information security rules if these match their own normative beliefs and if their peers 
are following the rules (Herath & Rao, 2009). The security policies and procedures of 
an organisation embed underlying assumptions and beliefs about how to manage 
information security (von Solms & von Solms, 2004). In other words, security policies 
and regulations are expressions of values, as well as sets of instructions (Hedström et 
al., 2011).  
In this light, it has been suggested that staff should be allowed more involvement when 
selecting controls and discussing policies to balance the quality of care with the security 
of information. Stahl et al. (2012) suggest that such an approach may contribute to the 
emancipation of information security managers and users and the effectiveness of the 
policies. 
3.4.4 National information policy 
Issues with policies do not solely exist within the internal context of organisations. 
Corporate policies are vulnerable to legislative changes requiring compliance (Orna, 
2008). Legislation and national policy relevant to information society issues, amongst 
which is information security, is referred to as information policy.  
According to Orna (2008), governments of all kinds encounter problems in the field of 
national information policy, caused by power relations, the nature of information itself 
and economic decisions. Orna states that information policies tend to focus on isolated 
 49 
topics such as copyright, intellectual property, data protection, or digital inclusion. This 
fragmentation has left some questions unanswered and new technological developments 
have raised additional issues.  
An analysis of information policymaking in the United Kingdom by Buckley Owen, 
Cooke, & Matthews (2012) found that the government has no appetite for further 
bureaucracy and for a single information policy. The researchers interviewed 
policymakers at the highest level of responsibility. If was found from the interviews that 
there is no requirement for a national information policy, but instead there is the desire 
for a greater degree of coordination between policies to ensure that they do not conflict.  
Meanwhile, the opponents of information policy state that information policy may have 
an unintended negative effect on IT innovation and research (Kaiser, 2006; McGowan 
et al., 2012; Ness, 2007). For instance, existing long-running research into trends and 
developments of diseases in a certain population is now obstructed by new data 
protection legislation that does not allow the researchers to continue to analyse the data 
they have been using for many years. Ness (2007) found in his survey amongst clinical 
scientists that privacy rules were adding uncertainty, costs and delay to health research 
and that this makes research more difficult.  
It has been suggested that the essence of political and social democracy is at stake 
without normative information policy (Duff, 2008, 2012). An example is the digital 
divide between the information rich and information poor, caused not only by the 
geographical spread of available communication technologies, but also by the socio-
economic status of social groups and individuals. Duff argues that policy must address 
these social structures as well.  
Information policy cuts through sectors such as health, environment, or education. In 
this respect, the current state of information policies within organisations and businesses 
is directly influenced by the state of the public or national information policy. In 
contrast to the inter-sectorial character of information policy, the Department of Health 
published a sector specific information policy for health and social care in 2012. The 
policy applies to England and sets out the ambitions to realise the potential benefits of 
information to improve health and care. The policy states that by 2015, it should be 
normal for patients to have online access to their health and care services records and 
personalised information to improve their health. Individuals will be able to take part in 
decisions about their care in a partnership with professionals. Care records will become 
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the source for all services and to inform research. Confidentiality and security of 
personal data are promised throughout the policy: 
NHS and other care services will share the information about me with all those 
who need to look after me (with my appropriate consent), will protect my data 
and respect my confidentiality (p. 14, point 1.9). 
Background data about us which can be used to improve our own care – and 
which, when held securely and with appropriate confidentiality safeguards in 
place, […] will, wherever possible, be recorded once within our care records and 
shared across our care (p. 77, point 5.11). 
We have a right to use your data, and a corresponding responsibility to […] take 
all reasonable steps to protect your confidentiality (p. 84, point 5.39). 
The report does not explain how the confidentiality and security will be approached or 
what the exact rules are. Confidentiality is related only to sharing data amongst and 
between health and care providers. The report promotes less bureaucracy in that respect: 
Concerns over security and privacy issues […] can lead to a culture that is 
overly risk averse and reluctant to share information at all, even where it would 
improve our care. The NHS Future Forum work has heard the clear message that 
not sharing information has the potential to do more harm than sharing it (p. 32, 
point 3.9). 
The trend for more open records appears to be international, since Brussels is also 
consulting on its new Data Protection Regulations, which are built on the utilitarian 
principle of the greatest benefit for the greatest number (Wyatt, 2012). The UK 
government is furthermore promoting the idea of Open Data; to have data accessible, 
without limitations based on user identity or intent and free of restrictions on use or 
redistribution (Cabinet Office, 2012).  
The current state of this information policy does not give grounds for organisations to 
implement an information security policy and to reach a state of compliance. The 
tendency to less bureaucracy and the focus on confidentiality only (and ignoring other 
information goals such as availability and integrity), does not help to improve the 
difficulties with organisational information security policy. The national policy does not 
articulate any clear answers or responsibilities for security issues. In fact, it is stated that 
when data protection and related issues get complicated, “there will be consultation with 
the Information Commissioner” (p.102), shifting the responsibility and final decision 
making entirely towards the hands of the Information Commissioner. 
Furthermore, the policy implies that in the end, the quality of care and the success of the 
policy is the responsibility of the patient and service users themselves: 
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Success will also rely on us as citizens and services users demanding better 
quality information, greater transparency, conveniences and experiences that 
meet our expectations of a 21
st
 century health and care system (p. 15, point 
1.18). 
The policy does not further explore how citizens are supported to express their demands 
and what these expectations are. 
The Department of Health expects that local health and social care organisations ensure 
they have appropriate systems in place to use and manage information. Details on how 
to protect the security of health and care data are not provided and for further support 
the document refers to the NHS Information Governance toolkit website, which 
contains examples of how local NHS organisations implemented policies and 
procedures.  
Other types of important information which should fall in the scope of information 
security and thus in the scope of information policy are not mentioned in the policy. 
These types of information include: employee records; intellectual property; software 
licences; financial data; press releases under embargo; information regarding criminal 
investigations; and so on. Furthermore, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales are not in 
scope of the Department’s information policy, and they have not published a specific 
integrated strategy for health information.  
3.5 Specific healthcare information security issues 
The ISO/IEC 27000:2009 defines information security as the preservation of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. These three elements are often referred to as 
the CIA-triad. If one of these requirements is not met, there is an unwanted or 
unexpected event going on, which could compromise the quality and continuity of care.  
Appari and Johnson (2010) asserted in their literature survey of healthcare information 
security research, that despite a growing stream of research on information security in 
general, only very limited amount of research has focused on studying information 
security risks in the healthcare sector. At first sight, this statement seems true when the 
term information security or risk is used as a search term. However, within healthcare, 
the CIA-triad is heavily discussed and researched under different terminology and 
within related topics. For instance, confidentiality has a relationship with research topics 
such as information sharing, data mining and authorised disclosure. Integrity is related 
to information quality and safety of health information technology, and availability is 
related to access to knowledge and patient records, information ownership, 
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infrastructure resilience and storage of data. When literature searches are expanded with 
these terms, a large body of research from different academic fields becomes available.  
Some authors suggest that the CIA-triad is limiting the perspective, is out-dated, and 
that it should be expanded with other elements. For instance, Parker (1998) argues that 
the CIA-triad is “dangerously incomplete” (p. 213) and that it should be expanded with 
possession or control, authenticity and utility, “or else criminals might find out about 
vulnerabilities that weren’t thought of” (p. 213). Others suggest expansion with 
characteristics such as responsibility, personal integrity, trust and ethicality (Dhillon & 
Backhouse, 2000); authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability 
(ISO/IEC, 2009); or privacy, identification, authentication, authorisation and 
accountability (Whitman & Mattord, 2012).  
Conversely, these extensions are confusing. The additional elements tend to become a 
mixture of security goals, characteristics and solutions. For example authentication is a 
technical mechanism, and privacy is a human and constitutional right or freedom, which 
refers to people and not to information. Furthermore, authorisation is not an aspect of 
information, but related to a process that limits access to data, which in turn leads to 
confidentiality and availability of information. This diversity in attempts to create a new 
set of information requirements is perhaps related to the different conceptions of 
information security that were discussed in chapter 2. Depending on the perspective of 
the security researcher or practitioner, different information goals are pursued.  
The next sections describe issues with confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information in healthcare.  
3.5.1 Issues with confidentiality 
Confidentiality in health care is a legal obligation that is derived from statutory and case 
law as well as forming part of the duty of care to patient. It is a requirement within 
professional codes of conduct and it must be included in NHS employment contracts as 
a specific issue linked to disciplinary procedures (Beech, 2007). Patients have the right 
to be able to trust healthcare practitioners and should not be deterred from seeking 
treatment for fear that their personal information may be disclosed without authorisation 
or consent.  
A large amount of healthcare information security research focuses on confidentiality in 
the context of Data Protection. Smith & Eloff identified in 1999 that the various data 
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protection acts that had been issued internationally still left some unsolved legal issues. 
They expressed their worries about the lack of uniform policies and legislation, security 
issues with data sharing across the web and access control to patient data. They 
suggested that legal issues would become a primary research category in the future. 
However, almost a decade later, it was found that research focused mainly on technical 
measures to implement data protection legislation in healthcare organisations (de 
Lusignan et al., 2007). This section further explores more recent literature on the issues 
with confidentiality and information sharing. 
The principle of data protection originated within the European Convention on Human 
Rights (1950), which gives individuals and their families the right of privacy, as well as 
suggesting the circumstances in which it may be appropriate for information to be 
shared. Data protection principles need to be applicable to a wide range of situations 
and data sets, however, the finer details are not defined. This leads to different 
interpretations and difficulties implementing the policy and the principles into practice 
(Hoffman & Podgurski, 2007; Myers et al., 2008). In contrast, discussions have arisen 
about whether or not the right to communicate and the right for citizens to access 
information should be added as a basic human right (International Telecommunication 
Union, 2003).  
In many countries it is a requirement of the data protection legislation that the 
processing of personal data is both lawful and fair. It can mean an attack on one’s 
privacy when the collection takes place without consent and without transparency about 
the purpose for which the data is used (Holvast, 2009). Sometimes an ethical dilemma 
occurs between maintaining a patient’s confidentiality, and disclosing information in 
certain circumstances (Beech, 2007; van der Linden et al., 2009). These circumstances 
can be necessary when there is a vital interest at stake of the person involved. Other 
situations may arise when information is available in connection with crimes, children, 
or vulnerable adults, and when failing to disclose information may expose an individual 
to risk of death or serious harm. In a situation like this, the healthcare practitioner needs 
to choose between law and ethics. Some of the medical professions issue ethical codes 
with guidelines, but not all staff working in or for healthcare organisations are subject to 
those codes (e.g. IT staff with access to databases for the purposes of maintenance and 
support have potential access to all data, without being subject to any ethical codes). 
Another dilemma arises when data from a patient’s medical record is shared for the 
advancement of knowledge. Whilst this has the potential for increasing medical 
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knowledge and improving the provision of healthcare, the use of data is not without its 
complications. Although the data held in databases may be anonymised, if a large 
number of detailed variables are collected, or when there are rarely occurring conditions 
included (e.g. heart transplant), it may be possible to link the data back to individual 
patients. Consequently, anonymised data is still subject to data protection principles (de 
Lusignan et al., 2007). Some scholars argue that it is not possible to completely delink 
patients’ identities from their health information for several reasons such as the 
discovery of errors or irregularity in care provision, which require identification of the 
patient for corrective follow-up care (Appari & Johnson, 2010).  
Patient consent is defined and interpreted differently in different countries. In general, it 
means that patients must give permission for the processing of their personal data. 
Different consent models exists, such as informed consent, implied consent, express 
consent, general consent with specific denials or general denial with specific consent 
(Mohammad, 2010). Truly informed consent requires that individuals know and 
understand the contents of the record. However, not all patients are competent to do so, 
and this requires an ethical security structure or appropriate substitute consent (Kluge, 
2004, 2008). Furthermore, patients often have no real jurisdiction over who sees their 
medical history and may not understand the true implications of the disclosed 
information. 
When perceived risks of privacy or security breaches increase, patients might avoid care 
(Myers et al., 2008). Brann and Matson (2004) discovered from the literature about this 
topic that: “Disclosure of personal information shared with a health care provider in 
confidence can cause serious hardships for the patient. Many patients experience 
discrimination, economic devastation, or social stigma as a result of confidentiality 
breaches” (p. 230). 
Health care organisations face challenging projects when they are bringing data 
protection and electronic health records systems together. Confidentiality is often 
compromised when transmitting data via networks or over the Internet. The benefits of 
technology versus confidentiality are another conflicting area. Medical record 
transmission via computers increases the potential for unauthorised exposure of 
classified medical information to third persons. ICT experts would say that it is easier to 
control access to computerised records as there are more possibilities for audit trails and 
access control, but the translation of legal requirements into access control models has 
proven difficult.  
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Another aspect is that data storage is getting more and more outsourced to third parties 
who can provide service against lower cost. This leads to information security 
uncertainty. The third party can be located in other countries, and patient data may only 
be stored in countries that provide adequate privacy protection. Furthermore, the 
physical distance of third parties make it difficult to audit and control the quality of their 
security measures to protect the data and systems, and to adequately delete the data 
when it is no longer needed. New types of services provided by these third parties, such 
as cloud computing, make it even harder to keep track of where data is stored and how 
the security is controlled.  
Confidentiality could lead to complications when patients use health portals or social 
networking sites for specific health issues. A person’s cyber identity can become 
essential for bonding with other patients or physicians. But the Internet is not a private 
club and posting personal data online is not automatically protected. This can lead to 
issues when personal details are abused. Health care providers are becoming a primary 
target for data fraud and identity theft (Kroll Fraud Solutions, 2010). The reasons for 
this are that both personal identifying information and health information are collected 
and stored in these facilities. There is often more data in one record than in other 
sources such as banks and schools. The value of a full identity profile, such as can be 
found in a medical record, could sell in the underground for $20 (RSA, 2010). In the 
U.S., these medical identities can be used to sell to people who use it to get medical care 
or prescription drugs (Johnson, 2009). The inconvenience and economic loss suffered 
by victims often happens without the victim’s knowledge and can take several years to 
correct. 
3.5.2 Issues with integrity 
Integrity as an aspect of information security implies the safeguarding against 
unauthorised modification of information. Security practitioners tend to focus on the 
part that says unauthorised, by developing and implementing access and authorisation 
models. However, these solutions aim to protect confidentiality and not the faulty 
modification of information (by user or system errors) and lack of data accuracy that all 
can lead to quality, billing and safety issues. For example, a national survey in 2003 of 
U.S. medical records managers found that 4-7% of the records had errors that resulted 
in over and under-reimbursement of billing claims (Lorence, 2003). Another example is 
that in the U.S., between 2008 to 2010, 11% of critical incidents involving healthcare 
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information technology were associated with patient harm (Magrabi, Ong, Runciman, & 
Coiera, 2011).  
Information integrity means maintaining and assuring the accuracy and consistency of 
data over its entire life-cycle and is defined as the “representational faithfulness of the 
information to the condition or subject matter being represented by the information” 
(Boritz, 2005). It is a requirement of the Data Protection Act to keep personal data 
accurate and up to date.  
Traditional paper based medical records can become inaccurate in a number of ways, 
including backdating, fraudulent entries, erasures, or other modifications. Anyone who 
has access to the paper record can remove pages, add entries, erase or otherwise tamper 
with authentic entries. Health information processing systems and technology have the 
possibility to improve the integrity of medical records. On the other side, these systems 
and technology introduce a new type of technology-induced and human related errors. 
The ability to make changes to an electronic record depends upon the rights assigned to 
a user. Users with data modification privileges can generally add, delete, or modify data 
or entire records.  
Information access control models and solutions are strongly related to the aspects of 
confidentiality and availability. Abuse of authorisations with the intent to modify 
information in a patient record is imaginable, for instance, when staff want to cover up 
their mistakes. However, most inaccuracies and inconsistencies occur due to incorrect 
use of systems, data entry errors, or system errors. 
Information integrity and system usability are strongly related. A study of the 
implementation of a computerised physician order entry (CPOE) system, found that 
users create workarounds when encountering usability problems with the system 
(Niazkhani et al., 2011). These workarounds influence the integrity of the data. For 
instance, it was found that when the system is unavailable at the time a decision needs 
to be made, or when an order entry needs to be placed, the user starts to rely on memory 
about the patient or check paper notes they made during rounds. Other issues were 
printer problems, miscommunication of orders and ideas between nurses and doctors, or 
lack of mobile computer devices or usability issues of the system. The staff often fell 
back to manual and paper based means. These workarounds potentially lead to 
mistakes, for example with drug prescriptions or information interpretation errors. 
Although most of the workarounds were made with the intention of maintaining a 
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smooth workflow or to ensure patient safety, in certain instances these workarounds 
burden providers with extra time and effort or endanger patient safety. The researchers 
recommend system implementers and evaluators to pay closer attention to recognizing 
and addressing workflows and workarounds and to design strategies to lessen the 
number of disruptions and their possible negative consequences.  
Information integrity has also strong relations with data quality and information systems 
safety. Appari and Johnson (2010) suggest that national policy and standardisation 
initiatives to improve healthcare information technology (HIT) design, development, 
maintenance and use processes could be beneficial to data quality and safety. 
Magrabi et al. (2013) compared the national HIT safety initiatives in seven countries. 
They demonstrated that there are gaps in the safety initiatives for HIT systems. National 
initiatives tend to focus on software for health professionals. Only a small subset of 
software is legally required to be safe in certain circumstances. EHRs and CPOE are 
seen to be outside this context. For these systems, standardisation is increasing, but this 
standardisation does not include safety aspects. The researchers found that England had 
the most comprehensive safety management programme for unregulated software, 
incorporating safety assurance based on standards for risk management and user 
interface design, with national incident monitoring. However, they state, the 
effectiveness is not known. They conclude that the safety of the majority of all types of 
HIT is not being explicitly addressed in most nations. The design phase of information 
systems is seen as crucial to deliver integrity. Their advice is that system developers 
should gain a better understanding of the workflows and users’ requirements to prevent 
workarounds. 
Kushniruk et al. (2013) reviewed national efforts to improve health information system 
safety in Canada, the U.S. and England. They state that data errors may arise from 
different phases of design; development; and implementation as well as the use of HIT, 
and are often only detected once systems are deployed within the real environment. 
They express the concern that the level of quality and safety associated with system use 
is highly variable, with calls being made for improved design and development 
processes, risk management, the need for reporting systems and new regulations related 
to ensuring system safety to maximize the benefits of HIT. The researchers compare the 
national policy initiatives between the three countries. They conclude that although the 
national healthcare systems differ, the underlying problems appear similar. Issues with 
relationships to vendors, error reporting, education, classification of errors and cross-
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country exchange of information will benefit from the sharing and communication of 
ideas, methods, findings and recommendations across nations.  
3.5.3 Issues with availability  
Availability of information relates to the information being accessible when needed. 
Healthcare staff needs to access a patient’s record to provide their care. Furthermore, 
patients require access to their records to check on their details. This availability of 
personal information is regulated through security mechanisms in the technology, 
procedures, policy, responsibilities and ownership of the information. 
A much-discussed topic to ensure information availability in healthcare is electronic 
patient records (EPR). EPRs allow for easy accessibility and use. Healthcare staff no 
longer has to search for their or their colleague’s file or clipboard with notes. The 
patient record is available real-time, independent of the physical location of the nurse, 
physician or patient. The Internet makes it possible to connect databases to each other, 
so that a doctor in one organisation can view a patient’s record from another hospital.  
In theory, the organisation and security of electronic records should be easier and better 
to control than paper records. In reality, security breaches of personal data are in the 
daily news, feeding the anxiety and questioning the advantages of electronic records to 
paper based records. The way that records are now accessed, processed, copied, stored 
and sent to other organisations, is not always understandable for users and patients. 
Monitoring devices, online services and electronic communication between facilities all 
possibly have locally stored patient data and leave data vulnerable for unauthorised 
access or interception during transmission. With so many stakeholders involved in the 
care, it is important that health records are complete and readily accessible, while at the 
same time access needs to be limited and controlled. 
In the late 1990s, it was estimated that on average 17 people had legitimate access to a 
patient’s record in managed care, including each member on a patient’s treatment team, 
insurance administrators, utilization reviewers and clerks (Munson, 1996 in Rock & 
Congress, 1999). Nowadays, the number of staff with the possibility to access medical 
records has grown exponentially. Illustrative is the case of Richard Hammond, a well-
known television personality in the UK. He was admitted to the hospital in 2006 after 
suffering a serious head injury during filming for his television show. It was calculated 
that around 300 medical staff accessed his medical records via the internal computer 
system in the 24 hours following his crash rather than the 20 or so, which would be 
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expected for a patient in intensive care (King, 2008). Another estimation is that 100,000 
non-medical staff in NHS trusts could have access to confidential patient records 
(Asley, 2010). This accessibility has serious consequences for the patient’s trust in 
healthcare.  
There appears to be a close relationship between availability and confidentiality. Many 
researchers in different countries found that patients are optimistic about the benefits 
that electronic records can provide to the healthcare system, but there is fear of the 
potential for confidentiality violations (Smit, McAllister, & Slonim, 2005). Some 
examples are:  
- A survey by the Kaiser Foundation found that while 72% of respondents believed 
the electronic records were more efficient, nearly half also felt that paper records 
were more secure (Conn, 2007).  
- In New Zealand researchers found that 73.3% of the participants in a survey were 
highly concerned about the security and privacy of their health records (Chhanabhai 
& Holt, 2007), but they see the advantages that electronic records can bring.  
- A nationwide project in the U.S. on electronic health information exchange reports 
that many of the states raised the issue of trust as critical, specifically in the way it 
affects the potential adoption and viability of electronic health information 
exchange. Consumer concerns tended to focus on privacy risks from the 
implementation of new technologies and the potential for unauthorized disclosures 
of sensitive information to payers and employers (Dimitropoulos, 2007).  
- Participants in a research study in Canada were asked about their attitudes toward 
privacy and health research and trust in different institutions to keep information 
confidential. Trust was highest for data institutes, university researchers, hospitals, 
and disease foundations (78% to 80%). Personal controls such as consent and the 
ability to audit who has accessed one's information – were among the most 
commonly cited approaches that improved people's confidence in the responsible 
use of their information for research. Third-party controls – e.g. research ethics 
boards, privacy officers, privacy commissioners, and panels of affected individuals 
– were nominated less often. The researchers noted as well, regardless of consent 
regime, the high level of concern that was voiced over what happens to one's 
personal information once it is released to researchers (Willison et al., 2007). 
Researchers found that patients are keen to have access to their records and to share 
accountability for the contents (Delbanco et al., 2012; Leveille et al., 2012; Ralston et 
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al., 2007; Walker et al., 2011), but in many countries this is not facilitated. For instance 
in the UK, patients could be charged up to £50 to gain access to their record (NHS, 
2013) and they need to apply through the courts if they want to have information erased. 
In current society, characterised by individualism, self-determination and patient 
empowerment, this situation is becoming frustrating. The Department of Health aims to 
build partnerships between health and care professionals and patients that share 
decision-making. The owners of the data are the service users and patients and they 
should be able to access the relevant information about their condition and health, and 
to access their personal records online (Department of Health, 2012).  
Ownership of health and care data is related to information policy. The data is created 
by an interaction between a health or care provider and a patient or user. There is some 
legal ground to recognize a co-ownership of the data that is the result of this interaction. 
The data would not exist without the patient, and would not exist without the 
involvement of the professional. Should other parties, such as insurance companies, get 
involved, then they too have a reasonable claim to ownership of that portion of the 
information that is generated by their involvement (Haislmaier, 2006). Information 
policy should provide the framework to decide on (shared) ownership rights and norms. 
Without such a framework, the information technology sector will continue to spend 
money on technological artefacts to maintain security, without really knowing why and 
where to implement these. 
While most healthcare facilities today use at least some computer technology to manage 
patient records, the reality is that healthcare is in transition and paper records are still 
prevalent at many locations. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Administration (HRSA) (2011) sums up some the availability and access issues with 
paper records. They are issues such as: gaining access to record storage areas; finding 
records left on counters, exam rooms or copy machines; receiving misdirected fax 
copies; and other similar events. Inappropriate access can be accidental or intentional. 
Since access to paper records implies physical access, securing against inappropriate 
access is accomplished by segregating records into separate locked storage areas; 
restricting physical access to storage areas; recording sign in and sign out procedures; 
and maintaining records handling training and other similar procedures.  
A second aspect related to availability of information is the performance and 
availability of the underlying ICT infrastructure. If this infrastructure becomes 
unavailable or does not work properly, the information is not accessible. This 
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infrastructure, including the information systems and databases, need to be controlled 
and maintained to stay available. 
The resilience of the infrastructure to disasters and the continuity of care when 
information systems become unavailable is key to healthcare. Fires, floods or other 
environmental disasters that damage physical locations can result in the complete loss 
of both paper and electronic medical records. Electronic records can degrade 
catastrophically -- tapes break, a bearing breaks on a piece of hardware, optical media is 
scratched. Such failures can happen at any time without warning. Depending on the type 
of storage and the amount of damage, it may be impossible to recover the affected data.  
Healthcare infrastructure needs to be available all the time. It is considered as a critical 
infrastructure: an essential asset that needs to be available for the functioning of society. 
Critical infrastructures are vulnerable because they are highly dependent on networked 
information systems. On top of that they are interdependent: should one infrastructure 
(such as the electricity network) fail because of an accident, a natural event, or an 
intentional act, it could bring down other infrastructures as well. Healthcare has a dual 
relationship with other critical infrastructures. If healthcare infrastructure fails, it could 
lead to the loss of medical knowledge, the inability to control outbreaks of diseases, and 
loss of life. The other way around, in the case of a national disaster, one of the 
challenges is to prevent the extension of the surrounding chaos into the medical facility. 
At the same time, the use of technology in an unstable and unpredictable environment, 
such as after a disaster, creates specific requirements for health networks and hardware. 
For instance, Levy et al. (2010) describe how after the earthquake in Haiti, a field 
hospital managed to operate an electronic hospital administration system as well as a 
complete electronic medical record. This was achieved by using a dual-network 
infrastructure, both wireless and wired; using laptop computers with battery power; 
interconnected generators and the use of application software that was specifically 
designed to enable continuity of work during communication loss with the main server.  
Critical infrastructures seem to be under constant cyber attack all over the world (Baker 
et al., 2010). The attacks that are occurring include massive denial of service attacks, 
stealthy efforts to penetrate networks undetected, and malware infections. The aims of 
the attacks vary from shutting down services or operations to theft of services and data 
or extortion attempts. They are also vulnerable for non-intentional information security 
risks, as illustrated by the destruction of a water-driven electrical generator at Russia's 
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Sayano-Shushenskaya dam in 2009 that was caused by a computer operator remotely 
starting the generator while one of the dam's turbines was being serviced.  
Information security literature explores the security of critical infrastructures such as 
communication, water and electricity supplies (Ericsson, 2010; Farrell et al., 2004; 
Sterbenz et al., 2010), but healthcare resilience appears to be less often researched and 
applied. The 2007 World Health Organisation global assessment found that less than 
50% of national health sectors had a specified budget for emergency preparedness and 
response (World Health Organization, 2008).  
The American Medical Informatics Association’s health policy conference supports the 
vision that system failures and other undesirable outcomes are in the nature of 
healthcare systems and unavoidable. They state that the “threats could affect the 
stability of the overall healthcare system” (p.461) and “disruptions in care and security 
challenges […] could result in the loss of public trust, a loss that may extend beyond the 
government to healthcare institutions and even providers” (p. 462) (McGowan et al., 
2012). The conference members suggest specific actions to maintain the healthcare 
infrastructure and to prepare for contingency. These actions include the identification of 
the risks in new technology; the sharing of information about system performance; 
policies to promote interoperability to support system resilience and emergency 
response and new approaches to predict system failures.  
A final risk is the risk of technology becoming obsolete. Retrieval and use of paper 
records is not affected by technological changes. Even where paper records are stored 
on film or micro-fiche, the expected technology life cycle is sufficiently long to avoid 
obsolescence concerns. Electronic records depend upon computing technologies that 
have notoriously short lifecycles. This means that during the life of an average medical 
record, the computing technologies will have undergone multiple generational changes. 
With each technology generation, previous technologies lose market value and 
manufacturers cease production. This means that the technology upon which the EHR 
system depends will become unsustainable as replacement parts become unavailable 
and operating systems and database platforms lose vendor support. 
A third requirement for modern healthcare is the availability of medical knowledge 
through patient information portals and social media. The accessibility of knowledge 
about conditions might help to improve self-care and patient empowerment. 
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Unavailability of information can have direct consequences for the quality of healthcare 
in a society. 
The Internet has given patients more availability to medical knowledge, which is 
causing a change in the relationship between doctors and patients. Cullen already 
identified this trend in 1998 (Cullen, 1998). Patients are nowadays empowered by 
access to their medical records and access to medical knowledge in general and as a 
consequence, are able to discuss their treatment options without accepting that “the 
doctor knows best”. Mair (2011) states that the traditional paternalistic approach of 
doctors does not fit in today’s society anymore, but society is still struggling with issues 
such as ownership and censorship of patient records.  
Medical information is becoming available for a wider public through social media. 
Patients use forums to discuss and share problems, and offer their own reviews and 
opinions. The use of social media in healthcare is generally seen as the tool to empower 
patients and to improve quality of care through better communication (Hawn, 2009). A 
systematic review of 98 original research studies on social media in healthcare found 
that although there are many benefits, some limitations exist as well. One of the 
limitations is the need to:  
address regulatory and security issues to broach a way forward for best-practice 
that allows the benefits of social media to be utilized yet still protects patients’ 
privacy and to therefore improve use of these media in routine clinical care. This 
is a public policy issue and is already being contested in the United States 
(Moorhead et al., 2013 p. 10).  
Batchelor et al. (2012) researched legal frameworks governing the use of social media 
by people with dementia. In our aging society, people are increasingly being involved in 
e-health technologies, enabling users to avoid or postpone moving to care homes. The 
decision-making ability of ageing people is often diminished or compromised as a result 
of dementia or age-related changes. These people have a lesser ability to give informed 
consent to contracts or user agreements, or to understand digital footprints, and 
evidence of online activity and connections. The researchers found that many issues that 
come from a loss of competence have been addressed in existing regulations, such as 
managing their finances and property or powers of attorney, but the applicability to 
online environments is not straightforward and the issues have not been considered 
together in this context. The ethical and legal responsibilities and duties of care of 
technology providers, healthcare professionals, regulatory bodies and policymakers 
“need sustained transdisciplinary research” (p. 101). The questions about the legal 
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framework concern not only the vulnerable people, but they concern all users of social 
media.  
Issues with information availability resonate in sociological discussions about 
inequalities between patients in terms of access to, use of, or knowledge of information 
technology and the Internet. Patients who do not have the skills or means to access 
information about their condition or about healthcare services, are perceived to be 
disadvantaged in demanding the best possible care and to actively participate in medical 
decisions. Most of the health information is available through the Internet, however, the 
Internet is not equally accessible, with less educated, economically disadvantaged and 
socially marginalized persons being least likely to access it (Kalichman et al., 2002; 
Neter & Brainin, 2012).  
3.6 Risk assessment methods 
Standards and regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) in the U.S., or the Information Governance Framework for the NHS in the 
UK, require the performance of regular risk assessments and the implementation of 
controls to secure data. In the UK, the Department of Health recommends that the 
boards of NHS organisations should ensure that the effort and resources that are spent 
on managing risk are proportionate to the risk itself (NHS, 2009). Therefore, it is 
essential that risks are valued according to the likelihood and damage they can cause 
and that the risk assessment leads to a quantified value for the risk.  
Information security risk management has been widely researched in the areas of 
information systems, financial organisations and in military environments. However, 
within healthcare, Appari and Johnson (2010) demonstrated that only anecdotal 
evidence exists of the successful implementation of frameworks. Such frameworks are 
the U.S. best practice approach Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability 
Evaluation (OCTAVE) (Collmann, 2005) or the CCTA Risk Analysis and Management 
Methodology (CRAMM), which is the standard for the NHS (Macdonald, 2005; NHS 
Commissioning Board, 2012). For the purposes of this thesis, it was essential to survey 
methods used in healthcare and to compare their characteristics. An adjusted version of 
this section of the thesis was presented as a (peer-reviewed) conference paper at IADIS 
2011 (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2011). 
In general terms, risk management is the process whereby organisations methodically 
address the risks attached to their activities. Risk management can be applied to a 
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business area, a project, a task or whenever money or resources need to be spent. Risk 
management for healthcare organisations can be defined as an organized effort to 
identify, assess, and reduce, where appropriate, risks to patients, visitors, staff, and 
organisational assets (Kavaler & Spiegel, 2003). Risk management in healthcare 
includes the whole spectrum of things that could and do go wrong. It includes slips, 
trips and falls involving staff, patients and the public, administrative errors that impact 
on patient care and clinical incidents that have a direct effect on the outcome of patient 
care. It also includes the management of the business risks associated with running a 
healthcare organisation or hospital including financial, ethical and information 
technology risks.  
One of the most commonly used risk management standards that focus on organisations 
is called Risk Management–Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009) which 
sets out a generic risk management process in five main steps: 
1. Context identification: a description of the subject for analysis, i.e. the analysed 
system and its environment. 
2. Risk identification: identify what could possibly happen. 
3. Analyse risks: identify and evaluate existing controls and consideration of the 
consequences and the likelihood.  
4. Risk evaluation: relating the resulting risk level with risk acceptance criteria.  
5. Risk treatment: identification and assessment of treatment options. 
Several boards within the NHS have adapted this standard for their generic and clinical 
risk management processes (NHS 24, 2013; South Western Ambulance Service, 2013).  
From an information security perspective, risk management is perceived as part of the 
information security lifecycle (Peltier, 2005). Most methods suggest that negative 
events can be prevented and information systems can be made secure if 
countermeasures are developed and implemented in a logical sequential manner. There 
are many information security risk management methods available from standardisation 
organisations, consultants, centres of expertise and the like, all with a different scope 
varying from small to large organisations, from ICT systems to a business process point 
of view. The analysis methods can be quantitative (estimating numeric values through 
methods such as ALE-based methods, the Courtney Method, Livermore risk analysis 
method, dependency models, and simulation approaches) or qualitative (estimating risks 
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through qualitative ratings with methods such as scoring in CRAMM, OCTAVE, 
scenario analysis, and checklist methods).  
A study in the U.S. amongst 250 healthcare organisations concluded that healthcare 
organisations are actively taking steps to ensure that patient data is secure. However, 
hospitals appear to be focusing on how to handle a breach after it has taken place, rather 
than focusing on prevention through risk assessments (Kroll Fraud Solutions, 2010).  
Where security risks have been researched in healthcare, there is a strong emphasis on 
specific projects or systems (Bolle, Hasvold, & Henriksen, 2011; Lim, Oh, Choi, & 
Lakshman, 2010; Samy, Ahmad, & Ismail, 2009). In large healthcare organisations, the 
number of people moving through operational areas is significant. By their nature, 
healthcare organisations operate in an environment where visitors and the public at 
large can never be totally excluded. Therefore, as stated by De Lusignan et al. (2007), 
the human side of ensuring data security is equally important in everyday practice. 
In theory, any state of the art risk assessment technique could be employed to facilitate 
the prevention and management of potential information risks. Examples of these 
techniques can be found on the website of ENISA (2010). 
Smith and Eloff (1999) argue that healthcare information systems are quite unique when 
compared to other information systems, with the result that they require a specific 
approach to risk management. They state that the purpose of a healthcare organisation is 
to take care of the patient. The most important asset is, therefore, the patient, as 
opposed, for example, to a financial institution where finances are the most important 
asset. Smith and Eloff further state that the need to protect the privacy of the patient is 
equally important as the sharing of patient data in order to ensure the availability of 
accurate and timely information to all authorised communicating partners. Security 
controls implemented to minimise risks, must thus be evaluated in terms of their 
functional benefits for protecting the privacy of the patient, whilst at the same time 
providing timely accurate information to service providers and physicians. Furthermore, 
the distributed healthcare environment increases the number of possible risks that could 
occur, in view of the fact that there are many communicating partners, some of whom 
could be untrustworthy. Most of the consequences of the occurrence of threats in health-
care information systems are very difficult to quantify, because of their non-financial 
nature. Another concern with respect to the vulnerabilities in healthcare, is its subjection 
to unique exposures, such as medical professional liability, managed-care errors, and 
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dealing with emergency situations which differ greatly from other sectors. If a patient is, 
for example, admitted to the casualty unit of a hospital, it is essential that the patient 
data should be available at once in order to treat the patient properly. Lack of the 
availability and integrity of patient data could lead to loss of life. Smith and Eloff 
believe that all the above-mentioned features need to be incorporated when performing 
risk analysis in healthcare. Existing risk analysis models can thus be adapted to further 
improve risk analysis in healthcare environments. 
3.6.1 Comparative review of methods 
Information security risk assessment methods used in healthcare were compared using a 
framework of characteristics. The framework of characteristics was partially based on 
other comparative frameworks for information security risk assessment methods. 
Vorster & Labuschagne (2005) created a framework to support organisations to choose 
the method that best meets their needs. In this framework the criteria are as follows:  
- whether risk analysis is done on single assets or groups of assets; 
- where in the methodology is risk analysis done; 
- people involved in the risk analysis; 
- the main formulae used; 
- whether results are relative or absolute (p. 97).  
The criterion whether risk analysis is done on single assets or groups of assets is 
relevant, because assets that suffer from information security risks are closely related, as 
was argued in chapter 2 of this thesis. In many cases, “a threat will affect either all the 
assets of an organisation, or a group of assets, but seldom only a single asset” (Vorster 
& Labuschagne, p.97). This criterion is added to the comparative review under the 
heading: focus. 
Another criterion that was reused from this framework was the possiblity of comparing 
risks. Some methods rank risks in a qualitative way and others score risks with a value. 
This criterion is added to the review as: measurement method.  
ENISA (2010) has generated an inventory of risk assessment methods. Each method has 
been described through a template with 21 attributes that describe characteristics of the 
method. Some of these attributes that provide general information about a method are 
included in the review framework. These attributes include: origin (country and 
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organisation), publication/first release year, compliance to standards and scope/target 
organisation.  
Additional attributes were added to discover and emphasise individual strengths of 
methods. These attributes were: key feature, research activity and presentation.  
After combining the relevant aspect of existing frameworks, the review framework for 
this thesis was as follows: 
1. Sector: The market sector that it was designed for or developed in. Was it developed 
specifically for healthcare?  
2. Standard: Formal method or industry standard that it refers to. 
3. Year: The date when the method was published. This gives some indication of the 
maturity of the method. 
4. Aggregation: Is it possible to analyse results and aggregate data from individual 
assessments to organisational or regional level? 
5. Scope: Information systems, human, process, society focus or combined? 
6. Measurement method: Is risk measured with a quantitative or a qualitative 
approach? 
7. Presentation and risk description: How are risks presented and described in words? 
8. Key feature: What makes this method special? 
9. Research activity: Are there published case studies in healthcare organisations or 
evaluations available?  
A literature search in databases with journals related to computing, healthcare, nursing 
and medical informatics (as listed in Table 4.4) was performed to find case studies or 
reviews relating to the use of a specific method in a healthcare environment. Only 
methodologies that include risk assessment techniques as part of the risk management 
process were assessed. Several information security methods or standards describe a 
management framework; they deliver a set of processes to manage information security 
in an organisation. The scope of this review did not include the question of how 
responsibilities and procedures are to be embedded within the organisation. This review 
only compared the risk measurement techniques, as they are the most relevant aspect for 
this thesis. 
Unfortunately, the results did not show many widely implemented formal methods to 
information risks assessment in healthcare. The literature search found only five 
information security risk assessment methods for healthcare. Three of these approaches 
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were reviewed in the framework of characteristics. A summary of the characteristics is 
illustrated in Table 3.1.  
Two of the five methods for information security risk assessment in healthcare that were 
found were not reviewed. The first, Odessa, is a methodology that provides healthcare 
data security in medical information systems, developed in the UK in 1997 (Warren, 
Furnell, & Sanders, 1997). The second, Risk Management in HealthCare – using 
Cognitive Fuzzy techniques (RiMaHCoF), is a prototype for assessing information 
technology risks in healthcare, created in South Africa (Smith & Eloff, 2002). This 
approach is a qualitative assessment with the focus on technical aspects. Human aspects 
are not in the scope of this model. The search in the literature database and wider 
Internet searches did not find any published case studies or reviews or other evidence of 
these two approaches being used or having evolved since. 
Furthermore, many reports with risk assessment amongst the key words used the 
ISO17799 standard and performed a gap analysis between the requirements in the 
standard and the organisation in scope (Bava et al., 2009). However, such a gap analysis 
using a checklist approach is not a risk assessment, as it does not evaluate the potential 
harm or likelihood of occurrence of an adverse event. 
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Table 3.1 Risk assessment methods used in healthcare 
Characteristic OCTAVE CORAS CRAMM 
Origin Created by the U.S. 
Computer Emergency 
Response Team for 
manufacturing, but 
tailored for health 
care since 2002. 
CORAS is a 
European R&D 
project, aims to 
develop an integrated 
framework for 
model-based risk 
analysis of security 
critical systems 
within telemedicine 
and e-commerce. 
The Central 
Computing and 
Telecommunications 
Agency (CCTA) of 
the United Kingdom 
government created 
CRAMM (CCTA 
Risk Analysis and 
Management 
Method) in 1987. 
Publication 
year 
1999. 2003. 1985. 
Standards used SP800-30. AS/NZS 4360:1999  ISO 27001. 
Scope Risk-based 
information security 
strategic assessment 
and planning. 
Applicable to security 
of critical systems to 
aid the early 
discovery of security 
vulnerabilities, 
inconsistencies and 
redundancies and will 
provide methods to 
achieve the assurance 
of the security policy 
implementation 
Providing a 
structured and 
consistent approach 
to computer security 
management for all 
systems. 
Data 
aggregation 
No. No. Some. 
Focus Single asset.  Single asset, process. Physical, software, 
data and location 
assets. 
Measurement 
method 
Qualitative ratings of 
potential impacts of 
identified threats to 
critical assets. 
Qualitative. Qualitative scoring 
system. 
Presentation Scenario, threat trees. 
Limited use of 
graphical modelling. 
Scenario, UML 
graphical 
presentation. 
Common risk based 
tables. 
Key feature Maps threat trees to 
risk profiles and 
scores impacts 
(although 
qualitative). 
Graphical threat and 
risk modelling. 
Supporting tool 
generates 
countermeasures for 
the risks.  
Research 
activity 
Several conference 
presentations and a 
case study. 
Several conference 
presentations and a 
case study. 
Rare reports of partial 
use. 
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3.6.1.1 CRAMM 
Several NHS organisations refer to CRAMM as their standard approach for risk 
assessment (Jackland, 2009; Macdonald, 2005; NHS Commissioning Board, 2012; 
Scott, 2013). CRAMM is a risk analysis and management method developed by the 
British government organisation CCTA (Central Communication and 
Telecommunication Agency), now renamed the Office of Government Commerce 
(OGC). The method is supported by the CRAMM tool. Its original purpose was to 
provide government departments with a method that would be specifically aimed at 
performing security reviews for information systems. Since that time the methodology 
has been developed, both from the perspective of content and of technical support. The 
method was commercialised as a tool by a UK firm (Insight Consulting)
 
and 
subsequently by Siemens, who now publishes the tool under version 5.1, released in 
2003. 
In CRAMM the information is gathered through interviewing the owners of assets, the 
users of the system, the technical support staff, and the security manager. In this 
manner, CRAMM is a review of the security of a product, conducted during the system 
development or for an already running system. Physical assets are valued in terms of the 
replacement cost. Data and software assets are valued in terms of the impact that would 
result if the information were to be unavailable, destroyed, disclosed or modified. There 
is not much focus on risks in operational processes or human factors.  
The risk assessment is qualitative (using the words high, medium, or low to indicate the 
level of threat and vulnerability), and the supporting software provides the advantage of 
generating the appropriate controls and countermeasures for each risk.  
The documentation produced during a CRAMM review uses a standardized format, 
mostly in the form of tables. The documentation is compliant with the mandatory 
documentation needed to achieve ISO 27001 certification. CRAMM is considered to be 
more a ISO 27001 compliance tool than a risk evaluation method.  
In his Ph.D. thesis on information security risk management approaches, Cho (2003) 
outlines the following advantages of CRAMM: its well-defined structure; applicable to 
almost all types of system; regularly updated; comprehensive set of safeguards; and is 
widely used. However, some disadvantages are: takes a large amount of time and effort; 
it could get mired in too much detail; subjective and requires skilled analysis; existing 
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safeguards are not considered during analysis stage; and costs of safeguards are not 
considered during risk management stage (p. 58).  
Publications about the use of CRAMM in healthcare in the UK could not be retrieved 
from the consulted databases. Repeated requests placed at the supplier (Siemens) did 
not receive a reply. The Information Commissioners Office (ICO) (2013) observes that 
the use of CRAMM, in the UK or elsewhere, has significantly diminished. The ICO 
bases this observation upon the scarcity of reference materials or media references, as 
well as upon responses to the surveys the ICO conducted.  
3.6.1.2 OCTAVE 
OCTAVE stands for Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation. 
It is a framework for security evaluation that was first published by the Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) in 1999. It was 
developed in the USA to help the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) address the 
requirements set out by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) for personal health data protection. It is a well-documented methodology with 
a strong presence in conferences and journal publications. Although it was developed 
for manufacturing, it has been tailored for healthcare since 2002. Several publications 
describe case studies in healthcare environments (Coleman, 2004, Woody, 2006). The 
general risk analysis process in OCTAVE starts with identifying the critical assets in the 
organisation. Critical assets are those assets that will have a large adverse impact on the 
organisation if their security requirements are violated. Then, a team of analysts 
identifies the threats to each asset and constructs threat profiles, which describe threat 
properties such as target asset, actor, motive, access and outcome. The next step is to 
identify systems in the IT infrastructure that are closely linked to the critical assets. 
These systems of interest are then analysed for vulnerabilities and a protection strategy 
is developed.  
The measure of risk in OCTAVE is determined solely through the qualitative ratings of 
potential impacts of identified threats to critical assets. The method rejects use of the 
probability of risk occurrence. They state it can be extremely difficult to obtain such 
estimates with a reasonable level of accuracy. Coleman published a report on the use of 
Octave in three healthcare organisations of different size and geographical location 
(Coleman, 2004) and reported that the method is usable in different healthcare 
environments. The method documents the risk findings in tables and creates threat trees 
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using a simple graphical tree-structure. The approach is similar to the one used in 
CORAS. 
3.6.1.3 CORAS 
A well-documented and relatively new approach is CORAS (Lund, 2011), a 
methodology that bases itself on a combination of: hazard and operability (HazOp), 
fault tree analysis (FTA), failure mode and effect criticality analysis (FMECA), Markov 
analysis, and CRAMM.  
CORAS was a European Research & Development project that ran from 2001 to 2003. 
The aim was to develop an integrated framework for model-based risk analysis of 
security critical systems within telemedicine and e-commerce. CORAS has further 
evolved since, which now provides a customized language, the UML-based CORAS 
diagrams for threat and risk modelling, and comes with detailed guidelines explaining 
how the language should be used to capture and model relevant information during the 
various stages of the security analysis (Hogganvik, 2007). The CORAS’ presentation of 
risks in diagrams improves the understanding of how events are related and could lead 
to a data security breach.  
During risk identification CORAS uses threat diagrams to identify and document how 
vulnerabilities make it possible for threats to initiate unwanted incidents and which 
assets they affect. The threat diagrams give a clear and easily understandable overview 
and make it easier to see who or what the threat is, how the threat works (threat 
scenarios) and which vulnerabilities and assets that are involved. The threat diagrams 
are used as input to the risk estimation phase, where unwanted incidents are assigned 
likelihood estimates and possible consequences. After the risk estimation the magnitude 
of each risk can be calculated on the basis of its likelihood and consequence, and 
modelled in risk diagrams. The risk diagrams specify which threats initiate the different 
risks and exactly which assets they may harm. This risk representation is then compared 
to predefined risk tolerance levels to decide which ones that need treatments. In the 
treatment identification, the threat diagrams that contain the non-tolerated risks are used 
as basis for treatment diagrams. In this phase the appropriate treatments are identified 
and modelled in treatment diagrams, where they point to the particular place where they 
should be implemented (e.g. pointing to a vulnerability). The resulting treatment 
diagrams can be seen as a plan for how to deal with the identified risks.  
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The CORAS developers conducted several empirical studies with test groups, and 
concluded that the diagrams facilitate active involvement of the participants in the risk 
identification sessions, and they are very helpful in visualizing the risk picture. 
According to the participants, the diagrams explicitly illustrate the threats and 
vulnerabilities in a way that makes it easy to see the relations and precisely define the 
risk consequences (Hogganvik & Stølen, 2006). CORAS has been tested, but not widely 
implemented as a standard approach in information security policies and governance 
standards. A successful case study has been published for a cardiology eHealth service 
in Crete (Stathiakis et al., 2003), but no further reports of implementations could be 
found in the searched literature databases. 
3.6.2 Evaluation 
CRAMM and OCTAVE have a technology focus and assess the risks of a system, a 
database, an application or a network at a given point in time. This delivers incomplete 
results as information security has a wider scope than information systems. 
Rouse (2008) describes how traditional approaches to the management of healthcare 
systems cannot rely on traditional information system management approaches. In his 
opinion, a major problem with the healthcare system is that it is not really a fixed 
system, but a complex adaptive system (Rouse, 2008). Traditionally, the management of 
systems (and thus implicitly the management of the security of those systems) are 
approached by decomposing a system into component elements (e.g. input, processes, 
output, subsystems, communication channels, devices) in order to make decisions about 
their design and security controls. Subsequently, the solutions are then recomposed by 
integrating the designed solutions for each element into an overall security system. 
However, not all security problems can be addressed through hierarchical 
decomposition. For example, decomposition may result in the loss of important 
information about interactions between the elements. Rouse argues further that another 
fundamental problem for very complex systems like healthcare is that no one is “in 
charge”, no one has the authority or resources to design the total system.  
Most traditional risk assessment approaches start with the establishment of the context 
of the assessment, or the boundaries of the review (Cho, 2003), as can be seen in 
CRAMM and OCTAVE. However, the boundaries of modern networked organisations, 
assets and technology are hard to define, as was argued in chapter 2 of this thesis. The 
fuzzy context of complex and adaptive systems makes it extremely hard to execute this 
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first process step. For example, when a security incident happens within organisation A 
that supplies assets to organisation B, it is likely that organisation B gets affected by this 
incident. This could be directly, when the incident is a virus that contaminates systems 
that are networked, or it could be indirectly, when the incident involves major fraud or 
identity theft and organisation B has to explain the situation to its customers. Situations 
like this occur frequently within the area of sustainable management. If one organisation 
in a supply chain uses child labour or environmental polluting methods, customers of 
the vendor of the end-product will ask questions about the ethics of the vendor.  
Another issue with complex adaptive systems is that they require adaptive decision 
making processes and adaptive risk assessment approaches (Rasmussen, 1997). In the 
information age, a holistic view of assessing risks should be adopted, moving away 
from the partial view of a single component, to consider the entire spectrum related to 
the environment that is being assessed.  
Crinson (2008) proposes not to seek separate human and technical information security 
risks. He recommends a focus on how the demands of working with information 
systems impact upon, and in turn are reconfigured by, material practice within a 
particular organisation. He states that any assessment of the threat to the security of an 
organisation’s information system will require a methodology that includes the 
contextual conditions and the existing sociotechnical security mechanisms.  
It is essential that risks can be rated in a common currency, allowing financial, 
operational and clinical risks to be compared against each other and prioritized 
(National Patient Safety Agency, 2008). This comparison should include information 
security as a risk category. This currency or measurement could be improved by 
implementing quantitative risk scoring mechanisms, which is not impossible, as can be 
learned from the risk models in the banking and insurance industry (Hubbard, 2010).  
For regulators and public administration, the management of risk and trust is crucial and 
it is critical that they receive high quality information about issues and communicate 
more effectively about them (Lips, Taylor, & Bannister, 2005). Individual healthcare 
organisations and the sector in general could benefit from a knowledge base of common 
security risks. None of the above methods support a central database to analyse risks 
and trends and to benchmark similar environments. Individual risk assessments lead to 
individual investments in countermeasures to control the risks. If healthcare practices 
and their partners were provided with the knowledge from others, investments could be 
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shared or specific solutions could be copied and there will be a better understanding of 
each other’s key risks and priorities. Trend analysis would make it possible for 
regulators and individual practices to target the main risk areas more quickly and more 
cost-effectively. Regulators and public administration could also use this knowledge to 
adjust and maintain their policies and compliance requirements.  
An integrated and adaptive risk management approach could support healthcare 
organisations to meet their compliance requirements. Information risks should not be 
approached from a technology point of view, as information risks include human, 
organisational, and societal threats, and should be part of a wider risk framework. The 
risks should be presented in understandable language, and be quantified in order to 
better map those risks to countermeasures. The development of a cross-organisational 
integrated risk management system will allow organisations to respond to their 
partner(s)’ key risks as they do to their own. Risk assessment results should not be kept 
within individual organisations; knowledge should be shared in a central system that 
enables a benchmarking and trend analysis for the whole sector, which could further 
contribute to policy improvement and cost reductions. 
Risk management approaches can be classified into first generation approaches, such as 
checklist-based approaches; second generation analyses which focus on detailed 
valuation of assets, threats and vulnerabilities; and third generation approaches that 
distinguish themselves by including the examination of various perspectives of systems 
and interrelationships between systems (Cho, 2003). The third generation takes various 
views into account. However, it still needs to model the system in the conventional way. 
According to Dhillon and Backhouse (2001), risk analysis approaches are mostly 
grounded in systems theory concepts and can be criticised for being just another way of 
evaluating systems, as they often resemble the checklist or evaluation methods. Siponen 
(2005) performed a similar study and came to the same conclusions. Their conclusions 
show that risk and evaluation methods have not kept up with the progress in connected 
technology and artefacts. 
The information society of today appears to have “outgrown the approach that 
traditional risk analysis utilises” (Gerber & von Solms, 2005, p. 25). Risks to the 
security of information are related to a diversity of other risk areas and cannot be treated 
in isolation from each other. Examples of such areas include conflicting policies, human 
resources risks (e.g. hiring an employee who turns out to be fraudulent), physical 
security risks (e.g. storing data in an unsecure building or natural disasters destroying 
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data storage devices), health and safety risks (e.g. loosing key information processing 
staff due to an unsafe working environment), risks from crime and aggression (e.g. 
cyberterrorism, hacktivism or information warfare) or process risks (e.g. an information 
processing process without correct approval steps leading to falsification of data).  
It is a major contention of this thesis that a new generation of holistic, adaptive risk 
approaches is required. Predictive analytics has made significant advances in the 
integration of predictive modelling with social and behavioural factors, referred to as 
Technosocial Predictive Analytics (Sanfilippo, Gilbert, & Greaves, 2012). A new 
generation of approaches is emerging where modelling and simulation is coupled with 
social intelligence practices, such as role playing and gaming, to stimulate collaborative 
decision-making. For example, Greene, Thomsen and Michelucci (2012) researched an 
approach in which many people were asked to contribute to solve a problem. The idea is 
that if citizens in a village observe security related events, they can report it. All these 
independent and sometimes incomplete observations are then evaluated by a group of 
experts in national security through a collaborative process of revision, evaluation and 
selection. Remote solvers may discover relationships between seemingly disjointed 
pieces of information that reveal important patters of behaviour and contribute to high-
level intelligence. Using distributed contributors increases redundancy, and improves 
the quality of information. 
Another example of collective data gathering, or crowdsourcing, is found in the weather 
information gathering research of Elevant (2011). She performed a comparative study 
of participants in Sweden and farmers in Sudan. Both groups participated by delivering 
information about local weather observation and it was tested if that information could 
contribute as a bottom-up practice for climatic information and extreme weather alerts. 
She concluded that both groups were able to deliver reliable information for forecasting, 
and on top of that, their participation had a positive influence on their empowerment as 
they create important data for governments and for the community.  
Another stream of research provides insights into different risk analysis approaches. 
Knowledge based decision support systems for risk analysis are frequently developed 
and used in medical areas or in aviation. Padma and Balusubramanie (2009) gathered 
knowledge about shoulder and neck pain risk factors from literature and concept 
mapping interviews with specialists. The combination of the expert knowledge and a 
quantification of risk factors were used to create a knowledge based decision support 
system for patient diagnosis. Gürbüz et al. (2009) analysed fatal aviation incident 
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reports in the Federal Aviation Administration database and applied data mining 
methods. They categorised the incident data in decision trees and as a result found some 
rules about fatality rates of incidents. 
These approaches show how collective data gathering, expert knowledge, and data from 
past incidents can contribute to risk analysis. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
information security risks in healthcare have not been extensively researched from these 
perspectives, nor have any methodologies that apply these techniques made name 
within the community of security practitioners. 
3.7 Synthesis of healthcare information security literature   
This chapter reviewed the literature on information security risks and controls in 
healthcare. It was shown that healthcare organisations, such as those in the NHS in the 
UK, steer their information security by means of the information governance 
framework. This framework makes the top management responsible for the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. However, academic research 
on the effectiveness of information security governance in individual healthcare 
organisations is rare. The foundations for risk controls, governance and policy, suffer 
from inconsistency and from a low acceptance level.  
In contrast, a large body of research in healthcare focuses on technical measures to 
enforce these policies. However, the local and national policy framework to base these 
technical controls on is often not consistent, nor clearly defined and sometimes even 
contradictory. Furthermore, organisational or local information security policies suffer 
from lack of staff involvement, including from the responsible top management.  
It was argued that risks associated with information security in healthcare are not being 
systematically and consistently assessed beyond the scale of specific information 
technology contexts. Analysing risks within the context of a system or one asset is not 
meaningful in modern networked organisations. The context is infinite and includes 
technical, environmental and social (including people, organisation, society) factors. 
The cultural context in which staff operates defines their views on information security 
risks, but this cultural context has not been widely researched, nor is it included in the 
leading risk assessment methods. Risk information is currently not gathered 
collectively, and the knowledge of healthcare staff and patients, security experts, and 
data from past incidents is not a part of the risk analysis scope of best practice methods. 
This situation causes a gap in knowledge about the actual information security risks.  
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The review of literature about issues with confidentiality, availability and integrity of 
information provided some insight into negative information security events in 
healthcare. These can be summarised as:  
1. Confidentiality events: patients avoiding care, financial loss, embarrassment/stigma 
or discrimination; 
2. Integrity events: issues with quality of care, billing and patient safety; 
3. Availability events: constraints on self-determination and patient empowerment, 
aging technology, information ownership and responsibility. 
Table 3.2 lists these issues in detail.  
Table 3.2 Issues with the CIA-triad in healthcare 
 Confidentiality Integrity Availability 
Issues The obligation to 
protect data versus the 
obligation to share 
information to 
prevent serious harm 
or death. 
 
The requirement for 
sharing private or 
embarrassing details 
for the advantages in 
knowledge to be able 
to create better care in 
the future. 
 
Digital identities are 
necessary to maintain 
control on 
authentication and 
access to data and 
systems, but these 
imply a new risk as 
they can be stolen and 
abused. 
Modifying information 
during workarounds if a 
system does not work 
properly. 
 
Modifying information 
to cover up errors. 
 
Making unintentional 
user errors. 
Technology makes it 
possible to access data that 
is stored anywhere by 
many stakeholders which 
improves care processes, 
but increases security 
issues. 
 
Patients want to access 
their records but in many 
countries this is not 
allowed or facilitated. 
 
Decision making ability of 
ageing people versus the 
possibilities of the use of 
technology and social 
media at home for self-
care. 
 
Accessibility of medical 
knowledge to patients 
through the Internet 
contributes to better care 
but widens the gap 
between the 
knowledgeable people and 
those without access to 
Internet. 
 
Technology enables 
continuity of services but 
also ages quickly causing 
un-availability of data in 
older systems. 
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 Confidentiality Integrity Availability 
 
Availability of healthcare 
systems during a disaster 
versus the negative 
outcomes of the disaster 
itself, which make it 
impossible to use the 
systems. 
Possible 
negative 
outcomes 
Patients avoiding 
care. 
Financial loss. 
Embarrassment/stigm
a/discrimination 
Quality issues. 
Billing issues. 
Safety issues. 
Constraints to self-
determination and patient 
empowerment. 
Unavailable data from 
older systems. 
Data and knowledge not 
available. 
Possible 
solutions 
Ethical codes 
Patient consent 
Technical artefacts 
Standards and national 
for risk assessment, 
design, development, 
and maintenance 
methods. 
International 
collaboration. 
Education. 
Framework for personal 
data ownership. 
Critical infrastructure 
strategy. 
Public policy for the use of 
social media in routine 
care. 
 
It is suggested that countermeasures to these issues should be sought in public policy 
frameworks, such as: ethical codes, patient consent, strategies and formal methods for 
artefact development and risk assessment. However, as was shown in the sections 3.3 to 
3.5, governance, policy and risk assessment approaches are suffering from problems 
and thus are not properly controlling possible information security risks.  
3.8 Conclusion 
Chapter 3 reviewed the literature on information security issues in healthcare. It was 
found that confidentiality, availability and integrity of information suffers from 
conflicting legislation, ethical considerations, and technological changes that cause 
unintentional unsecure side effects. The measures to control these issues are often 
sought in policy, but not grounded in thorough knowledge of risks that are specific for 
healthcare.   
The remainder of the thesis addresses these issues by developing a method to identify 
information security risks in the healthcare sector. This method takes the following 
lessons from this chapter and from chapter 2 into account:  
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1. Knowledge about information security incidents must be included in the risk 
analysis because sharing lessons from the past contributes to the general knowledge 
of information security (Lips, Taylor & Bannister, 2005).  
2. Many people and organisations must collaborate to gather security risk data, as 
sourcing risk information from multiple locations has shown an improvement in 
reliability of forecasting in other methods (Elevant, 2011). 
3. Experts must be involved to identify trends and triangulate the data, as expert 
elicitation is a proven method for scenario building and forecasting (Padma et al., 
2009; Rowe & Wright, 2001).  
4. Chapter 2 concluded that information security should be approached from a socio-
technical point of view. Technical, environmental and social (including people, 
organisation, society) factors should be part of the risk analysis. Risks are not 
limited to certain elements and occur in combination with each other (Crinson, 
2008). Any description of risks should take these elements and any possible 
combination and co-occurrence of these elements into account.  
5. Chapter 2 demonstrated that the scope of a risk analysis must not be limited to an 
asset or a contained environment. There is no such thing as an isolated system or an 
individual organisation. Assets and their social, physical, technical and human 
environment are entangled and therefore the scope is unlimited (Rouse, 2008). Risks 
are not exclusive to one organisation or system, but should be reviewed in relation 
to the global network. 
6. The presentation of risks in scenarios has proved to contribute to the understanding 
of the risk by those involved in the risk assessment and therefor is preferred above 
the presentation in words only (Gürbüz et al., 2009; Lund, Solhaug & Stølen, 2011).  
The next chapter describes de research methods that were used to create the novel HI-
risk method. After that, chapter 5 describes the HI-risk method and how it integrates the 
requirements above. Chapters 6 and 7 report how the method was applied.  
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4 Research methods 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the methodological choices in the creation and 
implementation of the HI-risk method: its design; its implementation; and the validation 
of the results. These different activities required different research methods, which are 
explained and justified. 
4.2 Research methods in healthcare information security  
In their survey of the research literature on information security, Appari and Johnson 
(2010) found that the majority of researchers use design research, qualitative research or 
quantitative research. Design research is sometimes called improvement research 
(Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2008) and it involves the design of novel or innovative artefacts 
and the analysis of the use and performance of such artefacts. The main goal is to 
achieve knowledge and understanding of a problem domain by creation and application 
of a designed artefact. In healthcare information security research, examples of design 
research can be found in the development of technological solutions for access control 
(Ferreira et al., 2006), for (authorised) disclosure of patient data for secondary usage 
such as academic research (Malin, 2007), and for data sharing in a network of providers 
(Malin & Airoldi, 2007). Qualitative methods are widely employed in social sciences 
when researchers aim to develop understandings of human behaviour and motivations. 
Qualitative methods such as interviews, group discussions, and observations are 
frequently used in healthcare information security research within different research 
approaches. Some examples of the qualitative research into healthcare information 
security centre around the impact of legislation on healthcare practices (Terry & 
Francis, 2007), or on financial risk and fraud control (FBI, 2011). Lastly, researchers in 
healthcare information security have adopted several quantitative methods including 
surveys, econometric analysis and statistical modelling in the areas of patients’ privacy 
concerns (Bansal, Zaheid & Gefen, 2007), public policy (Koppel et al., 2005), fraud 
control (Miller and Tucker, 2009), risk management (Rosenberg, 2001a) and impact of 
health IT on medical errors (Rosenberg, 2001b).  
This thesis combines design research with quantitative and qualitative research 
methods. The result of the design is an improved method for risk analysis that 
contributes to the understanding of information security risks in healthcare. 
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4.3 Research strategy 
The research strategy is based on design science research. Design research generally 
creates and evaluates a model, a method, a construct or an instantiation. Its mission, 
notes Van Aken (2004), “is to develop knowledge for the design and realisation of 
artefacts, i.e. to solve construction problems, or to be used in the improvement of 
performance of existing entities, i.e. to solve improvement problems” (p. 224). In 
practical terms, design can deliver artefacts such as a building, a training course, a 
medical system, an ICT system, a business process and so on. Designing a future 
artefact is different from describing and explaining the present (Van Aken, Georges & 
Romme, 2012). Therefore, the philosophical assumptions of design science for the 
purposes of ICT research are different from positivist or interpretivist approaches. 
Positivists assume that there is a knowable, single reality. They build knowledge 
through objective observations of this reality. These observations are done in a highly 
quantitative and statistical manner. The results are seen as truth, based on evidence, and 
form a foundation for predictions. Interpretivists believe that there are multiple realities 
that are constructed based on interactions. Knowledge is created through social 
interaction with reality in a subjective and interpretive manner. Interpretive researchers 
seek understanding and descriptions. Design researchers differ in that they assume that 
there are multiple realities, which are socio-technically enabled. New knowledge is 
developed to support the design of solutions to field problems. Van Aken et al. (2012) 
summarise the difference as: “Explanatory research studies the world as it is, design 
science research is interested in what the world can be” (p. 177).  
Winter (2008) found that while design science research is the dominant information 
systems research paradigm in the German-speaking countries, in many other European 
countries this type of research is less visible. Nevertheless, there are some indications 
that design research is settling in as an accepted research approach. Three separate 
journals have celebrated design research with special issues, namely MIS Quarterly in 
December of 2008 (Vol. 32, No. 4), and the European and Scandinavian Journals of 
Information Systems, respectively: EJIS in October 2008 (Vol. 17, No. 5) and SJIS in 
late 2007 (Vol. 19 No. 2). In the management field, Organization Studies has also 
published a special issue on DS (Vol. 29, Issue 3). Besides these journals, the 
International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) runs a separate track on design 
science research and there is now a separate conference called Design Science Research 
in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST).  
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Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2012) point out that design science research is often used in 
the fields of education, healthcare, computer science and engineering. Van Aken et al. 
(2012) add to these the fields of architecture, medicine, accounting, organisation, and 
management studies. They argue that design science research can be regarded as a 
family of approaches: “driven by field problems, using a participant-observer 
perspective, and pursuing a solution orientation” (p.148). 
Offermann et al. (2009) compared five existing design science research processes. 
These processes have three common phases: problem identification, solution design, 
and evaluation. Table 4.1 presents a comparison of five design science research 
processes as presented by Offermann et al.  
Table 4.1 Comparison of design science research processes (Offermann et al. 2009) 
 Peffers et al. 
(2008) 
Takeda et al. 
(1990) 
Nunamaker et 
al. (1991) 
March & 
Smith 
(1995) 
Vaishnavi & 
Keuchler 
(2004) 
P
ro
b
le
m
 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 
Problem 
identification 
and motivation. 
Define the 
objective for a 
solution. 
Enumeration 
of problems. 
Construct a 
conceptual 
framework. 
 Awareness of 
problem. 
S
o
lu
ti
o
n
 d
es
ig
n
 Design and 
development. 
Suggestion. 
Development. 
Develop a 
system 
architecture. 
Analyse and 
design the 
system. 
Build. Suggestion. 
Development. 
E
v
al
u
at
io
n
 
Demonstration. 
Evaluation. 
Communication. 
Evaluation to 
confirm the 
solution. 
Decision on a 
solution to be 
adopted. 
 Evaluate. Evaluation. 
Conclusion. 
 
 
The applied methods are not fundamentally different from explanatory research and can 
be a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods. To identify the problem, design 
science researchers commonly use interviews or literature research. The artefact design 
is a creative engineering process. Depending on the research field, specific design 
methods are used or the development process can be pragmatic. Once the artefact has 
been developed, it is necessary to evaluate it, using empirical methods. Methods in this 
stage could be observational, analytical, experimental, testing or descriptive. These are 
listed in Table 4.2, taken from Hevner et al. (2004). 
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Table 4.2 Design evaluation methods (Hevner et al., 2004) 
1.  
Observational 
Case study: study artefact in depth in business environment. 
Field study: monitor use of artefact in multiple projects. 
2.  
Analytical 
Static analysis: examine structure of artefact for static qualities (e.g. 
complexity). 
Architecture analysis: study fit of artefact into technical information 
system architecture 
Optimisation: demonstrate inherent optimal properties of artefact or 
provide optimality bounds on artefact behaviour. 
Dynamic analysis: study artefact in use for dynamic qualities (e.g. 
performance). 
3.  
Experimental 
Controlled experiment: study artefact in controlled environment for 
qualities (e.g. usability). 
Simulation: execute artefact with artificial data. 
4. 
Testing 
Functional (black box) testing: execute artefact interfaces to discover 
failures and identify defects. 
Structure (white box) testing: perform coverage testing of some 
metric (e.g. execution paths) in the artefact implementation. 
5.  
Descriptive 
Informed argument: use information from the knowledge base (e.g. 
relevant research) to build a convincing argument for the artefact’s 
utility.  
Scenarios: construct detailed scenarios around the artefact to 
demonstrate its utility. 
 
Design science research was selected for this thesis as the most appropriate research 
method because it aims to produce an artefact: a novel method to identify and monitor 
information security risks. To create this method, it is possible to use the strengths of 
existing methods and to combine these. The research followed the design science 
research process as proposed by Peffers et al. (2008). These authors describe a generic 
design process, based on their review of seven papers that evaluated design science 
research. In their proposed design process, suggestions for problem solving are drawn 
from existing knowledge or the theory base for the problem. The design starts with the 
identification and definition of a problem and its scope. Then, research is necessary to 
propose suggestions to address the problem. These suggestions provide a foundation for 
the creation of an artefact. During the actual development of the artefact, the existing 
knowledge is reused and synthesised. The authors suggest a sixth activity: the 
communication of the problem and its importance, the artefact, its utility and so on. This 
activity is not copied into the research design, as it is fundamental to writing a thesis.  
Table 4.3 lists the process steps in the left column. The second column describes the 
activities performed in each of the six steps. The third column links the activities with 
the knowledge base; the raw materials from and through which the design was 
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accomplished. The last column shows the research methods that were used in the 
present study to perform the activities.  
Table 4.3 Research design 
Design step Activity 
description 
Knowledge base Research methods 
Problem 
identification and 
motivation 
What is the 
problem? 
Definition of the 
research problem 
and justification of 
the solution. 
Understanding the 
relevance of risk 
analysis, the current 
methods and their 
weaknesses.  
Understanding 
information security 
issues in healthcare. 
Literature review. 
Define the 
objectives of a 
solution 
How should the 
problem be solved?  
What are the 
specific criteria that 
a solution for the 
problem should 
meet? 
 
Knowledge of that 
is possible, the 
strengths of existing 
methods of risk 
analysis, risk 
classifications and 
research method. 
Literature review. 
Design and 
development 
Create an artefact 
that solves the 
problem. 
Combine the 
strengths of existing 
methods of risk 
analysis, risk 
classifications and 
research methods to 
create a method that 
is a better fit to the 
problem. 
Iterative creation of 
the classification. 
Design of the 
Delphi study. 
Demonstration Demonstrate the 
use of the artefact. 
Prove that it works 
by solving one or 
more instances of 
the problem.  
Knowledge of how 
to use the method. 
Implementation 
with survey, data 
analysis, and Delphi 
study. 
Evaluation How well does the 
artefact work? 
Observe and 
measure how well 
the artefact 
supports a solution 
to the problem. 
Knowledge of 
relevant metrics and 
evaluation 
techniques. 
Case study with 
observations, data 
analysis, interviews, 
and survey. 
    
 
The empirical methods used to evaluate the method are quantitative and qualitative and 
include a simulation (through a survey and a Delphi study) and a test in a case 
organisation. These methods are discussed and justified in section 4.4. 
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4.4 Research methods 
4.4.1 Literature review  
The literature review focused on finding published material about information security 
risks and controls. The scope of information security is wide, which led to a wide 
search, incorporating many disciplines. It included material from social sciences, 
engineering and computing, and healthcare. The literature review approach followed 
Edinburgh Napier University’s guidelines for literature review and critical reading 
(Hall, 2009). To find the relevant literature, the available databases in NUINlink at 
Edinburgh Napier University were used. NUINlink is the main search engine where all 
the electronic databases and e-journals that the university subscribes to can be accessed. 
The used databases within these sections were already mentioned in chapter 3, and are 
now detailed in Table 4.4. 
Additional commercial reports, survey data and websites were found by Internet 
searches using ‘out of the box’ search engines and through blogs of security experts. 
Different search terms were used for different sections of the literature review. For any 
of the searches, the results were approached through similar steps: first to discard all the 
articles and books that were duplicates from the search results, then to discard the 
resources if the summary showed that the article was not relevant and finally after 
reading through the articles deciding whether or not to use them based on quality, 
relevance and usability.  
The literature revealed that information security is a concept that can be approached 
from different perspectives. These differences have led to relevant studies within 
different disciplines, but leading to individual solutions for specific problems. It was 
shown that there is a gap of knowledge about socio-technical information security risks 
in healthcare. The findings of the literature were usable as a platform, or set of 
requirements, for the design of the HI-risk method.  
The literature review was an on-going process throughout the four years of research. It 
was remarkable that in the last year of the research, some of the most relevant 
publications, placing information security in a wider societal context, appeared 
(Crossler et al., 2013; Mueller et al., 2013; Schneier, 2012; von Solms & van Niekerk, 
2013), as well as on-going information security discussions in relationship to society 
(such as the discussions about the consequences of the U.S. PRISM system to the 
privacy of citizens worldwide, or the openness of governments’ actions). This 
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demonstrates a growing interest in the holistic view of information security and a 
growing understanding of the relevance of the relations between society discussions and 
information security.  
Table 4.4 List of databases used in both literature reviews 
Social science databases Engineering/computing 
databases 
Health databases 
ASSIA (CSA) Science Direct (Elsevier) Edinburgh Napier Library 
Catalogue 
British Humanities Index 
(CSA) 
SpringerLink AMED (EBSCO) 
Edinburgh Napier Library 
Catalogue 
Web of Knowledge ASSIA (CSA) 
ERIC (CSA) Wiley online library British Nursing Index 
(EBSCO) 
Expanded Academic 
ASAP (Gale) 
Edinburgh Napier Library 
Catalogue 
CINAHL Plus with Full 
Text (EBSCO) 
PsycINFO (EBSCO) IEEE Xplore MEDLINE (EBSCO) 
Social Abstracts  Science Direct (Elsevier) 
 
A second literature review was performed during the design stage, as a specific design 
method. This literature review had a different aim from the standard literature review 
that is expected in a Ph.D. thesis. Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2008, p. 142) propose five 
steps in this type of design method: (1) Identify existing solutions that satisfy some of 
the requirements for the solution of the problem; (2) select those solutions that are best 
suited to the problem; (3) extract concepts and ideas from the chosen solutions that 
seem to be promising; (4) based on the mined concepts and ideas, form a tentative 
solution; (5) modify and refine the solution to best suit the problem.  
By following these steps, a socio-technical classification of information security risk 
factors was created. The second literature review compared existing security 
classifications to find possible combinations and improvements. It led to a novel 
classification of risk factors. 
4.4.2 Data collection 
4.4.2.1 Secondary databases 
The HI-risk method is designed as a method that is used by a group of healthcare 
organisations simultaneously. To execute the method, data about past information 
security incidents in healthcare was needed.  
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The implementation of the method was not performed with a real group of voluntary 
participating organisations. Instead, it was attempted to gather data from a variety of 
healthcare organisations in order to create a diverse dataset. This data was sought in 
secondary data from past information security incidents. Methodical collected 
information about data security breaches is available through different sources. Several 
private organisations, research institutes and governmental bodies publish reports, 
statistics, papers and surveys about data breaches and information security incidents. 
ENISA evaluated more than 60 existing initiatives that collected security incident data 
(Casper, 2007). The list in their study was used for this research as a starting point to 
find data on security breaches. Additional sources were added, which were found 
through references in journal articles or on the web. Table 4.5 shows the overview of 
the data security breach reports and websites in this review. Some surveys are repeated 
every year and in those cases only the most recent ones were included.  
 
Table 4.5 Data security breach reports and websites 
Year Organisation Title Healthcare 
respondents 
2010 PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
CIO Magazine and CSO 
magazine 
Global State of Security Survey, 
Trial by Fire 
- 
2010 Kroll Fraud solutions Security of patient data 100% 
2009 E&Y Global Information 
Security Survey 
Global Information Security Survey 
2009, Outpacing Change 
6% 
2009 Ponemon Institute 2009 Annual Study: Cost of a data 
breach. 
0% 
2009 McAfee 2010 Threat Predictions  
2009 Deloitte 2009 TMT Global Security Survey.   
2009 Govcert.nl Trend report 2008. Insight into cyber 
crime: trends & figures 
 
2009 PricewaterhouseCoopers BERR Information security 
Breaches Survey 2008 
<9% 
2009 Information 
Commissioner's Office 
Table of data security breaches from 
2007 until April 2009 
20% 
2009 Identity Theft Resource 
Centre 
www.idtheftcentre.org 13.7% 
2008 Computer Security Institute CSI Computer crime & security 
survey 
8% 
2008 Verizon  
 
2008 Data breach investigations 
report 
<3% 
2008 Perimeter eSecurity A Comprehensive study of 
healthcare data security breaches in 
the U.S. from 2000-2007 
100% 
2008 CompTIA research 7th Annual Trends in Information 
Security: an Analysis of IT 
Security and the Workforce 
- 
2007 CSO magazine, U.S. Secret 2007 E‐ Crime Watch Survey – 7% 
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Year Organisation Title Healthcare 
respondents 
Service, CERT® Program, 
Microsoft Corp 
Survey Results - 
2007 Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of 
Canada/Bell Information 
and Communications 
Technology inc. 
Evaluation of personal health 
information remnants in second hand 
personal computer disk drives 
- 
2007 European commission Statistical data on network security - 
2007 IT policy compliance group Taking action to protect sensitive 
data. Benchmark Research Report. 
12% 
 DatalossDB www.dataloss.db.org  
 Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse 
www.privacyrights.org  
 Attrition www.attrition.org  
 Openrightsgroup www.openrightsgroup.org  
 CERT http://www.us-
cert.gov/reading_room/#news  
 
 CSO Online E-Crime 
Watch 
www.csoonline.com/info  
 Bugtraq www.securityfocus.com   
 
Unfortunately, it appeared that the data from these surveys was not presented with 
enough detail to use in the database. Furthermore, each survey used different 
methodologies to collect data, with different taxonomies, over different time spans, 
dealing with different geographical areas and legislation. The result is that different 
organisations came to different and, sometimes, even contradictory, conclusions. 
Discovering information about data security breaches with a specific focus on 
healthcare was even more challenging. In most of the surveys, healthcare organisations 
form a minority within the group of respondents. The majority of the reports give a 
general overview spanning a diversity of industries and are limited in exposing 
information about healthcare organisations. A final shortcoming was that the collected 
data was often based on the memory of experts filling in a questionnaire and not based 
on consistent evidence gathering through incident registers. For all of these reasons, the 
data from these reports could not be used as a data source.  
4.4.2.2 Survey 
A new strategy to gather incident data was designed and involved approaching 
healthcare organisations directly. Some NHS organisations in the UK publish 
information about data breaches in the Information Governance section of the annual 
report. This information is publicly available. However, since this information is highly 
aggregated and not all NHS organisations do publish this information, it was decided to 
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approach healthcare organisations directly with a request for insight into security 
incident information. After consultation with the dissertation supervisors, it appeared 
that another research project within the faculty was searching for options to gather very 
similar information from NHS boards in Scotland. It was advised that it would appear 
unprofessional for the university to have two different researchers from within the same 
faculty approaching NHS organisations with very similar questions, and it was 
recommended to approach this survey as a team.  
The researchers met a number of times to discuss the best way to retrieve the 
information and the best format to gain quality data that would suit both projects. The 
format that would give the best possibilities for both projects to succeed was a survey 
by email.  
Surveys can be a helpful means to collect large volumes of data. The questions can be 
completed at the convenience of the respondents without interviewer bias or error. The 
main difficulty in using a questionnaire is securing a high response rate. Kotulic and 
Clark (2004) tried to survey 1540 organisations about the effectiveness of security risk 
management. After intensive attempts to receive response to the survey, the response 
rate did not get higher than 0.61%. The researchers decided to change the focus of their 
study to investigate why organisations did not want to participate. They learned that the 
top reasons for not responding to the original survey were related to surveys in general, 
company policy regarding security information sharing, and excessive use of 
management time. The conclusion was that it is nearly impossible to extract information 
about security by mail from business organisations without having a major supporter. 
Firms are unwilling to divulge such information without strong assurances that the 
information provided will in no way harm them. 
With this information in mind, and as the aim was to collect a large number of data 
from each respondent, it was considered that interviews (face-to-face or by telephone) 
would be too time-consuming. Organisations usually have an up to date list of incidents 
that they use in reports to the management. Therefore, the easiest way for the 
respondents to provide the information was to send that list by email. An email request 
was send to NHS boards and trusts in England and Scotland, for an overview of their 
information security incidents. As the research did not have a major supporter or 
sponsor, another strategy was used in the hope to receive the best response rate possible. 
Bearing in mind the advice of Kotulic and Clark that a major supporter was needed, and 
no supporter was available, the request was emailed to the Freedom of Information 
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officers, referring to the Freedom of Information Act. This Act entitles members of the 
public to request recorded information from public authorities. A requester may ask for 
any information that is held (ICO, 2013), but in some cases, the organisation is not 
obliged to provide the information. However, this strategy resulted in a 81% response 
rate, which was satisfactory.  
The survey contained a questionnaire and a request for a list of information security 
incidents in the past four years. The questionnaire and the list of incidents was required 
for the other project and for this research, only the list of incidents was required. The 
NHS Checklist for Reporting, Managing and Investigating Information Governance 
Serious Untoward Incidents, prescribes that NHS organisations must register 
information security incidents, and what must be registered (Department of Health, 
2007). The survey used a spreadsheet in which the columns required similar information 
to this checklist. A limitation of this approach was that not the whole HI-risk 
classification could be tested. The classification contains more categories than the NHS 
policy. However, the researchers wanted to keep the vocabulary of the incident list close 
to what the health boards are used to. It was expected that this would be the most simple 
and effective way to gain a good response. Also, this weakness would be compensated 
during the later steps in the research, as the classification was going to be evaluated 
several times during the next stages of the research.  
Initially, the emails were sent only to Scottish Health Boards, as the scope of the other 
project was limited to Scotland. After collecting the responses, the researchers went 
their own ways. The data was used in a joint paper about the results (Smith et. al. 2010), 
and in a thesis on IT risk assessments in healthcare by the other researcher (Smith, 
2010). 
The Scottish Health Boards reported a total of 504 incidents. After adding the Scottish 
incidents to a database, it was decided to broaden the research bed. The research bed 
was enlarged by sending the request for the list of incidents to the FOI officers of Care 
Trusts in England. England was added to create a bigger dataset in the collective 
register and thus a higher reliability of the representation of risk scenarios and 
consequently, would provide a better ground for generalisation. It would also enhance 
the diversity of organisations adding data. A list of the English trusts was available from 
the NHS website. All trusts have online presence and their websites were searched for 
the email address of the FOI officers. The FOI officers were sent an email with the 
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request to provide information about information security incidents (Figure 4-1). Using 
the exact same request made it possible to combine the data from both surveys.  
The responses were collected between September and December 2010. A total of 163 
requests were sent and 132 replies were received. This means that a 81% response rate 
was received and this was considered satisfactory for the purposes of this study, and the 
remaining organisations were not chased for their reply.  
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Dear Sir or Madam; 
Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, I wonder if you could supply me, within the statutory time 
period, with details of Information Security incidents and further details relating to the incident for your 
Health Board from 1
st
 January 2005 until September 2010. This includes classification of incident, nature 
of incident, system or number of records affected, whether the incident resulted in disciplinary action 
being taken. Normally this information is recorded as part of Information Governance. 
I have enclosed a table (Excel format) as this provides further clarification on the information sought and 
may aid you in satisfying this request. I have used classifications and types of incidents listed in the NHS 
Security Policy, which may further aid you.  
Please note no identifiable personal details are sought. This request has been issued to all Health Boards 
and the responses will be used for research purposes as part of an academic study.  
Should you require further clarification please do not hesitate to contact me by email. 
May I take this opportunity of thanking you for your support, 
Yours sincerely, 
Attachment: Incident register 
Date of Incident:  
Role of Individual to whom incident 
was reported: 
Such as: IT Security Officer, Information 
Governance Lead, IT Manager, Manager 
responsible for Security, Practice Manager. 
Nature of Incident: Type of incident such as: loss of USB stick 
containing data, theft of PC or other equipment, 
misuse of email, unauthorised access to secure 
area, loss of smart key, unauthorised access to 
records, failure to appropriately dispose of waste 
materials containing data, malicious code 
damaging systems. 
Location of incident:  
Cause of incident: Vulnerability in procedure or internal control, 
vulnerability in physical security, vulnerability 
in computer security or combination. 
Classification of Incident: From NHS Information Security Policy Incident 
Classification Table: Insignificant, Minor, 
Significant, Major, Acute. 
Number of records effected:  
Number of staff disciplined as a 
result of security incident: 
 
Was incident reported to IT Security 
Consultant at NHS NISG? 
 
Was incident reported to relevant 
Caldicott Guardian? 
 
Was incident reported to Chief 
Executive of Board? 
 
Actual or Estimated cost of incident 
to Board (to nearest £500) 
 
 
Figure 4-1 E-mail request for security incident data 
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4.4.3 Delphi study 
The survey data was analysed to retrieve the most frequent incident scenarios from the 
past. To make a risk forecast for the future based on the knowledge of past experience, 
the scenarios needed to be judged. This was done through consultation of a group of 
information security experts. Several structured methods for involving experts in 
research are known. These methods provide for a structured process that combines the 
opinions of people who have significant experience or expertise in a defined field in 
order to assess unknown quantities, parameters or probabilities. The combination of 
experts’ input summarizes the current state of expert opinion. Expert judgement 
analysis procedures can be approaches such as Delphi (Dalkey, 1969; Linstone & 
Turoff, 1975), Nominal Group Technique (Delbecq, van de Ven & Gustafson, 1975), 
Scenario Planning (Kahn & Wiener, 1967), or the Classical Model of Cooke (Cooke, 
1991).  
The Delphi method is a systematic, iterative survey method that enables anonymous, 
systematic refinement of expert opinion. The experts answer questionnaires in two or 
more rounds. After each round, a facilitator provides an anonymous summary of the 
experts’ forecasts from the previous round as well as the reasons they provided for their 
judgements. Each expert may then revise their earlier answers in light of the replies of 
other members of their panel. It is believed that during this process the range of the 
answers will decrease and the group will converge towards the ‘correct’ answer. 
Finally, the process is stopped after a pre-defined stop criterion (e.g. number of rounds, 
achievement of consensus, and stability of results) and the mean or median scores of the 
final rounds determine the results (Rowe and Wright, 1999). It is a flexible research 
technique that can be modified to meet the needs of the given study.  
Another possible way of expert judgement elicitation is through the Classical Model of 
Cooke (Cooke, 1991). In this model, experts provide a distribution for unknown 
quantities by specifying 5
th
, 50
th
, and 95
th
 percentile values for the quantities of interest. 
The combination of the expert judgement is obtained as a convex combination of the 
expert distributions where the experts’ weights are derived from the experts’ responses 
to a set of seed variables whose values are known by the analyst and which are used to 
calibrate the accuracy of the experts’ opinions. In this model the experts are not equally 
important to calculate the final answers.  
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The nominal group technique is an alternative for brainstorming sessions and was 
originally designed to generate ideas (Delbecq et al., 1975). Small groups of five or six 
participants are invited to discuss open-ended questions. Keeping the groups small 
avoids the problems of dominant personalities and the structure of the session prevents 
the group from discussing one direction for a long period of time. The disadvantage is 
that these persons would have to travel to a certain locations to meet, which is time-
consuming for them. 
Another instrument is scenario planning, also called scenario thinking or scenario 
analysis. Scenarios are hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the purpose of 
focusing attention on causal processes and decision-points (Kahn & Wiener, 1967). The 
analyst first identifies what he takes to be the set of basic long-term trends. These trends 
are then extrapolated into the future, taking account any theoretical or empirical 
knowledge that might impinge on such extrapolations. The result is a surprise-free-
scenario. This scenario serves as a foil for defining alternative futures. These are 
generated by varying key parameters in the surprise-free-scenario. Probabilities are not 
calculated, as Kahn says, no particular scenario is much more likely than all the others. 
Scenario planning recognises that many factors may combine in complex ways to create 
sometimes surprising futures. The method also allows the inclusion of factors that are 
difficult to formalize, such as novel insights about the future, deep shifts in values, 
unprecedented regulations or inventions. Scenario planning does not aim to long term 
forecast, but to describe alternative routes for the future. To evaluate the risk scenarios 
in this research, the method is lacking the option to estimate frequency of occurrence.  
Scenario planning concerns planning based on the systematic examination of the future 
by picturing plausible and consistent images thereof. Delphi, in turn, attempts to 
develop systematically expert opinion consensus concerning future developments and 
events. Researchers have stressed that both approaches are best suited to be combined. 
Authors refer to this type as Delphi-scenario (writing), expert-based scenarios, or 
Delphi panel derived scenarios. There are various types of information output of Delphi 
that can be used as input for scenario planning. Researchers can, for example, identify 
relevant events or developments and, based on expert opinion, assign probabilities to 
them. Moreover, expert comments and arguments provide deeper insights into 
relationships of factors that can, in turn, be integrated into scenarios afterwards. Also, 
Delphi helps to identify extreme opinions and dissent among the experts. Kinkel, 
Armbruster and Schirrmeister (2006) reported on their experiences with both Delphi-
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scenarios and scenario-Delphis. The authors found that, due to their process similarity, 
the two methodologies can be easily combined. Generally speaking, the output of the 
different phases of the Delphi method can be used as input for the scenario method and 
vice versa. A combination makes a realization of the benefits of both tools possible. In 
practice, usually one of the two tools is considered the dominant methodology and the 
other one is integrated at some stage. In fact, the authors found that in either case the 
combination of the methodologies adds significant value to futures projects. 
Expert judgement has been successfully applied in many fields (Cooke, 1991), however, 
it has not often been used in the field of information security. Ryan et al. (2010) 
recently state that they were the first ones to apply expert judgement in a probability 
model associated with information security related incidents. They used the classical 
model of Cooke and a stochastic mathematical process to combine the probability 
distributions for cyber attacks. Unfortunately, their article does not evaluate the quality 
of their probability predictions and they seem to have overlooked the fact that expert 
panels exist in information security forums such as the many CERT teams across the 
world which not only help organisations to respond to cyber threats, but also predict 
new trends in threats and risks. Examples of these within Europe are listed at the 
ENISA website (ENISA, 2013).   
For this research, Delphi was chosen over Cooke’s model as the main method to collect 
data from experts. The advantage of the multiple iterations in Delphi, where results can 
be compared and adjusted, gives the effect of interaction between experts and thus is 
likely to increase the quality of the judgements. As information is shared, it is 
anticipated that better arguments and information will be more important in influencing 
the group and that redundant information will be discounted (Clemen & Winkler, 1997). 
The second reason is the impracticality of the expert weighting in Cooke’s model. Rowe 
& Wright (2001) argue that all expert’s opinions should be weighted equally as there is 
generally not enough appropriate data to adequately rate all experts, because their 
experiences are incommensurable, or because no objective measurement of past 
performance exits.  
Other advantages are that Delphi has been proven to be a useful instrument in scenario 
development. As discussed above, the combination of Delphi and scenario thinking 
seems to work well and it is highly applicable to this research where we are looking to 
improve security risk scenarios. The aim of this stage in the research is to improve the 
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risk scenarios and experts will be asked for their input not only on probabilities, but also 
on the quality of the scenarios.  
A Delphi type of study is highly recommended for obtaining opinions from experts who 
live and work in different geographic regions and settings (Pulcini et al., 2006; Rowe & 
Wright, 2001). This is an important benefit, as the panel of experts is based in different 
regions, and they are not be able to get together to exchange their points of view 
personally (this also dismissed the option of the nominal group technique). The 
anonymity of the Delphi process also encourages open and honest feedback among 
experts (Gagnon et al., 2009; Williams & Webb, 1994). The latter is particularly 
important because participants are asked potential embarrassing questions about 
information security breaches. Although Delphi was developed in the 1950’s, the extent 
of use in research has not fallen over the last 30 years, and between 2000 and 2005 there 
has even been a greater proliferation of articles using this technique as an instrument, 
particularly in social science and health science fields (Keeney, Hasson, & McKenna, 
2006). Delphi is a usual instrument in the areas of technological and social forecasting, 
futures studies, social diagnosis, consensus interpretations of social or health realities, 
communication and participation (Landeta, 2006).  
The Delphi method is an attractive method for graduate research and it has been used in 
at least 280 dissertations and theses (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007) in a wide 
variety of contexts. A search in the UK Index of Theses found 45 theses that used 
Delphi as a research method and 20 of those were in the context of healthcare. 
Furthermore, Delphi is a common method in healthcare research. Thangaratinam and 
Redman (2005) calculated that since 1969, there have been over 1400 publications 
demonstrating use of this technique in a healthcare setting. Its applications have 
included forecasting disease patterns and health funding requirements, addressing 
clinical problems and education. 
Traditionally in a Delphi study, the number of rounds depends on the level of consensus 
achieved. However, as the number of rounds increases and the effort required by the 
participants, one often sees a fall in the response rate (Skulmoski et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, there is the debate about the definition of ‘consensus’ and the importance 
of consensus. Woudenberg (1991) argues that consensus can never be the primary goal 
as it is not necessary for high accuracy of the judgement. Many researchers do not 
attempt to set a level for consensus prior to the enquiry. Instead, they make a decision 
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after the data have been analysed or just set a limit to two or three rounds. For the HI-
risk method, it was decided to perform three rounds during the simulation.  
The method for selecting the Delphi panel is one of the most critical phases of a Delphi 
study (Kuusi, 1991). This is when the Delphi facilitator considers the most important 
stakeholders, the most important competence of the experts as well as the terms of 
delivering information in a Delphi process. To find the panel of experts for the 
simulation, a purposive sampling type was used after defining the criteria and 
characteristics of the panel members. Experts needed to have long-standing expertise 
(minimum of five years) in a senior role in either information security or risk 
management, in either healthcare organisations or research.  
The literature does not advocate one particular optimal sample size for Delphi studies 
(Keeney, Hasson, & McKenna, 2011). Many studies have used different sample sizes. A 
panel size of 12 has been suggested to be an ideal number, as Hogarth (1978) showed 
that groups containing between eight and 12 members have predictive ability close to 
the ‘optimum’ (Hogarth, 1978). Furthermore, Rowe and Wright, in their list with 
principles for a Delphi study recommend between five and 20 experts (Rowe & Wright, 
2001). With larger panels come greater administration and no empirical evidence was 
found that larger panels provide better estimations. Skulmoski et al. (2007) investigated 
the use of the Delphi method in 41 PhD studies and concluded that the panel size in 
these studies varies greatly from eight to 345, depending on the diversity of expertise in 
the panel and the type of research question.  
Thirty-five experts from the personal network of the researcher, conference speakers, 
and academics working on information security, were invited to join the expert panel by 
a personal email with a link to the online survey. They included information security 
managers, consultants, Caldicott guardians (NHS staff with a responsibility to ensure 
patient data is kept secure), a security journal editor, researchers, and healthcare 
professionals. Ten of them worked on the survey but only eight completed all questions 
(two respondents did not complete the whole survey and were excluded from the results 
analysis). In an attempt to increase the response rate, a reminder was sent to the 
remaining 27 and, on top of that, 13 more experts were approached through connections 
in healthcare consultancy and a healthcare software sales consultant who approached his 
clients with the request for participation. Furthermore, the secretariat of the NHS forum 
of Caldicott guardians was asked for help and discussions were started in online forums 
(expertise groups in LinkedIn). The extra effort gained four more experts, lifting the 
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number of respondents up to 12. Compared to the 133 organisations that provided data 
for the incident database, the panel with the size of 10% of the number of participating 
organisations was considered satisfactory. 
The size of the panel dropped in Round 2 to 11 and in Round 3 to ten. The input of the 
remaining ten panel members is satisfactory, as ten is still a valid panel size for a Delphi 
study and an 83% response rate as compared to Round 1 is still above the suggested 
70% retention rate to maintain rigour (Sumsion, 1998). The level of professional 
expertise was also maintained in the third round as illustrated in Table 4.6. In the first 
survey round the panellists were asked to rate their expertise in different areas on a scale 
from 0 (no experience) to 5 (more than 10 years’ experience). The panel members who 
completed Round 3 had an average strong expertise in information security (4), 
information governance (3.8) and risk management (3.8).  
Table 4.6 Expertise per round 
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Mean Round 1 (N=12) 4.0 3.5 2.9 3.4 3.3 3.5 2.6 
Mean Round 2 (N=11) 3.8 3.5 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.6 2.6 
Mean Round 3 (N=10) 4.3 3.3 3.1 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.0 
 
Usually all participants in a Delphi study remain anonymous. Their identity is not 
revealed, even after the completion of the final report. This prevents the authority, 
personality, or reputation of some participants from dominating others in the process. 
Arguably, it also frees participants (to some extent) from their personal biases, 
minimizes the ‘bandwagon effect’ or ‘halo effect’, allows free expression of opinions, 
encourages open critique, and facilitates admission of errors when revising earlier 
judgements.  
The questionnaire in the first round contained an introduction to the study, guidelines 
for completing the questionnaire and the questionnaire itself. The questionnaire was 
designed as an online survey. Before launching the questionnaire, it was piloted 
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amongst researchers within the Edinburgh Napier University Centre for Social 
Informatics, a businessman and an information security expert to improve 
comprehension and to work out any procedural problems. The pilot delivered some 
excellent feedback about the presentation of the questions. The result was a change to a 
different survey software package (the free student version of SurveyGizmo) and an 
improvement in the answer categories. The final version of the questionnaires of all 
three rounds are added to this thesis in appendix A. 
Some Delphi studies use Round 1 to gather information to design a questionnaire that 
will be used in subsequent rounds. This is also referred to as the blank sheet approach. 
Another approach is to present the expert panel with pre-defined lists. In HI-risk, a 
combination is used. The experts are presented with an online questionnaire that 
contains the scenarios from the previous research step. They are asked to express their 
personal opinion about the frequency of occurrence in the near future and to motivate 
their choice. The use of motivations or feedback in the Delphi procedure is an important 
feature of the technique (Rowe & Wright, 2001). Feedback that includes arguments in 
addition to summary statistics is an important source to enrich the understanding of the 
scenario. In addition, a blank sheet with the previously developed taxonomy or risk 
scenarios is provided to draw up one scenario they think is most likely to occur in the 
near future and one scenario that they expect to affect the largest number of patient 
records.  
After the first round, the means and medians for each scenario along with the arguments 
from panellists whose estimates fall outside the quartile ranges were collected and 
represented in updated scenarios. Furthermore, the suggested new scenarios were added 
to the survey questions. The updated scenarios, the new scenarios and the comments 
were presented again in the second round.  
In Round 2, the six predefined scenarios were updated with the mean estimates of the 
panel, plus the upper and lower quartiles, and the comments and opinions from all the 
panellists. Furthermore, a total of 14 new scenarios provided by the panellists in Round 
1 were added. From these 14 new scenarios, nine were selected to be included in the 
mandatory section of Round 2. This selection was based on the following criteria: 
- More than one expert created a very similar scenario (this happened three times). 
- The six new scenarios with the highest expected frequency were added. 
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The remaining five new scenarios were added to the questionnaire as non-mandatory 
questions. The choice to make only 15 questions mandatory was based on fatigue level 
of the survey. SurveyGizmo runs a diagnostic test on the survey before publishing and 
the fatigue level score indicates whether or not the survey is more or less likely to cause 
survey fatigue. With all the added comments, the respondent had a lot of reading to do 
for each scenario and the completion time would be very long, increasing the risk of 
experts dropping out. The total number of questions per Delphi round is listed in Table 
4.7. 
Table 4.7 Number of questions per round 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
6 scenarios from incident 
register 
2 blank sheets 
6 scenarios from incident 
register 
14 new expert scenarios  
6 scenarios from incident 
register 
13 expert scenarios 
 
The aim of Round 2 was to gather the opinion of the experts about the expected 
frequency of occurrence of a scenario and evaluate the level of consensus amongst the 
panel members. Round 2 delivered some more descriptive statistics that were used to 
present the data in Round 3. Added to the means, medians and comments for each 
scenario were range, largest estimation, smallest estimation, standard deviation and a 
visualisation of the distribution of estimated frequencies in box and whisker plots. 
The questionnaire in Round 3 was a repetition of Round 2, enhanced with the data 
gained from Round 2. The survey was again divided into a mandatory section and a 
voluntary section. In the mandatory section, the panel were asked for their opinions 
about the ten main scenarios and in the voluntary section they could comment on nine 
less important scenarios. Figure 4-2 illustrates one of the screens from the Round 3 
survey. 
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Figure 4-2 Screen shot of survey 
 
4.4.4 Case study 
The Delphi study delivered a risk map that needed to be tested in a real context. Hasson 
and Keeney (2011) discuss that the results of a Delphi study do not offer indisputable 
fact and that, instead, they offer a snapshot of expert opinions, for that group, at a 
particular time, which can be used to inform thinking, practice or theory. As such, 
Delphi findings should be compared with other relevant evidence in the field and 
verified with further research to enable findings to be tested against observed data to 
enhance confidence (Hasson & Keeney, 2011). In order to test the quality of the results, 
a real organisation would have to be involved in the testing.  
Three possible methods to test the HI-risk output were considered. The first option was 
to hold a survey amongst healthcare organisations. Organisations could be presented 
with the scenarios and indicate how much they agree with the expected frequency. A 
survey would have the advantage that many organisations in different locations could be 
involved, but it is limited in investigating the organisational context. Furthermore, it 
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would not provide an opportunity to test the quality of the map against a list of real 
incidents that had occurred. 
The second option was an experiment with the model in a controlled environment. This 
option could deliver a concrete product: the prototype of an expert system for incident 
and risk monitoring, but it might be difficult to compare the results with real data in 
their context. Extending this prototyping to a real situation would require a longitudinal 
study within multiple healthcare organisations that would use the expert system for a 
longer period of time. This would have been the preferred option if the research had 
been sponsored. However, this study was self-funded, so unfortunately this was not 
feasible.  
Considering the circumstances, a case study using multiple research techniques was 
chosen as the best possible strategy to validate the method. A case study suits the type 
of ‘how’ research questions (Yin, 2009), looking to find out how staff behaves and how 
information security risks are identified and controlled. On top of that it provides the 
opportunity to have in-depth conversations with employees in healthcare to gain a better 
understanding of the socio-technical context of information security. Furthermore, it is 
possible to actually observe people in their working environment to test some of the risk 
scenarios. Finally, it provides an opportunity to run a simulation with the risk map, 
using real information security incident data.  
The case study was held at a large NHS hospital. A sponsor was found in the Speech 
and Language Therapy department. The case study proposal was given to Edinburgh 
Napier University’s ethics committee within the School of Computing for consideration 
in September 2012. Although patients were not involved in this study and there was no 
need to access patient records, and thus formally this type of study would only need 
approval from the institution where the research will be conducted (NHS, 2012), it 
would have been possible that –as a visitor to a healthcare organisation- personal 
information was overheard or patients could be seen. Furthermore, during observations 
of staff and their security behaviour, members of NHS staff might feel uncomfortable 
during observations as they might see the researcher taking notes of non-compliant 
behaviour. Finally, the registers of incident data that were analysed could potentially 
contain sensitive information as well. For these reasons, ethical approval was requested 
from the university’s ethics committee.  
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The School of Computing ethics committee decided to refer the request for approval of 
the case study to the ethics committee within the faculty of Life Sciences. This second 
committee did not approve of the research and decided that the researcher needed a 
NHS research passport. This passport is provided by the university having undertaken 
all the appropriate disclosures and checks on the student and confirms this to the NHS 
partner. Unfortunately, at that time, the university did not have a process in place to 
provide research passports and the case was taken to the University degrees committee 
and to the University Integrity committee in December 2012.  
After completing several forms to allow a criminal records check of the researcher, and 
spending several weeks waiting for feedback or progress, the research coordinator 
within the case organisation advised in January 2013 that, after all, no disclosure 
approval nor research passport was needed (NHS, 2012). Furthermore, the university’s 
ethics committee approved the research proposal on 14 February 2013. After that, the 
correct approval process ran through online forms, which needed completion in the 
Integrated Research Application System (IRAS). After the necessary authorizations 
within the case organisation were signed off on 25 March 2013, the case study took 
place in April 2013.  
Semi-structured interviews were held with the IT Security Manager and with the two 
Information Governance Leads of the Speech and Language Therapy Department. 
These persons were selected because of their knowledge of information governance and 
risk management processes and their leading role in promoting secure behaviour 
amongst staff. The interviews were guided by a list of open-ended questions and more 
questions were created during the interviews. The set-up was face-to-face and the 
interviews were voice recorded and transcribed. The interviewees were asked general 
questions about information governance and information security, about their approach 
to risk assessment and their opinion about the most important risks. During the 
interviews, new potential risk factors were identified and these were added to the 
classification of risk factors. Furthermore, the researcher gained more knowledge about 
daily information security routines, policies, risk assessment methods and 
organisational culture.  
Observations were held in two locations of the Speech and Languages Therapy 
department. The aim of the non-participative observations was to test if any risk 
scenarios could be spotted and if they would fit in the classification. The aim was 
specifically not to audit staff or to report any potential incidents, as was pointed out to 
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the staff in a preliminary briefing. Staff were observed in their daily routines, without 
disturbing them. Any potential information security risks were noted and matched 
against the classification. This led to adjustments of the classification where risk factors 
were recognised that had not been listed yet. The aim was to test the classification, not 
to test the security of the case organisation. The observation form to take notes on was 
the classification itself (presented in Table 5.6 in this thesis), and observed categories 
were ticked and missing categories were noted and added. 
On behalf of the researcher, the IT Security Manager forwarded a survey to his 
colleagues who regularly participate in risk assessments. The survey was created online 
in SurveyGizmo with the aim of surveying the business requirements for the HI-risk 
method. Unfortunately, only three responses were received and the IT Security Manager 
indicated that it was unlikely to receive a better response, as only a few members of 
staff perform risk assessments. Therefore, the results of this survey cannot be used for 
generalisation, but they still provide a useful indication of opinions about risk 
assessment methods within the IT department. The survey contained nine questions 
about risk assessment methods, frequently occurring risks and risk management. 
The ultimate test of the quality of the forecasts was the analysis of the incident register. 
The incident register data was copied into the HI-risk database and benchmarked 
against the risk map, using the same scenario analysis technique as before with the 
primary data. This led to conclusions about the quality of the forecast shown in the risk 
map.  
4.5 Evaluation of the research methods 
As discussed above, the original research plan was to create a database of security 
incidents, and to perform a quantitative analysis with data visualisation techniques. 
Bayesian statistics would support the possibility of calculating potential future risk 
scenarios, even when one or two variables are unknown. Unfortunately there appeared 
some hurdles with the data collection, which caused the research plan to change twice. 
The first hurdle was the lack of re-usable secondary data and databases about security 
incidents. Unfortunately, published data from past surveys appeared to be not detailed 
enough, was fragmented and was collected with different methodologies, different 
taxonomies, over different time spans, dealing with different geographical areas and 
legislation. The result is that different publications came to different and even 
contradictory conclusions. Finding information about data security breaches with a 
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specific focus on healthcare was even more challenging. In most of the surveys, 
healthcare organisations form a minority within the group of respondents. This hurdle 
led to the decision to change the original plan and to gather primary data directly from 
healthcare organisations.  
The second hurdle was the low level of quality of the primary data about security 
incidents that could be collected. After a survey, healthcare organisations provided a list 
of their past security incidents to the researcher. The description of these incidents was 
often very high level and abstract and gave only limited insight in what actually 
happened. There was not enough detailed data available to run quantitative statistical 
analyses. Therefore, the analysis of the incident database was done through qualitative 
techniques. On the positive side, this research hurdle confirmed the value of the role 
that experts play in security risk management. The design choice to include expert 
knowledge in the method, proved to be very important to fill in the omissions and to 
triangulate the quality of the scenarios.  
The HI-risk method uses a combination of data gathering techniques from different 
sources with the aim of producing risk data that is less dependent on scope, time and 
stakeholders. The selected techniques have been validated and checked for reliability by 
doing the following: 
- Reviewing other methods for risk assessment for the use of chosen research 
methods. All individual techniques have been used by other researchers and 
practitioners to study information security risks, however, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, they have not often been used in combination with each 
other. 
- The surveys were piloted on independent staff within the faculty and external 
information security consultants and IT sales managers, all of whom were unrelated 
to the research.  
- The Delphi study is self-validating through its design in three rounds.  
- The HI-risk method was validated by running a simulation to prove the usability of 
the process steps. 
- The results of the method simulation were validated in a case study. Hevner et al. 
(2004) pointed out that the result of any design research could be considered a 
success as long as the practical addition to an area of knowledge can provide the 
basis for further exploration. The results of the case study are encouraging for 
further development of the automated part of the method. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter explained the research methods. It was a requirement that the HI-risk 
method that was created included risk data collection techniques to ensure less 
dependency on subjectivity, time and stakeholders. The research used a diversity of 
qualitative and quantitative methods to collect and analyse data within a design science 
research strategy. Figure 1-1 in chapter 1 showed a summary of the steps that were 
performed during the research and refers to the chapters in this thesis that report the 
results of each step. This chapter explained the methods behind these steps. The steps 
follow the process of design science research. In this process, the first step describes the 
problem and motivation of the project. Then the requirements for a solution are created. 
The third step is to create the artefact: which in this research is the HI-risk method. The 
artefact is then demonstrated and evaluated to measure how well it performs.  
This approach ensured that the best possible effort within the circumstances was made 
to create a reliable method and resulted in validated risk scenarios that included risk 
categories from different perspectives. The next chapter (chapter 5) describes the final 
artefact that was created: the HI-risk method.  
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5 The HI-risk method 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5, 6 and 7 together represent the research results. The results are separated over 
different chapters because they represent the different stages in the research.  
First, this chapter 5 presents the design of the HI-risk method. This is the artefact that 
was created during the research. The design of the HI-risk method is based on an 
evaluation and re-use of best practices. This chapter explains how the method came to 
be: the requirements that is was based on, the process steps within the method and how 
existing methods were reused and adjusted to fit the requirements for HI-risk.  
Chapter 6 presents the results of a simulation with this method. To simulate HI-risk, 
primary data was collected, analysed and used as input for a three-round Delphi study. 
The conclusion of this simulation was a forecast of risk scenarios in healthcare. 
Chapter 7 presents the validation of the forecast by means of a case study. The HI-risk 
method was tested to determine how reliable the results are for practical use in an 
individual organisation. 
5.2 Method requirements 
From the background and literature review chapters, the following requirements for an 
information security risk assessment approach were identified (as detailed in Section 3.8 
of this thesis): 
1. Knowledge about information security incidents must be included in the risk 
analysis.  
2. Information security risk data must be sourced from multiple locations and 
organisations. 
3. Experts must be involved to identify trends and triangulate the data.  
4. Technical, environmental and social (including people, organisation, society) factors 
must be part of risk analysis.  
5. The scope of a risk analysis must not be limited to an asset or a contained 
environment. Assets and their social, physical, technical and human environment are 
entangled and therefore the scope is unlimited. 
6. Risk factors occur in combination with each other in scenarios. 
These requirements were taken into consideration for the design of the method.  
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5.3 Method description 
HI-risk [short for Health Information risk] is a method for the healthcare sector to 
identify and monitor its information security risks. The method is not limited to one 
individual organisation; it is based on the concept that all healthcare organisations 
experience similar risks and could benefit from the knowledge that exists in the 
collective, in order to take effective security measures. The aim is to reach a collective 
state of information security: a state where we (as patients, as voters, as tax payers, as 
healthcare consumers, as family and friends of patients) have trust in the level of 
respect, protection and quality of care that our information receives from the people and 
organisations that we share it with. HI-risk is aimed at healthcare organisations in 
general –the scope is not limited to primary or secondary care, private or national 
healthcare-, and includes technical, environmental, and social (human, organisational 
and societal) risk factors.  
When there is an issue with our trust, caused by uncertainty about the level of respect, 
protection and quality of care that our information -in electronic or other form- receives, 
there is a security incident. According to the international standard BS ISO 31000:2009, 
the likelihood of occurrence of an incident, combined with the consequences of a 
certain event, is called a risk.  
To describe a risk, it is therefore necessary to know the possible events. The HI-risk 
method provides the opportunity for participating organisations to register their 
incidents in a central database. From this database, an analysis of the incident scenarios 
can visualise the most frequent scenarios. These scenarios are presented to a group of 
experts in the field: security experts, information governance functions, risk managers, 
and so on. These experts can express their opinions about the expected frequency of 
occurrence for the future. Their expectation is based on their experience, their 
knowledge of countermeasures being taken, and their insight into new potential threats. 
The combination of incident knowledge from the past and expert expectations for the 
future forms a risk map. The map is the main deliverable of the HI-risk method, and 
healthcare organisations can use that to monitor their information security risks. The 
map changes constantly, as incidents occur every day and every entry in the register 
changes the frequencies in the database. This ‘living’ map provides a well-informed 
overview of the state of information security in healthcare. 
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The method differs from other method such as CRAMM and OCTAVE (Table 5.1). 
The biggest difference is that HI-risk does not start with context identification. The 
context includes all systems, people, processes, environments and wider contexts 
thinkable. The scope is indefinite; everything related to healthcare should be able to 
contribute knowledge to this method.  
Table 5.1 HI-risk compared to other methods 
BS ISO 31000:2009 OCTAVE CRAMM HI-risk 
1. Context 
identification:  
a description of the 
subject for analysis, 
i.e. the analysed 
system and its 
environment. 
Create threat 
profile 
Asset 
identification 
Not applicable: context is 
indefinite 
2. Risk 
identification: 
identify what could 
possibly happen. 
Threat and 
vulnerability 
identification 
Asset valuation 
Threat and 
vulnerability 
assessment 
Register incident data 
Expert elicitation 
Risk map 
3. Analyse risks: 
identify and evaluate 
existing controls and 
consideration of the 
consequences and 
the likelihood. 
  The consequences and 
likelihood evaluation are 
part of the expert 
consultation. Furthermore 
countermeasures taken by 
the collective will lower 
the number of incidents 
and thus lowers the risk 
likelihood automatically. 
4. Risk evaluation: 
relating the resulting 
risk level with risk 
acceptance criteria. 
 
  This step can be added to 
HI-risk. The decision to 
accept or not accept a risk 
could be made by the 
collective or by an 
individual organisation. 
5. Risk treatment: 
identification and 
assessment of 
treatment options. 
Develop 
protection 
strategy 
Countermeasure 
selection and 
recommendation 
This step can be added to 
HI-risk or be left to the 
participants. Risk 
solutions can be left to 
emerge from the collective 
or could be created 
collectively. The use of 
standards and checklist 
could be helpful, but they 
limit the creativity and 
innovativity of possible 
solutions. 
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Furthermore, as was argued in the background chapter and the literature review, 
controls against risks can either emerge by themselves or could be enforced. Selecting 
controls to treat risks is therefore not a necessary step of risk analysis, the treatment of 
risks should be left to the individuals within the collective. The use of best practices and 
standards might inspire some solutions, but these only deal with the threats which are 
known. “Risk is unknowable” (Parker, 1998 p. 500), and the unpredictability of new 
threats makes it impossible to have all the answers included in an existing checklist. It is 
therefore best to leave controls to emerge from the practice. 
Three main processes form the method: a collective information security incident 
registration process, scenario analysis and expert consultations, as shown in Figure 5-1. 
The next sections of this chapter detail how these processes were developed. 
 
Figure 5-1 HI-risk process  
 
5.4 Collective register of information security incidents  
The first part of the HI-risk method is a collective information security incident register. 
Incident data from a group of participating organisations within a network (such as 
within one supply chain, a geographic region, a conglomeration of organisations 
reporting to one board, and so on) is logged according to a standardised terminology 
and structure. This structure is the classification of information security elements. The 
classification was developed specifically for the HI-risk method, as (to best of the 
researcher’s knowledge) no commonly accepted classification or taxonomy for 
healthcare information security risks was available. 
Organisations register 
their incidents 
Analysis of scenarios Expert consultations Forecast 
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A taxonomy is a system for naming and organising things into groups that share similar 
characteristics. When creating taxonomies, certain criteria need to be met. In the 
biological and library sciences, taxonomy development is a long-term, collaborative 
effort involving classification specialists. Taxonomies evolve slowly through a 
consensus process that involves representatives from multiple public and private sector 
organizations. A classification of information security incidents “must be 
comprehensible to both security experts and to those less familiar with security” 
(Lough, 2001, p. 39). Furthermore, the classification must be complete, so that every 
factor that contributes to the incident must fit somewhere in the structure. Amoroso 
(1994) states that classifications should have categories with the following 
characteristics:  
 Mutually exclusive – classifying in one category excludes all others because 
categories do not overlap. 
 Exhaustive – taken together, the categories include all possibilities. 
 Unambiguous – clear and precise so that classification is not uncertain, regardless 
of who is classifying. 
 Repeatable – repeated applications result in the same classification, regardless of 
who is classifying. 
 Accepted – logical and intuitive so that categories could become generally 
approved. 
 Useful – could be used to gain insight into the field of inquiry. 
Throughout the course of the research, the classification of the HI-risk method was 
compared several times with these criteria, bearing in mind that any classification is an 
approximation of reality and should be expected to fall short in some characteristics. 
This may be particularly the case when the characteristics of the data being classified 
are imprecise and uncertain (Howard & Longstaff, 1998), as is the case for the typical 
information security information. The results of these comparisons are described in 
section 7.4.1 of this thesis. 
To develop the taxonomy, it was first investigated which categories needed to be 
included. Taxonomies that were “presented in the past have a common set of 
categories” (Lough, 2001 p. 236) and these were reused in the HI-risk classification. 
The key categories often used in other information security classifications are threat, 
vulnerability and risk. These categories are different concepts and each of them can 
have its own taxonomy of sub-categories and variables.  
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The ISO/IEC 13335-1:2004 defines threat as a potential cause of an unwanted incident 
which may result in harm to a system or an organisation. A vulnerability is defined as a 
weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be exploited by one or more threats. In 
this vision, one or more threats could lead to an exploitation of one or more 
vulnerabilities. This suggest that a risk is caused by a scenario of one or more threats, 
exploiting one or more vulnerabilities, leads to one or more events that could harm one 
or more systems, assets or organisations.  
The required categories depend on the definition of what is an information security risk. 
As stated before, a risk is the combination of some incidents that lead some damage. 
Together, the categories in the classification should represent a risk scenario. A risk 
scenario is the expected frequency of occurrence of a situation where one or more 
THREAT agent(s) perform(s) one or more METHOD(S) to exploit one or more 
WEAKNESS(ES) that cause(s) one or more undesirable EVENT(S), leading to 
DAMAGE.  
Thus, the categories required for the classification are threat, method, weakness (or 
vulnerability or flaw), event and damage. Many existing information security 
taxonomies specify one or more of these categories. 
Publications which attempt to classify computer security threats and vulnerabilities 
started to appear in the 1970s (Abbott et al., 1976; Anderson, 1972; Lackey, 1974; 
Neumann, 1978). These classifications served as system design requirements and it was 
believed that it was better to solve security issues during the design stage than 
afterwards. Authors like Howard & Longstaff (1998), Krsul (1998) and Lough (2001) 
reviewed some pioneering classifications and used them to create new ones. Many 
others have performed similar reviews. Table 5.2 shows several of these published 
taxonomies and classifications from different authors over time. These classifications 
tend to focus on a specific system, a specific type of event or a technology. Many of 
these taxonomies were designed for a specific operating system, for software, focus on 
only vulnerabilities or only on threats, or do not take human and procedural elements 
into account. This makes many of them incomplete to use in a socio-technical model. 
Furthermore, the limited focus on only vulnerabilities or threats does not match the 
definition of a risk in this thesis.  
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Table 5.2 Overview of security taxonomies  
Year Author Type of taxonomy 
1972 Anderson  Threats and vulnerabilities 
1974 Lackey Threats 
 McPhee Integrity flaws in operating system 
1975 Saltzer & Schroeder Vulnerabilities 
 Parker Functional vulnerabilities 
1976 RISOS study Vulnerabilities in operating systems 
 Attanasio IBM VM/370 OS flaws 
 Nielsen (SRI) Breaching incidents 
1978 Bisbey & Hollingsworth Protection analysis taxonomy 
  Peter Neumann Categories of flaws  
1984 Perry & Wallich Types of computer crimes 
 Straub & Widom Motivations of attackers 
1988 Hogan Operating systems 
 Rissenbatt Network communication vulnerabilities 
1989 Neumann & Parker Computer misuse techniques 
1990 Beizer Bug taxonomy 
 Brian Marick Defect classification 
1991 Russell & Gangemi Vulnerabilities and threats to computer 
security 
1992 Spafford Common system vulnerabilities 
1994 Cheswick & Bellovin Firewalls and Internet security 
  Landwehr, Bull, McDermott, Choi Computer program security flaws 
 Syverson Replay attacks in cryptoprotocols 
1995 Icove et al. Computer crimes and computer 
criminals 
  Dunnigan & Nofi Deception techniques 
  Aslam Security faults in the Unix operating 
system 
  Bishop UNIX system and network 
vulnerabilities 
  Brinkley & Schell Types of computer misuses 
  Kumar IDS attack signatures 
  Gritzalis Flaws in cryptographic protocols 
  Stallings Network security 
1996 Cohen Internet holes, attacks 
1997 Lindqvist & Jonsson System intrusions  
 Du and Mathur Software errors that led to security 
breaches 
  Cohen Attacks against information systems 
 Jayaram & Morse Security threats to networks 
1998 Howard & Longstaff Incident taxonomy with events & 
attacks 
  Krsul Software vulnerability analysis 
1999 Asaro, Herting, Roth, and Barnes Confidentiality breaches in EMR 
systems 
 Bishop Vulnerability classification 
 Ristenbatt Network vulnerabilities 
2000 Mostow, Bott Internet attacks 
2001 Man, Wei Attacks against mobile agents 
 Lough Taxonomy of attacks in wireless 
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Year Author Type of taxonomy 
networks 
 Richardson Vulnerabilities to support denial of 
service attacks 
2002 Piessens Taxonomy of Internet software 
vulnerabilities  
 Jiwnani Maintaining software with a security 
perspective 
 Wood, Stankovic DoS attacks in WSNs 
2003 Cheswick Attack classes 
 Welch, Lathrop Threat taxonomy 
 Kamara et al Vulnerabilities in firewalls 
 Gray Vulnerability taxonomy 
 Hussain et al DoS attacks taxonomy 
 Alvarez, Petrovic Web attacks taxonomy 
2004 Hoglund Software problems 
 Delooze Internet attacks 
 Golle et al. Attacks in VANETS 
 Arce Shellcode attacks 
  Brann and Mattson Typology of confidentiality breaches in 
healthcare 
 Jiwnani, Zelkowitz Taxonomy for auditing software 
 Pothamsetty, Akyol Protocol vulnerabilities 
 Yongzheng, Xiochun Privilege vulnerabilities 
 Langweg A classification of malicious software 
attacks 
 Newsome et al Sybil attacks in WSNs 
 Killourhy et al Categories of anomaly in IDS 
 Mirkovic, Reiher DDos Attack and defense mechanisms 
2005 Christey Vulnerabilities 
  Weber A software flaw taxonomy: aiming 
tools at security 
 Tsipenyuk A taxonomy of software security errors 
 Hansman, Hunt Taxonomy of attacks 
2006 Kjaerland Taxonomy of attacks 
 Seifert, Welck, Komisarczuk Taxonomy of honeypots 
2007 Bazaz & Arthur Vulnerabilities 
2008 Myers Confidentiality breaches 
2010 Verizon incident sharing framework 
(Veris) 
Incident classification 
2010 Samy, Ahmad & Ismail Threat categories in healthcare 
information systems 
2011 ISO 27005 List of consequences, threats, 
vulnerabilities 
 
One taxonomy that was reused was the incident taxonomy of Howard and Longstaff 
(1998). They reviewed many computer and network incident taxonomies and divided 
the different approaches into six categories: lists of terms, lists of categories, results 
categories, empirical lists, matrices and action-based taxonomies. They concluded that 
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none of these approaches provide a common language to combine or compare security 
information. In their project, which was funded by the Sandia National Laboraties and 
the CERT Coordination Centre, they created a taxonomy for security incidents that 
combined of several matrices. In their taxonomy, an incident entails a combination of an 
attacker, an attack, an event and objectives. This taxonomy, copied in Table 5.3, formed 
the basis for the CERT incident database. Its strength to re-use it in HI-risk is the 
formula behind the formation of the columns: an incidents is triggered by and attacker 
to reach a certain objective. The attack is made up of tools, vulnerabilities, events and 
an unauthorised result. Its weakness is that its focus is on computer systems, and there 
are no categories for social or environmental events. This weakness was identified by 
Howard himself: in his Ph.D. thesis (Howard, 1997) which formed the foundation of 
this taxonomy, where he identifies the lack of human risk factors such as 
professionalism, behaviour, error, motives and commitment. Another weakness is the 
limited description of unauthorised results, or damage category. 
 
Table 5.3 Computer and Network incident taxonomy (Howard & Longstaff, 1998) 
Incident 
 Attack(s)  
   Event   
Attackers Tool Vulnerability Action Target Unauthorized 
result 
Objectives 
Hackers Physical 
attack 
Design Probe Account Increased 
access 
Challenge, 
status, 
thrill 
Spies Information 
exchange 
Implementa-
tion 
Scan Process Disclosure of 
information 
Political 
gain 
Terrorists User 
command 
Configuration Flood Data Corruption of 
information 
Financial 
gain 
Corporate 
raiders 
Script or 
program 
 Authenticate Component Denial of 
service 
Damage 
Professional 
criminals 
Autonomous 
agent  
 Bypass Computer Theft or 
resources 
 
Vandals Toolkit  Spoof Network   
Voyeurs Distributed 
tool 
 Read Internetwork   
 Data tap  Copy    
   Steal    
   Modify    
   Delete    
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Parker’s (1998) proposed framework for information security expands on the 
‘unauthorised result’ column of Howard and Longstaff. Parker calls this “potential 
information losses” (p. 242) and lists the following categories: 
1. Availability and utility losses 
a. Destroy, damage, or contaminate 
b. Deny, prolong, accelerate, or delay use or acquisition 
c. Move or misplace 
d. Convert or obscure  
2. Integrity and authenticity losses 
a. Insert, use, or produce false or unacceptable data 
b. Modify, replace, remove, append, aggregate, separate, or reorder 
c. Misrepresent 
d. Repudiate (reject as untrue) 
e. Misuse or final to use as required 
3. Confidentiality and possession losses 
a. Locate 
b. Disclose 
c. Observe or monitor and acquire 
d. Copy 
e. Take or control 
f. Claim ownership or custodianship 
g. Infer 
4. Other losses 
a. Endanger by exposing to any of the other losses 
b. Failure to engage in or allow any of the other losses to occur when 
instructed to do so. 
Human risk factors are related to human errors and many publications exist in this area, 
such as Baysari, Mcintosh and Wilson (2008), Cosby (2003), Hollnagel (1998), Reason 
(1990), and Shorrock and Kirwan (2002).  
Liginlal, Sim and Khansa (2009) analysed publicly reported privacy breach incidents 
and derived a human error taxonomy of privacy breach incidents and their causes. They 
divided the main types of incidents into two categories: human error and malicious acts. 
Within these categories were two possible sources of error: IT-enabled or manual 
processes. This led to a list of eight leading causes of breaches. 
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Table 5.4 Taxonomy of human error (Liginlal et al., 2009) 
Breach type Source of error Leading cause of breach 
Human error IT-enabled process 1. Lost computer equipment 
 Manual process 2. Inappropriate skill in using IT 
  3. Insufficient monitoring 
  4. Improper disposal of documents 
  5. User entry errors 
Malicious acts IT-enabled process 6. Internet threats, attack, or hack 
 Manual process 7. Employee manipulation and 
malfeasance 
  8. Unauthorised access 
 
A number of taxonomies that focus on information security within healthcare have also 
been reused. Asaro et al. (1999) organised a collection of indicators from scenarios of 
confidentiality breaches in the form of a taxonomic tree. The indicators help to 
determine the information needs for audit trail generation and analysis by giving an 
overview of the information that is likely to be targeted in the record and the motivation 
of the attacker. The tree represents two paths of indicators: the motivational indicators 
based on the relationship between the patient and the user (or the breacher of the 
confidentiality), and indicators within the system such as unexpected number of patients 
accessed. The user-patient relationship types that are identified are: familial, 
employment, friend/neighbour, adversarial legal, professional or other. These types of 
relationship explain motivations to access a patient’s record and are useful to identify 
potential risk factors related to people and social circumstances. Asaro et al. also 
identified information elements that could be targeted. These are listed in Figure 5-2. 
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Figure 5-2 Information elements, based on Asaro et al. (1999) 
 
Brann and Mattson (2004) created a typology of confidentiality breaches during 
conversations, based on interviews with 51 patients and observations of the behaviour 
and actions of healthcare providers. Patients gave their definitions and experiences 
concerning confidentiality within the hospital of study. Observations of the behaviour of 
staff resulted in additional experiences, which were all combined in a typology. This 
typology was later expanded with written communication (Brann, 2007). The typology 
that emerged is purely based on human behaviour and verbal communication, and did 
not include electronic communication which makes this typology an interesting addition 
to the above mentioned taxonomies that focus mostly on computer technology based 
threats and vulnerabilities. The types of confidentiality breaches in healthcare 
communication that were found are illustrated in Table 5.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
Information 
about the patient 
Clinical data 
Test results 
Diagnoses 
Experimental 
drug levels 
Patient care 
logistics 
Location of 
patient care 
Time/date of 
patient care 
Designated 
provider details 
Special 
VIP status 
Involvement in 
experimental 
studies 
Information 
element types 
Relationship 
information 
Fellow employee 
relationship 
Familial 
relationship 
Legal 
relationship 
Demographics 
Name 
Home address 
Identifiers such 
as social security 
number 
Birthdate  
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Table 5.5 Typology of confidentiality breaches (Brann & Mattson, 2004, 2007) 
Theme Type 
Internal confidentiality breach Informal conversations among health care providers 
about patient’s or co-worker’s health status 
 Telephone conversations involving health care 
providers or insurance company representatives 
 Communication between health care providers and 
patients overheard by another patient or provider 
reveals information to a patient about another patient 
 Communication about a patient between a health 
care provider and a non-patient 
External confidentiality breach Sharing confidential information with family 
 Sharing confidential information with friends 
Accessibility to written 
communication 
Leaving records, notes, forms available for others to 
peruse 
 Disposal of client’s records in non-protected area 
 
Carthey and Clarke (2010) wrote a guide for individuals and teams working to improve 
patient safety. The guide aims to build awareness of the importance of human factors in 
making changes to improve patient safety. In the guide, the conclusions of research in 
safety culture and human factors are brought together. Five elements of safety culture 
are indicated to be related to reduction of human errors:  
1. Open culture: staff feel comfortable discussing patient safety incidents and 
raising safety issues with both colleagues and senior managers. 
2. Just culture: Staff, patients and carers are treated fairly, with empathy and 
consideration when they have been involved in a patient safety incident or have 
raised a safety issue. 
3. Reporting culture: staff have confidence in the local incident reporting system 
and use it to notify healthcare managers of incidents that are occurring, 
including near misses. 
4. Learning culture: the organisation is committed to learn safety lessons, 
communicates them to colleagues and remembers them over time. 
5. Informed culture: the organisation has learnt form past experience and has the 
ability to identify and mitigate future incidents because it learns from events that 
have already happened (for example incident reports and investigations).  
Researchers have also created classifications of security behaviour (Schultz, 2002; 
Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005). Surprisingly, the classical view of the 
technical inside and outside still persists in many of these approaches (Franqueira, van 
Cleeff, van Eck, & Wieringa, 2010). Classifications related to human behaviour and 
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organisational culture frequently make a distinction between insider behaviour and 
external attackers. Illustrative of this is that it is frequently claimed that insiders are the 
biggest problems for information security (Baker et al., 2011; Baker, Hylender, & 
Valentine, 2008; BERR, 2008; Crinson, 2008; CSI, 2011; Franqueira et al., 2010; 
Libenson, 2007; Liginlal et al., 2009; Schultz, 2002; Verizon, 2012; Williams, 2008).  
The decision to re-use elements of the models above was based on the goal of being as 
complete as possible for the description of socio-technical information security incident 
and risk scenarios in healthcare. In terms of the requirements of Amaroso (1994), as 
listed in section 5.4 and highlighted cursive in the text here, the classification must be 
exhaustive. The categories needed to be extended beyond threats and vulnerabilities, as 
a complete description of a risk also includes the actual events and damages. Social and 
environmental variables contributing to information security risks were included. On the 
other side, it was decided not to expand in detail on all possible computer 
vulnerabilities, as these can be very technical or system-specific. For this study, these 
types of vulnerabilities were not useful, however, in future studies it will be possible to 
add these to the classification without much effort.  
Eventually, the 5 categories included in the HI-risk classification (threat, method, 
weakness, event and damage) were repeated as much as possible from existing 
classifications. A threat describes the initiator: the who or what started the incident, the 
where, and the why information was ‘attacked’ or targeted. The method describes the 
methods and techniques that are used to ‘attack’ information, or to cause an undesirable 
event. The weakness is the flaw or vulnerability in the security controls, procedures, or 
human nature; it is the weak spot that is being taken advantage of. The event is what 
goes wrong: the asset and the information items that are exposed or damaged. The 
damage category lists the negative outcome: the number of records affected, the 
quantitative value and qualitative description of the damage. These 5 main categories 
aim to be logical and intuitive, so that they can become accepted. The sub-categories 
within the 5 main categories are mutually exclusive and unambiguous; they should not 
overlap or cause confusion. The classification is presented in Table 5.6. The sub-
categories and elements are filled with what was learned from the classifications 
reviewed in this chapter, the literature review in chapter 2 and 3 (as summarised in 
Table 3.2) and the lessons learned after the surveys, interviews and observations (as 
described in chapters 6 and 7).  
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 Table 5.6 Classification of security risk and incident factors 
Category Sub-category Element 
THREAT   
Initiator Person Medical staff 
  Financial administration staff 
  Trainee 
  Personal assistant 
  Secretary 
  Admin support 
  Management/executive/board 
  Technicians 
  Cleaners 
  IT staff 
  Restaurant/catering staff 
  Volunteers 
  Other staff:… 
  Unknown staff 
  Employee in partner organisation or related 
healthcare provider 
  Employee in third party supplier or contractor 
  Ex-employee 
  Patient 
  Family or carer/representative of patient 
  External group or activists 
  Government/police 
  Researcher 
  Unknown 
  Other person: 
 Environmental 
element Earthquake 
  Weather related 
  Fire 
  Water 
  Animals 
  Unknown 
  Other:…. 
 Social Change in legislation 
  Change in organisation/merger/acquisition 
  Change in organisational policies 
  Implementation of new infrastructure 
  Implementation of new marketing medium 
  New products or services developed 
  New trends in society  
  Social atmosphere within organisation 
  Redundancies 
  Regional crime levels 
  National/regional security alert evel 
  Other:… 
 Asset Building 
  Hardware 
  Software 
  Resources (water, electricity,…) 
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Category Sub-category Element 
  Communication assets 
  Other:….. 
Motive Unintentional No motive, unintentional action 
 Intentional Justice 
  Satisfaction 
  Resignation 
  Knowledge 
  Financial gain 
  Emotional gain 
  Political gain 
  Covering up errors 
  Convenience 
  Thrill 
  Status 
  Challenge 
  Unknown 
  Other:….. 
Location Within premises Reception 
  Parking 
  Public space 
  Consultation room 
  Corridor 
  Cafeteria 
  Ward 
  Other:… 
  Unspecified internal location 
 Other location At the patient's home/environment 
  At the staff member’s home/environment 
  Public transport 
 
 
On the premises of other healthcare provider or 
related organisation 
  In a public place 
  Private transport 
  Other:…. 
 Unknown   
Unknown   
METHOD   
Personal  Making a mistake 
  Stealing 
  Copying 
  Unauthorised accessing 
  Damaging, breaking 
  Manipulating 
  Abusing ICT facilities 
  Inserting a script/program 
  Libel 
  Overhearing/eavesdropping 
  Overseeing  
  Intimidating/verbal threats 
  Harassment  
  Pressuring 
  Falsification 
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Category Sub-category Element 
  Offensive jokes, offensive language  
 
 
Personal comments about a person’s physical 
appearance or character 
  Other:… 
  Unknown 
Physical  Burglary 
  Robbing 
  Hijacking 
  Physical attack 
  Natural disruption 
  Other:… 
  Unknown 
Automated  Data tapping 
  Toolkit 
  Distributed tool 
  Other:….. 
  Unknown 
Unknown   
WEAKNESS   
Human 
vulnerability 
Procedure/policy 
not followed Unattended asset or record 
  Security facility not used 
  Sharing of password or access token 
 
 
Sharing personal details when asking for IT 
support  
  Unsecure disposal of data carrying assets 
  Other procedure not followed:…. 
 Situational Telephone conversation in public area 
  Informal conversation in public area  
  Untidiness 
  Other:… 
 Mistakes Fax to wrong recipient 
  Email recipient entry errors 
  Data entry errors 
  Hasty working 
  Lack of skills/training 
  Other:… 
 Mental state Emotions 
  Mental workload 
  Failing to take due care and attention 
  Distractions 
  Other:… 
 Unknown  
Organisational 
vulnerability Procedural Paper record in internal post 
  Paper record in external post 
 
 
Organisational changes, new procedures, 
routines 
  Lack of internal control in procedure 
  Security flaw in storage of data 
  Insufficient supervision 
  Lack of security in email application 
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Category Sub-category Element 
  Flaws in settings in authorisations/privileges 
  Lack of control of outsourcing partner 
 
 
Failure to implement timely measures of 
control 
  Process design 
  Relocation of activities to new site 
 Cultural Lack of learning culture: the organisation is not 
committed to learn lessons, to communicate 
them to colleagues and to remember them over 
time 
  Social atmosphere within organisation 
 
 
Closed culture: staff not feeling comfortable 
discussing incidents and raising issues with 
both colleagues and senior managers 
 
 
Unjust culture: staff, patients and carers are not 
treated fairly, with empathy and consideration 
when they have been involved in an incident or 
have raised an issue 
 
 
Lack of reporting culture: staff have no 
confidence in the local incident reporting 
system and do not use it to notify healthcare 
managers of incidents that are occurring, 
including near misses 
 
 
Lack of informed culture: the organisation has 
not learned from past experience and has not 
the ability to identify and mitigate future 
incidents. 
  Staff’s job satisfaction 
 Other: …..  
 Unknown  
Physical 
security 
vulnerability Storage facility Lack of lockable space  
  Lack of secure filing cabinets 
  Other:….. 
 Transport Transportation of media 
  Transportation of paper records 
  Other:….. 
 Secure areas Fax in unsecured environment 
  Printer in unsecured environment 
  Unsecured remote working environment 
  Lack of visual control on entrance point 
  Other:….. 
 Maintenance Lack of maintenance to building and facilities 
  Clearance of a building 
  Other:… 
 Vulnerability in 
security facilities Alarm system 
  Windows  
  Doors 
  CCTV 
  Guards not alert 
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Category Sub-category Element 
  Unsecured entry points 
  Other:….. 
 Unknown  
Computer 
vulnerability  Design 
  Implementation 
  Configuration 
  Website 
  Maintenance 
  Changes 
  Equipment 
  Other:….. 
  Unknown 
Unknown   
EVENT   
Confidentiality 
breach  Read/observe/hear personal data 
  Copy personal data 
  Disclose personal data 
  Acquire personal data 
  Locate personal data 
  Other:….. 
  Unknown 
Availability 
breach  Data lost or gone missing 
  Destroy data 
  Damage data or facilities 
  Delay process 
  
Data, notes or reports not available when 
needed 
  Other:….. 
  Unknown 
Integrity breach  Insert false data, notes or reports 
  Modify notes, data or reports 
  Remove parts of data, notes or reports 
Breach of 
ethical norms or 
code  Spreading illegal material 
  Publication of harmful material 
  Other:… 
Affected asset Affected data item Patient identifiable information 
  Clinical data 
  Patient care logistics 
  Payment details 
  Insurance details 
  Financial information 
  Employee’s personal information 
  Confidential research data 
  Confidential organisational data 
  Copyrighted data 
  Data under embargo 
  Medical recordings: illustrations, video, voice, 
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Category Sub-category Element 
scans, x-rays, photos, ultrasound picture 
  Unknown 
  Other:… 
 Technology 
related asset Application 
  Server 
  System 
  Networks & Devices 
  Other:… 
 End user devices Desktop 
  Laptop 
  Ipad/tablet  
  Smart phone 
  PDA 
  Self-service kiosk 
  Entry device/card reader 
  Printer 
  Scanner 
  Copier 
  Fax 
  User authentication device 
  Patient monitoring system 
  Implant  
  RFID chip 
  Unknown 
  Other:… 
 Offline data Backup tapes 
  Disks/cd/dvd/stick 
  Documents 
  Hard disk 
  Smartcard 
  Unknown 
  Other:… 
 Facility UPS 
  Camera 
  Physical barrier 
  Security system 
  Power infrastructure 
  Unknown 
  Other:… 
Unknown   
DAMAGE   
Direct costs  Repair cost 
  Mailing expenses 
  Replacement costs 
  Fines or penalties 
  Legal costs 
  Consultancy costs 
  Research or investigation costs 
  Call centre costs 
  Unknown 
  Other:… 
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Category Sub-category Element 
Indirect costs 
 
Embarrassment, awkwardness, anxiety or 
distress to the organisation or medical staff 
 
 
Embarrassment, awkwardness, anxiety or 
distress to the patient 
 
 
Affecting reputation of organisation or medical 
staff 
  Patients opting for for other healthcare provider 
  Loss of health or life of patient 
  Discrimination 
  Quality of care affected 
  Compliance to regulation affected 
  Tensions in work environment for medical staff 
  New products or services stalled 
  Other:…. 
  Unknown 
Affected 
number of 
patients  0-9 
  10-99 
  100-999 
  1,000-9,999 
  >10,000 
  Unknown 
Unknown   
 
 
The classification was the first step in the design of a database that can hold all the 
incident data from the participating organisations. This database was created with 
Microsoft Office Access. All elements from the classifications are represented in the 
columns in the database. When information security incidents are registered in the 
database, it is possible to count frequency of occurrence of elements and frequency of 
co-occurrence of multiple elements.  
5.5 Scenario analysis 
Each incident is described as a scenario. The threat category is always the start of a 
scenario, followed by the used method that exploits a vulnerability or weakness. This all 
leads to an event that causes damage. 
The concept of analysing a risk as a scenario is based on fault and attack trees, also 
referred to as cause-consequence diagrams (Nielsen, Platz & Runge, 1975). The 
advantage of trees is that for more complex situations they can be divided into sub-trees, 
which can also be reused in different situations. Fault trees have been used before, for 
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the analysis of failure conditions of complex technical systems. Schneier was the first to 
associate the term ‘attack tree’ with the use of fault trees for attack modelling which 
made this approach more widely known (Schneier, 1999). It has since been used by 
Reddy et al. (2008) to analyse consumer information privacy, by Grunske and Joyce 
(2008) to predict security for component-based systems, and by Edge et al. (2007) to 
analyse the security of online banking systems.  
Attack trees can capture the steps of an attack and their interdependencies. The idea is 
to build a graph to represent the decision-making process of attackers. The roots of the 
tree represent potential goals of an attacker. The leaves represent ways of achieving the 
goal. The main building blocks of attack trees are called nodes. The nodes are used to 
model steps of an attack, events or attacker actions. Each tree has a single top node, 
which represents the achievement of the attack's ultimate goal. The nodes under the root 
node are high-level ways in which a goal may be achieved. Child nodes represent attack 
steps that have to be performed successfully before another step can occur.  
To facilitate the scenario analysis, the database of past incidents is copied to Excel. The 
COUNTIFS formula in Excel applies criteria to cells and counts the number of times all 
criteria are met. The syntax of that formula is: 
COUNTIFS(criteria_range1, criterial1, [criteria_range2, criteria 2]…) 
This formula allows counting the number of co-occurences of a selection of variables. 
In other words, this formula counts the number of times certain scenarios occurred. This 
generated an overview of the most frequent incident scenarios from the past.  
The presentation of a scenario description can be graphically supported, as is done in 
other methods such as CORAS. This graphical presentation in tree maps has shown 
some positive contributions to the understanding of risks.  
5.6 Expert elicitation 
The second step in the HI-risk method is the consultation of a group of information 
security and healthcare experts by means of the Delphi method. The process consists of 
a number of rounds of questionnaires and an analysis of the results. After each round, 
the researcher provides an anonymous summary of the experts’ forecasts, as well as the 
comments that they provided with their judgements. Each expert may then revise their 
earlier answers in light of the replies of other members of the panel. It is believed that 
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during this process the range of the answers will decrease, and the group will converge 
towards the ‘correct’ answer, as explained in more detail in the Methodology chapter. 
The Delphi method was chosen over other methods for expert elicitation because of the 
multiple iterations and the convenience of the online survey possibility. This way, the 
experts did not have travel in order to meet physically, creating the possibility to create 
a panel that is not bound to geographic location.  
In the first round, the experts are shown the most frequent incident scenarios and asked 
to indicate the expected frequency of occurrence in the future. This question is repeated 
in Rounds 2 and 3, with the addition of showing them the answers and comments made 
by the other experts. After three rounds, the combined opinion of expected frequency is 
considered to be the forecast. Furthermore, experts are given the opportunity to point 
out trends they see for future incidents.  
The output of the Delphi study is combined with the most frequent scenarios from the 
incident database and presented on a risk map. This map is a graph with two 
dimensions: frequency of occurrence and severity of the damage (in number of affected 
patient records). The scenarios are positioned on this graph as a visualisation to support 
decision-makers in their decision which scenarios require action. 
5.7 Risk monitoring 
Risk monitoring is used to review the state of risk scenarios, to identify new risks and to 
assess the effectiveness of risk treatment. The risk map and the risk scenarios provide an 
overview for information security risk managers that can be used to compare the risk 
situation in an individual organisation with the situation in the network of organisations. 
Furthermore, it can be used to act quickly on new risk scenarios that occur in other 
organisations, in order to prevent them from happening in the own organisation.  
The knowledge that is derived from the HI-risk method can also be used to create 
collective policy and measures of control. It supports the knowledge management and 
knowledge sharing of the participants and could improve the security of the collective 
of participating healthcare organisations.  
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter described the HI-risk method. The first step in the method is the 
registration of information security incidents by a group of collaborating organisations. 
The register follows a classification that was created after studying existing models to 
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describe risk factors. From the collective incident register, an overview of the most 
frequent scenarios is generated. The second step is the elicitation of expert knowledge 
in a three-round Delphi study. The panel judges the most frequent scenarios and 
estimate the possible future scenarios. The output of both steps is combined in a risk 
map.  
The HI-risk method was put into action and evaluated in a case study. The next chapter 
(chapter 6) reports how the method was carried out and chapter 7 describes the results 
of the case study. 
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6 HI-risk method demonstration  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes how the HI-risk method was performed by gathering incident 
data from healthcare organisations, scenario analysis and by the expert elicitation. The 
aim of this research step was to test the usability of the method and to deliver the main 
output of the method: the risk forecast.  
The data to create the database was collected through a survey. After that, a Delphi 
study was carried out with a panel of 12 selected experts. During the registration of the 
collected incident data from the survey and the Delphi study, the usability and 
completeness of the classification were tested. It also showed if the categories were 
mutually exclusive, repeatable and unambiguous. The execution of the method resulted 
in additions and alterations to the classification. The survey data and the Delphi study 
results were combined to create the map of information security risks in healthcare. This 
map presents the most frequently expected information security risk scenarios.  
6.2 Data collection for the incident database 
Data was requested directly from NHS Health Boards and Care Trusts in Scotland (14) 
and England (149) through a FOI request, as discussed in the Methodology chapter. The 
list of organisations that were approached are listed in Appendix A. The responses were 
collected between September and March 2010. A total of 163 requests were sent and 
132 replies were received (Table 6.1). As noted earlier, this means that a 81% response 
rate was received and this was considered satisfactory for the purposes of this study, and 
the remaining organisations were not chased for their reply. Two organisations replied 
that collecting the data for the answer would cost more than £600 and therefore 
included no response. The information about the incidents was copied into the incident 
database.  
Table 6.1 Overview FOI responses  
Number of sent FOI requests 163 
Number of replies 132 
Number of no replies  28 
Undeliverable emails 3 
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The returned incident registers contained some narrative information about incidents 
and a basic categorisation of cause and location. The presentation of the information 
differed widely. Almost all of them were unique in their format and descriptions of 
incidents. Some respondents completed the provided spreadsheet, others sent a list 
generated from an IT service desk application or referred to their annual reports. 
There appears to be no common approach to report and administer incidents, even 
though guidelines exist (Department of Health, 2010a). One observation was that the 
organisations that provided the highest numbers of incidents also recorded them with 
more detail and included near misses. This does not mean that they suffer from more 
incidents than others, it possibly means that these organisations experience a greater 
awareness and professionalism towards information security and therefore report higher 
numbers of incidents as they could be better in identifying and reporting them.  
All usable replies were selected from the 132 organisations and the data was 
restructured into the HI-risk database. Eventually 2108 incidents from 83 organisations 
were added. Hundreds more incident descriptions could not be used; they were often too 
generic to be able to make an interpretation for the model.  
6.2.1 Data analysis 
The data in the incident database was analysed to discover patterns in co-occurrences of 
variables. The variables are nominal and qualitative, so it was not possible to perform 
advanced quantitative statistical analysis. It was possible to count frequencies of 
occurrence of individual variables. Counting the frequency of occurrences of a specific 
threat or specific vulnerability in an organisation’s incident register gives some 
information about past incidents and could be used to make decisions about the 
implementation of security controls. An organisation could, for instance, decide to focus 
on process improvements and employee training to bring down the number of incidents 
caused by vulnerabilities such as human errors when handling personal data. Or they 
could decide to invest in physical security measures to prevent theft and damage if the 
frequency of thefts is high. Although this type of data is very basic, according to 
Hubbard (2010), it still can help to make potentially good decisions, because the 
decisions would be based on structured data, which is better than no data at all. Some 
examples of such basic statistics are shown in Figures 6-1 to 6-4.  
Figure 6-1 shows the number of incident and the number of patient records that were 
affected. The figure visualises the fact that most incidents impact a low number of 
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patients. It also shows that the higher the number of affected records, the lower the 
frequency of occurrence. Only 3 large-scale incidents occurred. 
 
Figure 6-1 Number of incidents and damage 
 
Another example in Figure 6-2 shows the types of threat initiators that were registered. 
It shows that staff were the main initiator of incidents, but that a large amount of 
incidents were triggered by unknown causes. Not knowing the cause of incidents is 
deemed problematic, as this information is needed to decide which countermeasures to 
implement.  
The list of occurred vulnerabilities is shown in Figure 6-3. This graph shows again that 
there are many unknown factors. Furthermore, it shows that leaving assets unattended is 
by far the most frequently registered factor in information security incidents.  
In Figure 6-4 the affected assets are shown. It shows that paper records are the third 
most frequently affected asset during information security incidents.  
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Figure 6-2 Number of incidents per threat initiator 
 
Figure 6-3 Vulnerabilities 
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Figure 6-4 Affected assets 
 
One research hurdle appeared with the data. The quality of the data in the database was 
limited, causing limitations to the analysis. During the data entry, it appeared that the 
classification itself and the responses to the FOI requests showed some weaknesses:  
1. Only nine elements of the threat category initiator appeared in the incident register.  
2. The respondents did not report the motivations of the initiator. It was not reported 
what initiators wanted to achieve, what their relationship was and what kind of 
attacker they were. 
3. The list of vulnerabilities turned out to be too detailed for this exercise. The 
description of the incidents was too abstract to use all of the elements. Therefore, 
only the sub-categories could be used for the test. 
4. The majority of the respondents did not report the damage that was suffered from 
incidents.  
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The survey data also added value to the classification and some adjustments were made: 
1. The location of the incident was registered in most cases. During the analysis, it 
became clear that additional elements needed to be added to the list of possible 
locations. Incidents also occur at home with the patient or staff.  
2. From the list of affected assets only a few seemed to occur. Two devices were 
added: medical devices and phone system/switchboard (including answering 
machines).  
3. A new sub-category was added to the list of possible damage. Almost all 
organisations registered the number of patient records affected to the breach and 
adding this number to the register provides for an indication of the severity of the 
incidents. This suggests that healthcare organisations find this number important to 
register. 
The HI-risk approach is looking for patterns beyond the basic statistics, in the form of 
scenarios. These scenarios show the combinations of variables that occur together 
during an incident. The data is analysed for the number of times certain variables occur 
together in a scenario, leading to an overview of most frequent scenarios (Appendix B). 
This way, 181 unique scenarios were distilled from the 2108 incidents. The top 5 most 
frequently occurring scenarios and the most damaging scenario (scenario 6) were used 
in the next research step, to ask experts for their opinion about how these most frequent 
scenarios from the past could serve as an indicator for future risks. These scenarios are 
illustrated in Figure 6-5 and 6-6. The scenarios can be described as follows: 
Scenario 1: Email to unauthorised recipient.  
Ten out of 100 incidents (10% of past incidents) involve an internal employee located 
on the premises who sends an email which includes patient-identifiable data, to a 
recipient who is not authorised to see that data and consequently discloses the personal 
details of a few patients (less than 10 patients). 
Scenario 2. Unattended asset goes missing.  
Nine out of 100 of the incidents (9% of past incidents) involve an internal employee 
located on the premises leaving an asset unattended and consequently the asset goes 
missing. The asset contained personal information of a few patients (less than 10). 
Scenario 3. Wrong privileges set.  
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Six out of 100 incidents (6% of past incidents) involved an internal employee on the 
premises who unintentionally was given the wrong privileges or authorisations, causing 
disclosure of personal patient information to unauthorised persons.  
Scenario 4. Password or access token sharing.  
Five out of 100 incidents (5% of past incidents) involve an internal employee sharing 
his password or access token leading to disclosure of patient information to 
unauthorised persons. 
Scenario 5. Procedure not followed.  
Four out of 100 incidents (4% of past incidents) involve an internal employee located 
on the premises who does not follow the formal procedures leading to disclosure of 
patient information.  
Scenario 6. More than 10,000 patient records affected.  
A few (0.14%) of the past incidents involved the loss or destruction of data on a 
portable (backup) medium, affecting more than 10,000 patient records. 
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Figure 6-5 Mistake scenarios tree 
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Figure 6-6 Unauthorised access scenarios tree 
 
6.3 Expert elicitation 
The scenarios presented in the previous section were useful to learn about past 
incidents, and they were then used as input for an expert panel to judge the expected 
frequency of occurrence in the near future. The experts’ opinions were gathered with a 
three-round Delphi study. The approach and rationale behind the Delphi method was 
explained in chapter 4 of this thesis. In this section, the result of the Delphi study is 
presented. A shorter version of this section has been published in the peer-reviewed 
journal Computers & Security (Van Deursen, Buchanan and Duff, 2013).  
The results are presented in four different ways: a narrative (section 6.3.2); in box-and-
whisker plots (Figure 6-7 to 6-25); by means of descriptive statistics (Table 6.2); and in 
a table showing the consensus per round (Table 6.3). For each individual scenario, a 
narrative about the expert’s opinions on the scenario is presented from section 6.3.2 
onwards. The aim is to investigate the reason behind outlying estimations and to analyse 
alternative views on the scenarios. The comments give valuable information about the 
rationale behind outlying scores. Where the opinions were very diverse and there were 
not enough consensuses to define a group judgement, the comments were analysed for 
possible explanations of the diversity. Equally, outlying opinions were analysed. The 
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spread of opinions is visualised graphically in a box and whisker plot by showing the 
interquartile range (the range that contains the answers of the middle 50 percent of the 
respondents). These diagrams have a box showing the range from the first to third 
quartiles, and the median divides this large box into two boxes for the second and third 
quartiles. The whiskers span the first quartile, from the second quartile box down to the 
minimum, and the fourth quartile, from the third quartile box up to the maximum. The 
median is indicated with a diamond. These figures are included in the next sections with 
the scenario discussions. 
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the expected frequency of occurrence for the most 
important scenarios are shown in Table 6-2. The table shows the 19 scenarios that were 
evaluated by the experts, as was described in section 4.4.3 of this thesis. These include 
the 6 scenarios presented to the experts in Round 1 and the 13 scenarios that were 
created by the experts in the blank sheet. The statistics include mean, median, range and 
standard deviation of their judgements. The final group judgement is based on the 
median rather than the mean, since single extreme answers can ‘pull’ the mean 
unrealistically (Gordon, 1994 p. 9). Furthermore, when the distribution of the 
frequencies for some scenarios differ highly, the median is a more stable figure than the 
mean (Armitage, Berry, & Matthews, 2002). These statistics show that the experts 
estimated that scenario 2, staff sharing passwords or access tokens, is the most likely 
event to occur in the near future. The median of that scenario is 8.9, which means that 
the experts predict that almost 9% of all future incidents will fit into this scenario. 
 Table 6.2 Expected frequency of occurrence per scenario per round 
 
Round 1  Round 2 Round 3 
Scenario 1 Unattended asset or record goes missing 
Median 5.0 4.5 5.0 
Range 20 9.5 5.5 
Largest 20 10 8 
Smallest 0 0.5 2.5 
Mean 6.1 4.6 4.9 
St Dev 5.5 3.6 1.36 
Number of experts (N) 12 10 10 
Scenario 2 Password or access token sharing 
Median 5.0 8.9 8.9 
Range 29.9 29.5 5.0 
Largest 30.0 30 10 
Smallest 0.1 0.5 5 
Mean 7.7 11.3 8.1 
St Dev 9.3 8.5 2.12 
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Round 1  Round 2 Round 3 
Number of experts (N) 12 10 10 
Scenario 3 Email to wrong recipient 
Median 2.3 3.0 3.0 
Range 9.9 4.5 5.0 
Largest 10.0 5 5 
Smallest 0.1 0.5 0 
Mean 4.2 3.1 2.8 
St Dev 3.8 1.9 1.27 
Number of experts (N) 12 10 10 
Scenario 4 Theft from the premises (blank sheet scenario) 
Median 7.5 5.0 5.0 
Range 0.0 9.9 8.0 
Largest 7.5 10 10 
Smallest 7.5 0.1 2 
Mean 7.5 3.7 5.0 
St Dev - 3.2 2.18 
Number of experts (N) 1 9 10 
Scenario 5 Procedure not followed 
Median 4.0 3.5 4.5 
Range 9.9 9.5 6.8 
Largest 10.0 10.0 8.8 
Smallest 0.1 0.5 2 
Mean 4.4 4.3 4.3 
St Dev 3.9 3.4 2.11 
Number of experts (N) 12 10 10 
Scenario 6 Wrong privileges set 
Median 1.7 2.3 2.5 
Range 14.8 8.5 2.5 
Largest 15.0 9.0 4.0 
Smallest 0.2 0.5 1.5 
Mean 3.7 3.0 2.8 
St Dev 4.4 2.6 0.8 
Number of experts (N) 12 10 10 
Scenario 7 High impact mistakes (blank sheet scenario) 
Median 5.3 3.5 2.8 
Range 4.5 20 4 
Largest 8 20 5 
Smallest 3 0 1 
Mean 5.3 4.7 2.9 
St Dev 3.18 6.10 1.15 
Number of experts (N) 2 9 10 
Scenario 8 Working in a public place (blank sheet scenario) 
Median 7.5 2.0 2.5 
Range 0 9.9 1 
Largest 8 10 3 
Smallest 8 0 2 
Mean 7.5 3.6 2.4 
St Dev - 3.77 0.42 
Number of experts (N) 1 9 5 
Scenario 9 Unsecure remote 3
rd
 party (blank sheet scenario) 
Median 7.5 2.5 2.3 
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Round 1  Round 2 Round 3 
Range 0 6 2.5 
Largest 8 6 3 
Smallest 8 0 1 
Mean 7.5 2.8 2.0 
St Dev - 2.42 0.83 
Number of experts (N) 1 9 10 
Scenario 10 Transportation of data (blank sheet scenario) 
Median 0.8 0.7 1.0 
Range 0 1 5.8 
Largest 1 1 7 
Smallest 1 0 1 
Mean 0.8 0.6 2.0 
St Dev - 0.38 2.51 
Number of experts (N) 1 6 5 
Scenario 11 Family of patient (blank sheet scenario) 
Median 0.8 0.6 1.0 
Range 0 1 9.5 
Largest 1 1 10 
Smallest 1 0 1 
Mean 0.8 0.5 2.6 
St Dev - 0.53 4.14 
Number of experts (N) 1 6 5 
Scenario 12 Backup medium goes missing 
Median 0.4 1.0 0.8 
Range 9.9 5.9 0.9 
Largest 10 6 1 
Smallest 0 0 0 
Mean 1.4 1.6 0.7 
St Dev 2.78 1.91 0.38 
Number of experts (N) 12 9 5 
Scenario 13 Improper disposal (blank sheet scenario) 
Median 0.8 0.5 0.9 
Range 0 1 1.5 
Largest 1 1 2 
Smallest 1 0 1 
Mean 0.8 0.5 0.9 
St Dev - 0.55 0.46 
Number of experts (N) 1 6 10 
Scenario 14 Third party discloses data (blank sheet scenario) 
Median 0.3 0.5 0.5 
Range 0.5 0.7 2.3 
Largest 1 1 3 
Smallest 0 0 0 
Mean 0.5 0.6 0.8 
St Dev 0.29 0.29 0.65 
Number of experts (N) 3 9 10 
Scenario 15 Unsecured remote working  (blank sheet scenario) 
Median 0.8 0.5 0.5 
Range 0 4.95 0.7 
Largest 1 5 1 
Smallest 1 0 0 
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Round 1  Round 2 Round 3 
Mean 0.8 1.5 0.6 
St Dev - 2.08 0.26 
Number of experts (N) 1 9 5 
Scenario 16 External groups (blank sheet scenario) 
Median 0.6 0.4 0.5 
Range 0.5 1 0.8 
Largest 1 1 1 
Smallest 0 0 0 
Mean 0.6 0.3 0.5 
St Dev 0.35 0.33 0.32 
Number of experts (N) 2 9 5 
Scenario 17 Trainee breaching confidentiality (blank sheet scenario) 
Median 3.0 0.3 0.5 
Range 0 2 1 
Largest 3 2 1 
Smallest 3 0 0 
Mean 3.0 0.5 0.5 
St Dev - 0.77 0.35 
Number of experts (N) 1 6 5 
Scenario 18 Breach at the patient home (blank sheet scenario) 
Median 7.5 0.2 0.2 
Range 0 5 0.8 
Largest 8 5 1 
Smallest 8 0 0 
Mean 7.5 1.3 0.4 
St Dev - 2.12 0.35 
Number of experts (N) 1 9 5 
Scenario 19 Covering up errors (blank sheet scenario) 
Median 0.8 0.3 0.2 
Range 0 1 2.4 
Largest 1 1 3 
Smallest 1 0 0 
Mean 0.8 0.4 0.7 
St Dev - 0.49 1.03 
Number of experts (N) 1 6 5 
 
Table 6.3 shows the level of consensus after grouping the individual responses into 
ordinal categories. When forecasting risks, it is not ideal to focus too much on the 
absolute numbers as it is generally not easy to forecast the exact number of times a risk 
materialises with the relative small amount of data that was gathered for this study. For 
that reason, the quantitative data is grouped into qualitative categories. These categories 
are presented as: very rarely (<0.5% of all incidents), rarely (0.5-1% of all incidents), 
sometimes (>1-5% of all incidents), frequently (>5-10% of all incidents) and very 
frequently (>10%). The underlying frequencies are not grouped into equal intervals, as 
this leads to many categories without cases in them. Therefore, intervals of unequal size 
 146 
were chosen in a way that showed the optimal appearance, as suggested by Healey 
(2011). 
Table 6.3 Consensus levels for frequency of occurrence  
 Round 1   Round 2  Round 3  
 Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus  Frequency Consensus 
Scenario 1 Unattended asset or record goes missing 
Very rarely  2 17% 2 20% 0  
Rarely  0  1 10% 0  
Sometimes  5 42% 4 40% 9 90% 
Frequently  4 33% 3 30% 1 10% 
Very frequently  1 8% 0  0  
Scenario 2 Password or access token sharing 
Very rarely  2 17% 1 10% 0  
Rarely 3 25% 0  0  
Sometimes  1 8% 0  2 20% 
Frequently  4 33% 6 60% 8 80% 
Very frequently  2 17% 3 30% 0  
Scenario 3 Email to wrong recipient 
Very rarely  2 17% 1 10% 1 10% 
Rarely  1 8% 2 20% 0  
Sometimes  5 42% 7 70% 9 90% 
Frequently 4 33% 0  0  
Very frequently  0  0  0  
Scenario 4 Theft from the premises (blank sheet scenario) 
Very rarely  0  2 22% 0  
Rarely  0  1 11% 0  
Sometimes 0  5 56% 7 70% 
Frequently  1  1 11% 3 30% 
Very frequently  0  0  0  
Scenario 5 Procedure not followed 
Very rarely  3 25% 1 10% 0  
Rarely  2 17% 1 10% 0  
Sometimes  2 17% 5 50% 8 80% 
Frequently  5 42% 3 30% 2 20% 
Very frequently  0  0  0  
Scenario 6 Wrong privileges set 
Very rarely  3 33% 1 10% 0  
Rarely  3 25% 1 10% 0  
Sometimes  3 25% 6 60% 10 100% 
Frequently  2 17% 2 20% 0  
Very frequently  1 8% 0  0  
Scenario 7 High impact mistakes (blank sheet scenario) 
Very rarely  0  2 22% 0  
Rarely  0  0  1 10% 
Sometimes  1  6 67% 9 90% 
Frequently  1  0  0  
Very frequently  0  1 11% 0  
Scenario 8 Working in a public place (blank sheet scenario) 
Very rarely  0  4 44% 0  
Rarely  0  0  0  
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 Round 1   Round 2  Round 3  
 Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus  Frequency Consensus 
Sometimes  0  2 22% 5 100% 
Frequently  1  3 33% 0  
Very frequently  0  0  0  
Scenario 9 Unsecure remote 3
rd
 party (blank sheet scenario) 
Very rarely    2 22.22% 1 10% 
Rarely    2 22.22% 2 20% 
Sometimes    4 44.44% 7 70% 
Frequently  1  1 11.11% 0  
Very frequently    0  0  
Scenario 10 Transportation of data (blank sheet scenario) 
Very rarely    3 50%   
Rarely  1  3 50% 4 80% 
Sometimes        
Frequently      1 20% 
Very frequently        
Scenario 11 Family of patient (blank sheet scenario) 
Very rarely    3 50%   
Rarely  1  3 50% 2 40% 
Sometimes      2 40% 
Frequently      1 20% 
Very frequently        
Scenario 12 Backup medium goes missing 
Very rarely  7 58% 4 44.44% 2 40% 
Rarely  3 25% 2 2.222% 3 60% 
Sometimes  1 8% 2 2.222% 0  
Frequently  1 8% 1 11.11% 0  
Very frequently    0  0  
Scenario 13 Improper disposal (blank sheet scenario) 
Very rarely    3 50% 4 40% 
Rarely  1  3 50% 5 50% 
Sometimes    0  1 10% 
Frequently    0    
Very frequently    0    
Scenario 14 Third party discloses data (blank sheet scenario) 
Very rarely  2  6 67% 7 70% 
Rarely  1  3 33% 2 20% 
Sometimes    0  1 10% 
Frequently    0  0  
Very frequently    0  0  
Scenario 15 Unsecured remote working  (blank sheet scenario) 
Very rarely    6 67% 4 80% 
Rarely  1  0  1 20% 
Sometimes    3 33% 0  
Frequently    0  0  
Very frequently    0  0  
Scenario 16 External groups (blank sheet scenario) 
Very rarely  1  8 89% 3 60% 
Rarely  1  1 11% 2 40% 
Sometimes    0  0  
Frequently    0  0  
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 Round 1   Round 2  Round 3  
 Frequency Consensus Frequency Consensus  Frequency Consensus 
Very frequently    0  0  
Scenario 17 Trainee breaching confidentiality (blank sheet scenario) 
Very rarely    5 83% 4 80% 
Rarely    0  1 20% 
Sometimes  1  1 17% 0  
Frequently    0  0  
Very frequently    0  0  
Scenario 18 Breach at the patient home (blank sheet scenario) 
Very rarely    6 67% 4 80% 
Rarely    1 11% 1 20% 
Sometimes    2 22% 0  
Frequently  1  0  0  
Very frequently    0  0  
Scenario 19 Covering up errors (blank sheet scenario) 
Very rarely    4 67% 4 80% 
Rarely  1  2 33% 0  
Sometimes    0  1 20% 
Frequently    0  0  
Very frequently    0  0  
 
6.3.2 Results per scenario   
6.3.2.1 Scenario 1: Unattended asset or record goes missing 
In this scenario, an internal employee accidentally leaves an asset unattended and as a 
consequence this asset goes missing, directly leading to the loss of data of up to 10 
patients and indirectly leading to costs and embarrassment for the staff or organisation 
and affecting the compliance to regulation. The type of asset is not specified in detail in 
this scenario. It could be anything such as an i-Pad, smart phone, laptop, USB stick, 
diary or a paper record and so on.  
The experts commented that this scenario “is very likely with USB sticks or 
smartphones or even paper files” (ID15, Round 1), and it does happen, as “small 
unencrypted USB devices do go missing, are left in drives or are simply mislaid” (ID14, 
Round 1). Furthermore, it was mentioned that it “applies more to paper than to 
electronic assets” (ID20, Round 1). 
It was also mentioned that very often it is not clear if an item was mislaid or stolen. The 
scenario in which items are stolen is described in Scenario 4: theft on the premises, 
where theft can be proven. In the comments it was mentioned that sometimes 
organisations combine these two scenarios in their incident registers. In the scenario 
 149 
meant here, items go missing by mistake, sloppiness or unknown causes, while Scenario 
4 is based on burglary and robbery.  
This scenario was reported frequently in the registers of past incidents (9% of all 
incidents), but the panel did not estimate the possible frequency of occurrence to be this 
high. This lower expectation may be influenced by  
Thin clients or private clouds hosting virtual machines. No data held locally. 
Moving towards this with private cloud data centres (ID19, Round 2).  
As personal data is less stored on devices and more in the cloud, the incidents 
will transition to the cloud storage space as well. Scenarios are different in that 
case (ID24, Round 3). 
The frequency estimations in Round 1 varied along a range of 20. The range of answers 
declined in Round 2 and even further in Round 3 to 5.5. The median remained the same 
but the range of answers was drawn closer to the median. As the mean and median were 
closer together in Round 3 and the standard deviation decreased, the agreement amongst 
the experts seemed to have increased. Furthermore, the consensus rate went up from 
40% to 90% for the category sometimes: the frequency of occurrence of this scenario is 
expected to be between 1% and 5% of all incidents, in contrast to the past experience, 
which was 9% (frequently). Round 3 showed no significant outliers anymore. Figure 6-
7 illustrates that in Round 1 the highest expected frequency was 20, and that the 
interquartile range was large. In Round 3 this interquartile range was smaller, indicating 
that most answers were in a small range from each other.  
Figure 6-7 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 1) 
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The majority of the panel (90%) estimate that this scenario occurs sometimes (between 
1-5% of all incidents). Industry reports suggest that one of the biggest current trends is 
the growing use of mobile devices (replacing unfixed desktops and workstations) to 
access and store patient records, leading to an increasing level of risk (CompTIA, 2012; 
Ponemon, 2011), which supports the expert panel estimation as one of the most frequent 
scenarios. However, the experts also mentioned that the use of encryption, a ban on 
memory sticks and thin clients or private clouds hosting virtual machines are measures 
that organisations are taking to lower the frequency of occurrence of this scenario, and 
as a result the expectation is that it will happen less frequently in the near future. 
6.3.2.2 Scenario 2: Password or access token sharing 
In this scenario, an employee shares a password or access token with someone and, as a 
consequence, patient information is disclosed to an unauthorised person. The experts 
agree that this scenario is likely to occur more frequently than registered in the incident 
registers. The experts rating the frequency on the highest end suggest that it is otherwise 
not possible to gain access:  
From past experience, I know it is impossible to work without sharing 
passwords. A true situation. A student nurse is required to gain experience on a 
particular system before being allowed own credentials. The only option is to 
use someone else’s password to gain the experience to be issued with own 
credential. Crazy, but this is from first-hand experience. Whether this leads to 
disclosure is a totally different question as it all comes down to personal 
integrity (ID26, Round 2); 
Personnel that are working in a hospital only for a short period of time (co-
assistant) use passwords from doctors frequently since they otherwise don’t have 
access to the computer systems (ID12, Round 1); 
and that it is standard practice:  
Based on knowledge of how student nurses are trained, the sharing of passwords 
is standard practice. The passwords are being shared with novice staff and hence 
their appreciation of potential consequents tends to be poor; likewise they are 
more prone to making mistakes than experienced staff (ID25, Round 3).  
In all environments that I know, password sharing is common. The fact that 
most people are trustworthy keeps the incident rate down (ID18, Round 1). 
It is often not perceived as a risk, as it is sometimes in the best interest of a patient and 
colleagues are allowed to see the data anyway: 
Given prominence of IG across NHS, staff are aware that they shouldn’t share 
passwords. However, understaffed wards with clinicians and nurses under 
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pressure to treat patients.... yes, this will happen, and it will be seen as 
acceptable if it is perceived to be in best interest of patient (ID22, Round 3). 
Not only can this lead to disclosure of personal patient data, but auditing becomes an 
issue too.  
Clinical teams will share passwords, as the perception is that it is quicker to 
jump on another to save time, and to alleviate patient distress, pain, etc. 
Management may issue access tokens in an attempt to reduce incidents of this 
type as people are seen to own their individual access token and may be less 
likely to give it away. However temporary staff may still share access for 
convenience. Audit becomes an issue. (ID19, Round 2). 
The work pressure and the way systems are designed seem to enable this practice, and it 
is suggested this risk scenario should be controlled with awareness training, special 
arrangements for temporary staff or trainees and additional terminals to work from. This 
risk scenario has been pointed out by other researchers as well. A study of the state of 
information security in twenty Dutch hospitals found that in two-thirds of these 
hospitals it was common to share one logon-id and password within a department 
(IGZ/CBP, 2008). The work pressure and the way systems are designed seem to enable 
this practice, and it is suggested to control this risk scenario with awareness training, 
special arrangements for temporary staff or trainees and additional terminals to work 
from.  
The panel estimated that the frequency of occurrence of this scenario is higher than 
suggested by past incidents (9% compared to 5%). After Round 3, the mean and median 
became closer together and the standard deviation lower, suggesting consensus amongst 
the respondents. Figure 6-8 illustrates a shrinking interquartile box over the rounds. The 
consensus rate for this scenario is 80%.  
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Figure 6-8 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 2) 
 
6.3.2.3 Scenario 3: Email to wrong recipient  
This scenario was reported as the most frequent in the registers of past incidents. It 
involves emails containing personal data of patients being sent to either the wrong 
recipients and/or to persons not authorised to receive that information. It is a scenario 
caused by unintentional mistakes by employees. The incident could lead to heavy fines, 
as can be illustrated by the £80,000 penalty that the ICO in the UK imposed on a 
County Council after a member of staff emailed highly sensitive personal information 
about a large number of vulnerable people to unintended recipients by clicking on an 
additional contact list, which had only been intended for internal use (Information 
Commissioner, 2011). 
The panel commented that some organisations do not use email to exchange patient data 
and thus have a lower frequency of occurrence.  
We have another solution in place to exchange patient data (ID24, Round 2). 
In other organisations it appears to happen often and it can also mean that notes on 
patients are included in meeting minutes. When the minutes are sent to a distribution 
list, it can easily happen that the list contains people who should not receive these 
details.  
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The experts did not estimate the possible frequency of occurrence to be as high as it 
occurred in the registers. 
This occurred at about 5:1000 10 years ago. Policies on patient identifiable 
information have since been adopted which seem to have addressed the issue 
(ID23, Round 1). 
Others commented that mistakes are easily and often made. 
It is very easy in a large healthcare organisation or hospital for employees to 
mistype email addresses or confuse recipient details. The larger the number of 
people with access to email, the more prone to error. Particularly where the staff 
IT expertise or workloads vary (ID14, Round 1). 
90% of the experts expect the frequency of occurrence of this scenario to be between 
1% and 5% (this scenario will happen sometimes), in contrast to past experience, which 
was 10% of all registered incidents. The mean and the median are close together. 
 
Figure 6-9 Distribution of expected frequency of occurrence (scenario 3) 
 
6.3.2.4 Scenario 4: Theft on the premises 
This scenario was suggested by the panel in Round 1. The scenario involves the theft of 
devices with personal data stored on it from the premises of the organisation. It can lead 
to a number of possible events such as loss of data and a breach of confidentiality. Theft 
of computers, laptops or other devices is the biggest cause of privacy breaches in 
healthcare reported to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health & Human 
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Services (2012). In their list of breaches, it shows that 50% of the breaches of health 
information security (that affected 500 or more individuals) are caused by theft. 
The scenario was reported frequently in the incident registers although the experts 
together estimate the frequency to be a little lower. The combined experts estimation is 
5%, and the past experience frequency was 6%. 70% of the experts agree that this 
scenario happens sometimes (1% to 5% of all incidents are like this scenario). One 
expert suggests that this scenario could be combined with lost assets: 
It is often very hard to reconstruct whether an item was lost or stolen. We treat 
the two the same in risk analysis (ID 21, Round 2). 
One outlier on the high end of the range (suggesting 10%) argues that this happens 
frequently: 
I've seen this in several healthcare organisations. In one particular case the PC in 
an addiction unit was deliberately stolen by drug dealers to provide them with a 
sales and marketing database of known addicts! (ID26, Round 2). 
This remark illustrates one of the statements of this thesis to include the environment 
and local crime rates as factors in a risk analysis. As was discussed in the background 
chapter, the implementation of physical security controls is often limited to the controls 
proposed by the international standard BS7799. However, some areas within 
organisations or within close range of the premises could be at higher risk due to safety 
and crime factors and require a broader risk analysis.  
For this scenario the consensus grew over the three rounds and the mean and median are 
close together. Figure 6-10 shows no data for Round 1 because the scenario was created 
in Round 1. In Round 3 the range was smaller than in Round 2 and the mean and 
median are almost equal. The one outlier at 10 causes a large range of answers (8).  
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Figure 6-10 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 4) 
 
 
6.3.2.5 Scenario 5: Procedure not followed 
Not following the formal procedures could lead to the disclosure of patient information 
to unauthorised persons, affecting compliance to regulation. A number of annual 
industry surveys recognize this scenario as one of the most frequent ones, and explain 
this type of scenario by lack of information security awareness. Awareness includes the 
behaviour, motivation, knowledge and skills of employees regarding information 
security. For instance, in the 2010 Kroll Fraud Solutions survey, the most frequently 
selected answer that would put data at risk was “lack of attention by staff to security 
policy” (Kroll Fraud Solutions, 2010).  
The issues with policy and procedures were considered in the literature review in 
chapter 3. Several publications were discussed which suggested a number of possible 
causes of these issues. Amongst these issues were the style and wording of the policies, 
the compatibility with practice, communication and feedback, training, changing 
organisational structures, peer pressure and compliance. The experts confirm these 
issues, as their comments appear to discuss the same topics. Some of the comments 
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made by the experts refer to staff often breaching policy and procedures but they can be 
unaware of it.  
Staff wouldn’t perceive themselves to be breaking the rules and hence may 
happen more often than is reported (ID19, Round 2). 
Staff tend to be helpful and fix problems outside of procedures when there is an 
urgency. 
Not following procedures happens regularly. We tend to be helpful, fix problems 
outside of procedures. Procedures contain checks to contain and correct this 
behaviour. We are increasingly getting better at this - hence the number of 
instances should decrease (ID18, Round 1). 
Too often patient data handling urgency overrules the safe conduct; else staff is 
not aware of any policies (unskilled or low skilled staff) or does not have any 
interest (high or extremely specialised skilled staff)… (ID13, Round 1). 
However, if the procedure is compatible with the practice, the adoption rate increases. 
We specify more and better procedures covering more work activities. 
Procedures contain checks, so they are increasingly more fault-resistant. As staff 
finds that following procedures leads to better results, adoption rate increases. 
All leading to better results than in the past (ID21, Round 2). 
Proper training, security awareness programmes and sanctions are suggested to have a 
positive influence in controlling this scenario.  
It all depends on user awareness, training, sanctions, and perhaps the motivation 
for intentional disclosure (ID15, Round 1). 
Ignorance or seeing rules as 'getting in the way' will always ensure that this is a 
high risk. It can only be countered by good security awareness training 
programmes (ID12, Round 1). 
Over the three rounds, the range of frequency estimations shrank but was still large. 
Figure 6-11 shows that Round 2 had outliers with higher estimations and lower 
estimations and Round 3 only had one outlier on the top. The individual with the higher 
estimation motivated his estimation with commenting that it may occur more frequently 
but it is often not reported.  
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Figure 6-11 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 5) 
The experts estimated the possible frequency of occurrence of this scenario as almost 
similar to the frequency of past incidents (which was 4%). Eighty percent of the experts 
in the panel estimate the frequency to be between 1% and 5%. Table 6.2 showed that 
the median and mean are close together and that the standard deviation is still large, but 
got lower over the three rounds and 80% of the estimations are now within the same 
interval.  
6.3.2.6 Scenario 6: Wrong privileges set 
This scenario describes how flaws in the settings of authorisations and privileges in 
systems can lead to confidentiality breaches because unauthorised employees receive or 
can read personal data they should not have access to. Table 6.3 showed that 100% of 
the panel estimates that this scenario will occur in 1% to 5% of all incidents. Figure 6-
12 shows a small distribution of estimated frequencies.  
Earlier, in Round 2 it had shown a few outlying answers. From the comments made by 
the experts who estimated the frequency of occurrence as high, it seemed that, 
according to them: 
Identity and access management and a proper implementation of authorization 
of electronic patient information has not been implemented very often and 
successfully (ID17, Round 1). 
I see it in many organisations. People accumulate access rights and the periodic 
review to clean that up does not happen (ID15, Round 1) 
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The profiles of these experts (ID14, ID15, and ID17 in Round 1) showed that these are 
the panel members with the highest expertise level in IT security. On the other hand, the 
experts who rated the frequency the lowest, refer in their comments to be confident that 
the procedures should cover this risk and to have confidence in the IT staff: 
IT staff is alert and need signatures before they give authorisations (ID 23, 
Round 2); 
Covered by procedures (ID19, Round 1); 
This is reviewed regularly (ID20, Round 1). 
This relation was shown to the experts in Round 3, as it could influence their point of 
view on the scenario. In Round 3 indeed, the differences completely disappeared. Some 
of the experts suggest that the IT staff usually follows the procedure but the managers 
who authorize the privileges do not perform periodic review to cancel or change 
privileges when no longer necessary.  
 
Figure 6-12 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 6) 
The experts estimate the possible frequency of occurrence to be lower than the 
frequency of past incidents showed (was 6%). The range of expert estimations 
decreased from 14.8 in Round 1 to 8.5 in Round 2 and dropped even more to 2.5 in 
Round 3. The estimations for this scenario had the lowest standard deviation of the 
scenarios (Table 6.2). 
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6.3.2.7 Scenario 7: High impact mistakes 
This scenario involves situations where medical or other internal staff makes an 
unintended mistake, which affects a large number of 1,000 to 9,999 patient records. It is 
a scenario that was suggested by two experts on their blank sheet in Round 1. The 
scenario was presented to the group and although in Round 2 there was little consensus 
and a high range of answers, in Round 3 their opinions came much closer together with 
a 90% consensus that this scenario happens sometimes.  
The register of past incidents did not show this scenario as frequently as the experts 
would have expected, “but it happens more often than we think” (ID 18, Round 3). 
The experts commented that mistakes with high consequences are expected:  
Mistakes are made easily (ID13, Round 2). 
People are human. Given workloads and work scenarios of busy clinical staff, 
disclosure as a result of internal mistakes is a real risk. It does happen and will 
continue to do so (ID14, Round 3). 
Biggest risk is still internal mistakes, because of the high impact (ID18, Round 
2). 
 
 
Figure 6-13 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 7) 
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6.3.2.8 Scenario 8: Working in a public place 
One expert suggested in Round 1 a scenario that involves:  
Medical staff working in a public place with a laptop or talking over the phone, 
and being overheard or seen, leading to the disclosure of personal data, affecting 
0-9 patient records (ID12, Round 1). 
He elaborated on this scenario with: 
Medical staff, in particular senior medical staff, still seem to have the attitude 
that they are above the law and that they should be able to work where and when 
they choose (ID12, Round 1). 
There was no instant tendency to agreement amongst the experts in Round 2 but they 
came to a 100% consensus in Round 3 (Figure 6-14). Of all 19 scenarios, this scenario 
is one of those with the closest consensus and the lowest range between estimated 
frequencies. 
This scenario is deemed hard to counteract: 
There will always be situations where public can see or hear medical staff 
discussing patients. Due to sheer size of NHS and older buildings this will never 
be 100% eliminated (ID14, Round 2). 
This happens more in hospitals than in GPs since GP surgeries are smaller and 
more easily controlled. A&E, on wards common to be overheard. Don’t think 
this will ever go away (ID14, Round 3). 
Theoretically this could apply to laptops connecting to open Wi-Fi hotspots - 
often a service offered at large facilities. But I think it is still more the case that 
we are not aware enough of our surroundings when discussing confidential 
details over the phone. It is not a choice of working where you choose; it is a 
consequence of rising work pressure (ID18, Round 2). 
I believe that medical staff still sees themselves as invisible or that people 
cannot hear, understand or are not interested in information they are talking 
about regarding other patients. It is a culture thing borne out of ward rounds, etc. 
(ID25, Round 2). 
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Figure 6-14 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 8) 
 
This scenario is related to three main factors: attitude of staff, the requirement to be able 
to work anywhere and the technical possibility to work anywhere. The background 
chapter discussed the growing possibilities of mobile working. Mobile working requires 
specific technical and social security controls. The attitude of staff and the awareness of 
the possibility of being overheard are main risk factors in this scenario.  
6.3.2.9 Scenario 9: Unsecure remote 3rd party 
This scenario was suggested by an expert in Round 1:  
An employee in a third party supplier or subcontractor making a mistake when 
using remote access from home or office and disclosing personal data, affecting 
100-999 patient records (ID25, Round 1). 
The experts responded that this can happen, but not as frequently as was suggested. 
Over the rounds, the experts estimated that it may happen in somewhere between 1% 
and 3% of all incidents. Although there is not a 100% consensus within a category of 
frequencies (Table 6.3), the range of answers is low (Figure 6-15). 
The scenario is mostly related to outsourced IT services and the possibility for staff in 
that company to access all data, and this kind of scenario is expected to start occurring 
more frequently in the future.  
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Outsourcing of maintenance or whatever IT services brings this issue to become 
a growing issue (ID19, Round 2). 
It will happen more and more often as more is outsourced and more and more 
business partners cannot prove or be controlled if they haven't these kind of 
incidents (ID 19, Round 3). 
The causes of this scenario are suggested to be due to procedural errors and awareness. 
Given the large number of individuals who potentially could gain access when 
working for outsource IT supply companies, there is a likelihood of error leading 
to disclosure. The more remote the support is from the end user the less they are 
seen to own the data, hence easy to make procedural errors (ID14, Round 2). 
Unauthorised use of real data for testing and development purposes in an 
insecure environment (ID12, Round 2). 
This scenario is important because “These incidents can have a large impact too” (ID18, 
Round 2). 
 
Figure 6-15 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 9) 
 
6.3.2.10 Scenario 10: Transportation of data 
This scenario was created in Round 1:  
An unknown person breaching confidentiality by copying personal data on a 
storage medium and transporting this medium for convenience, affecting 100-
999 patient records (ID19, Round 1). 
As underlying causes, it was suggested that this happens because staff is working at 
home to complete their tasks. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
E
st
im
a
te
d
 f
re
q
u
e
n
cy
 o
f 
o
cc
u
re
n
ce
 
Experts' mean
Experts' median
Frequency of occurrence in
incident register
 163 
Staff take home personal data for research purposes and to allow them to 
produce reports (ID12, Round 3). 
This is getting increasingly simpler to do and increasing work pressure may 
make staff feel this is necessary to complete their tasks (ID18, Round 2). 
It also happens within the premises of the organisation and the medium involved will 
increasingly consist of tablets: 
Depending upon network setup, could still allow use of external devices such as 
USB Keys (unlikely), but more commonly used are mobile tablets, PCs, ipad, 
etc., where record details are held. They can be moved around clinical team 
members as they move around their normal job tasks (ID14, Round 2). 
 
 
Figure 6-16 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 10) 
 
The consensus rate of 80% suggests some strong support for this scenario.  
6.3.2.11 Scenario 11: Family of patient 
In Round 1, this scenario was suggested by one the panel members: 
A family member/representative/carer of patient accessing the unattended 
patient's record unauthorised to gain knowledge (ID24, Round 1). 
This scenario led to disagreement between the experts: 
I strongly disagree with the consensus here when it relates to a patient in 
hospital and the notes are left on the end of the bed for visitors to read. 
Likewise, mail to home is often read by family members or the envelope 
marking infers the contents, even if the envelope is not opened (ID12, Round 3). 
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My experience is higher, much higher (ID 13, Round 3). 
One expert insisted on a higher frequency of occurrence, which is visible in the higher 
range of estimations in Round 3.  
There was not so much disagreement amongst their comments on why this kind of 
scenario happens: 
Curiosity killed the cat. Everyone tries to see what their doctor writes about 
them! So only natural to ask or look if paperwork or devices are nearby, so yes 
could see another patient’s details easily. Proper observation of procedures 
should prevent this from happening but the reality is in a busy care environment 
where staff are under pressure and under resourced (ID14, Round 2). 
This is very human to do this. Records are often left unattended (ID 18, Round 
2). 
Family can be easily overheard and so often breach confidentiality, even 
towards other patients (ID19, Round 2). 
 
Figure 6-17 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 11) 
 
6.3.2.12 Scenario 12: Backup medium goes missing 
This scenario was presented in Round 1 as the scenario from the past with the highest 
impact. In this scenario the loss of a portable backup medium during transport to the 
offsite storage facility affected the full database of patient’s records, involving more 
than 10,000 records. Although the scenario was rare, the impact was very high. Most 
experts acknowledge the existence of this scenario:  
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Some of the engineers have lost/got stolen from their backup medium out of the 
car (ID13, Round 2), 
and estimate it to be more frequent that past experience would suggest (Figure 6-18). 
Sixty percent of the experts agree that it happens in less than 1% of the cases. 
Preventive measures were suggested by the experts and they expect that this scenario 
will grow ever rarer: 
Given recent press coverage, backup devices used now are encrypted (ID14, 
Round 1). 
With increasing deployment of Private Cloud data centres in NHS the standard 
solution includes […] to encrypt all backups, snapshots and snapmirrors for 
security. […] No need for tape ID14, Round 2). 
Manageable with policies, encryption, no mobile backups but only back data up 
onto the network (i.e. no external harddisks or such). Tapes are becoming 
obsolete, for offsite backup storage - consider a private cloud or a cloud solution 
dedicated to healthcare industry (ID15, Round 1). 
 
Figure 6-18 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 12) 
 
6.3.2.13 Scenario 13: Improper disposal 
In Round 1, this scenario was suggested by one the panel members: 
An employee in a third party supplier or subcontractor is not taking due care 
when clearing out a building or destructing records, affecting 100-999 (ID20, 
Round 1). 
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These records can be paper-based or digital.  
Many organisations still do not have proper procedures for destruction of 
faulty/failed media; on such media a disk cleansing program cannot run (ID12, 
Round 3). 
 
Figure 6-19 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 13) 
 
The range of answers is small, and no expert expects this to occur more than in 2% of 
all incidents. The causes seem to be found in the attitude of the outsourcing partner 
towards the security of the records and the lack of control the healthcare organisation 
has over this partner.  
With third parties involved, if staff is poorly paid, they are not paid enough to 
take care. They don’t own the data, are remote from the source, and therefore 
don’t perceive it as theirs and don’t treat data the same as they would their own 
(ID14, Round 2). 
This would be common with building work, renovations or office moves. Items 
are misplaced. People are human but IG now features heavily in contracts (ID14, 
Round 3). 
This happens rather often. I myself had the opportunity to gather piles of 
information, while collecting my old status. The area was not secured at all, and 
I was left alone for hours (ID19, Round 2). 
It will happen more and more often as more is outsourced and more and more 
business partners cannot be controlled (ID19, Round 3). 
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6.3.2.14 Scenario 14: Third party discloses data 
Three experts suggested a similar scenario on their blank sheet in Round 1: 
Incidents that involve a third party supplier or subcontractor unintentionally 
copying data leading to the disclosure of personal data, to the loss of availability 
and affecting the integrity of data, involving 1,000 to 9,999 patient records 
(ID12, ID14, ID23, Round 1). 
The panel agreed that this happens, but it happens very rarely. The main cause of this 
scenario is again IT suppliers or subcontractors (like scenario 9) not taking appropriate 
controls. Testing systems with real data instead of test-data is mentioned as a cause: 
The big issue that, still and all too often, live personal information is used for 
testing purposes. The test environment is often not secured to the extent as the 
production environment. It is against the Data Protection Act that live personal 
information is used for testing purposes (unless explicit permission has been 
obtained), but it still occurs very widely (ID12, Round 1).  
The main risk comes from the unauthorised (illegal) use of personal information 
for testing or training purposes. In these environments, the data is often not 
properly protected (ID12, Round 2). 
Personal data is often used in testing and gets out of the production security 
regime that way. Also, audit evidence is another leak of data out of production 
environments. This leads to personal data ending up on laptops or portable hard 
disk drives (ID18, Round 2). 
The frequency of occurrence is perceived as low.  
Viewed as a low risk due to the physical and procedural environment in which 
suppliers operate (ID12, Round 3). 
Most contractors obliged to meet ISO standards when dealing with IT Systems -
we are and we work throughout the NHS. If this behaviour occurs contracts are 
not renewed so this is low as a source of risk (ID14, Round 3). 
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Figure 6-20 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 14) 
 
However, when the scenario does occur, it affects a large number of records. 
The disclosure itself is not so often, but the amount of data compromised is 
(ID19, Round 2). 
 
6.3.2.15 Scenario 15: Unsecured remote working environment 
This scenario was suggested on the blank sheet and it refers to the physical environment 
when one is:  
Working from outside the premises. Staff looses data unintentionally, and it 
involves 10-99 records. Remote working is not for hospital employees so often 
active. But growing and becoming more and more an issue! (ID19, Round 1).  
There is some agreement that remote access to the systems is secure, but the issues are 
the non-electronic activities and home security. 
This will occur more often with medical papers of patients because medical 
people need to read them. For the electronic version of this information this will 
be less due to thin client computing capabilities (ID17, Round 3). 
Most remote working occurs through encrypted VPN or using logon tokens, 
therefore this is a very secure system. Movement of paper based data and 
memory sticks…hmmm… (ID14, Round2). 
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Figure 6-21 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 15) 
 
6.3.2.16 Scenario 16: External groups 
The scenario involving external groups or activists wanting to steal, access, abuse or 
manipulate data was proposed by two experts on their blank sheet in Round 1 (ID13, 
ID18). 
The panel agree that this could happen, but very rarely. One expert commented that in 
his country this is not likely to happen: 
Reports in press and FOI requests indicate this doesn’t happen very often in 
Scotland hence I would reassess this question as unlikely to occur therefore 
frequency must be less than 5 (ID14, Round 2). 
However, others state that it is generally likely to occur: 
Read the newspapers of the last weeks, you will read quite a lot of examples of it 
happening nowadays (ID17, Round 3). 
The 'major hack' will happen, and when it happens it will affect a large number 
of patient records. It is hard to estimate how likely this is, hence I am reserved 
(ID 18, Round 1). 
Medical data is an attractive target for high profile hackers. This will happen and 
when it happens it will have a substantial impact (ID18, Round 2). 
The range of estimations is small and all experts estimate this scenario to be lower than 
1% of all incidents.  
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Figure 6-22 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 16) 
 
6.3.2.17 Scenario 17: Trainee breaching confidentiality 
This scenario where trainees unintentionally access patient records unauthorised was 
suggested in Round 1 (ID24). There were not many comments about this scenario, but it 
was the cause of some confusion amongst the experts because of the word 
‘unintentionally’: 
The key word here is ‘unintentionally’. When it happens, it happens 
intentionally, like looking up a celebrity's status (ID18, Round 2). 
They are eager telling about their new job (ID19, Round 2). 
It was also suggested that this scenario is strongly related to other scenarios: 
Based on knowledge of how student nurses are trained, the sharing of passwords 
is standard practice. The passwords are being shared with novice staff and hence 
their appreciation of potential consequences tends to be poor; likewise they are 
more prone to making mistakes than experienced staff (ID14, Round 1). 
Like scenario presented earlier: links trainee nurse using another’s credentials. 
(Other scenario staff sharing logons.) Think this occurs more than is reported 
since trainee will be told of procedure to follow rather than be entered into 
incident log (ID14, Round 3). 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
E
st
im
a
te
d
 f
re
q
u
e
n
cy
 o
f 
o
cc
u
re
n
ce
 
Experts's mean
Experts' median
Frequency of occurrence in
incident register
 171 
 
 
Figure 6-23 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 17) 
 
6.3.2.18 Scenario 18: Breach at the patient’s home 
Another scenario suggested in Round 1. In this scenario a breach happens at the home 
of a patient. This could be initiated by healthcare staff and other patient facing staff 
talking to each other, believing that the other person already knows everything about the 
patient.  
Only a few comments were made: 
I'll stick with past experience. It is hard to control the patient's home 
environment. Impact will be low, however, as it will involve the patient's own 
data (ID18, Round 2). 
Information regarding patients left out on view to assist continuity of care is 
often not marked confidential or restricted to specific carers and often is 
generated by the patient's/user's friends or relatives (ID25, Round 2). 
I would rate this as 5% or higher, since devices are updated on home visits by 
clinicians and care teams to patient homes. Whilst on those premises less 
awareness of security (no notices on every door warning of security), more 
informal environment yet care team under pressure due to severity of problems, 
overwork, lack of staff or other resources so may easily lead to breach of a small 
set of data current or previous patient data (ID14, Round 2). 
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Figure 6-24 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 18) 
 
6.3.2.19 Scenario 19: Covering up errors 
This scenario, suggested by ID15 in Round 1, involves medical staff accessing data, 
reports or notes to insert data, modify notes or remove parts of reports to cover up their 
errors. 
The consensus in the panel tends to be with a very low frequency of occurrence, 
although one expert is convinced this happens more often than the consensus rate: 
Given incidence of malpractice, pressure from managers, culture around 
surgeons & GPs, easy to close ranks and loose or amend data. Would rate as a 
very real problem. Difficult to quantify, as we wish these details not to be made 
public as this leads to legal claims. It happens more often than the public 
perceive (ID14, Round 2). 
This happens particularly when threat of litigation. Clinicians protect themselves 
(ID14, Round 3). 
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Figure 6-25 Distribution of estimated frequency of occurrence (scenario 19) 
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6.3.3 Risk map 
The final output after the Delphi study is a risk map. This risk map is an overview of 
risk scenarios and their expected frequency in the future. It is created by calculating the 
average of the experts’ mean after Round 3 and the frequency of occurrence in incident 
register. The map is a hypothetical model of which scenarios could be expected in a 
participating organisation in the near future. Figure 6-26 shows the 19 most important 
scenarios and the expected frequency and damage on a grid. The numbers on the map 
refer to the following scenarios: 
1. Unattended asset goes missing: an internal employee located on the premises leaves 
an asset unattended and consequently the asset goes missing. The asset contains 
personal information of a few patients.  
2. Password, user ID or access token sharing: an internal employee located on the 
premises shares his log on credentials leading to disclosure of patient information to 
an unauthorised person. 
3. Email to unauthorised recipient: an internal employee located on the premises sends 
an email to an addressee unauthorised to access the patient data included, and 
consequently discloses the personal details of a few patients. 
4. Theft on the premises: the theft of assets from the premises, containing personal 
data from 10-99 patients. 
5. Procedure not followed: an internal employee located on the premises does not 
follow the formal procedures leading to disclosure of patient information. 
6. Wrong privileges set: an internal employee located on the premises was given the 
wrong authorisations/privileges, causing disclosure of personal patient information 
to unauthorised persons. 
7. High impact mistakes: an internal employee located on the premises makes a 
mistake that affects the security of 1,000 to 9,999 patient records. 
8. Working in a public place: staff working in public place with a laptop or talking and 
being overheard or seen, leading to the disclosure of personal data of a few patients. 
9. Unsecure remote 3rd party: an employee in a third party supplier or subcontractor 
makes a mistake when using remote access from home or office and discloses 
patient data, affecting 100-999 records. 
10. Transportation: an unknown person breaches security by copying personal data on a 
storage medium and transports this medium out of the premises, affecting 100-999 
records. 
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11. Family breach: a family member or carer of a patient accesses the unattended patient 
record without authorisation to gain knowledge about the patient. 
12. Backup medium goes missing: the loss of a portable backup medium during 
transport to the offsite storage facility, containing the full database of patients’ 
records, affecting more than 10,000 patient records. 
13. Improper disposal: an employee in a third party supplier or subcontractor is not 
taking due care when clearing out a building or destroying records. 
14. Third party discloses data: an employee in a third party supplier or subcontractor 
copies and discloses personal data, affecting 1,000 to 9,999 patient records. 
15. Unsecure remote working: internal employee loses data through an unsecure remote 
working environment. 
16. External groups: incidents involving external groups or activists wanting to steal, 
access, abuse or manipulate personal data. 
17. Trainee breach: a trainee unintentionally accesses a patient record without 
authorisation. 
18. Patient’s home: an internal employee causes a security breach of a patient record at 
a patient’s house. 
19. Covering up errors: staff makes changes to data, reports or notes to gain status or to 
cover up medical errors. 
The forecasting ability of the map was tested in a case study. The aim was to discover if 
the incident scenarios that occurred in the case organisation fall in the same quadrants 
as the scenarios on the map. Chapter 7 discusses these results. 
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Figure 6-26 Risk map of expected security risk scenarios 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated the use of the HI-risk method and explained how each step in 
the development was completed. It was shown how the different research methods each 
delivered data that was used to perform the method. The classification, which is the 
foundation of the incident registration, was presented; it was shown how the scenarios 
were calculated by means of tree mapping; and the results of a three-round Delphi study 
were presented. The final output was a risk map with the 19 most important scenarios. 
This risk map was tested in a case study and the results of that test are discussed in the 
next chapter.  
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7 Case study test results 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter resulted in a risk map (presented in Figure 6-26). The risk map 
showed the estimated frequency of occurrence of 19 scenarios. The accuracy of these 
estimations and the completeness of the risk factor classification in Table 5.6 were 
tested in a case study. The case study was performed at the Speech and Language 
Therapy (SLT) department in a large hospital in the UK and included interviews, 
observations, documentation study, a survey and an analysis of incident data. Details of 
the approval process and the methodological design of the case study were described in 
section 4.4.4 of this thesis. This chapter now reports the results. The first section 
describes the setting of the organisation where the interviews and observations were 
held. Then, the next section discusses the results of the quantitative analysis of incident 
data. Finally, the results of the interviews, observations and survey are discussed and it 
is explained how these results influenced the risk factor classification and how the 
findings relate to the research literature. In the conclusion of this chapter it is stated that 
it is possible to state that the HI-risk method could be a helpful approach to information 
security risk forecasting. 
7.2 Setting 
The observed department operates from a number of separate locations. The 
observations and interviews were held at two different sites. Site 1 is a modern building 
that was recently opened. In contrast, site 2 is an older building that will be closed 
within a couple of years. This contrast in settings provided valuable input for the test of 
the classification of risk factors, as it was possible to observe similar processes being 
performed in very different environments.  
At the time of the visits, the department was in the transition from a paper-based case 
notes system to an electronic patient record system. This transition made information 
security an important topic of discussion amongst staff. All staff that was involved in 
the research were cooperating enthusiastically.  
The interviews were held with the Information Governance leads for the department 
(further indicated as Interviewee 1 and 2). They have not been involved in the 
development of any corporate policies but they are responsible to ensure that the 
department adheres to the policies. The structure within the department is that one lead 
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takes responsibility within one area of the services and they are working together with 
clinical specialists and take people on board to help with the process at certain times. 
They have been charged to review all these policies and to find out how they relate to 
their working practices. There is regular communication with the IT security manager to 
gain advice about the implementation of the policies and for situations that are not 
covered by the policy. For instance, typical for the department is the use of voice 
recordings as part of their therapy sessions. Specific guidelines on whether these 
recordings are part of the medical record or not, had to be created. 
The Information Governance leads work close together with the IT security manager. 
The IT security manager was interviewed at his office and provided the incident data to 
test the HI-risk forecast. The IT security manager reports to the Information Governance 
manager.  
7.3 Quantitative analysis of the incident data and risk forecast  
The case organisation supplied an overview of 512 security events registered by the IT 
service desk and a number of additional incidents that were registered by the security 
manager over the years 2011 and 2012. This timeframe was selected because the risk 
map was based on data collected in 2010 and 2011 and thus would forecast the risks 
occurring in 2011 and 2012. The registers included incidents from the whole 
organisation, including the SLT department. As this department is quite small in 
relation to the organisation as a whole, individual incidents for this department were not 
analysed separately because there was not enough data available. 
The list of events in the case organisation was interpreted and translated into the HI-risk 
classification, identical to the previous research step when the incident data of NHS 
organisations was entered into the database (as described in section 6.2). It appeared 
that the IT service desk registered security events that did not count as an incident. 
Examples of these events were registered calls from users asking for advice or ordering 
assets. After careful consideration, a total of 503 events were analysed.  
The analysis was performed in two ways. First the frequencies of security risk and 
incident factors (as listed in Table 5.6) that occurred in the case organisation were 
compared against the frequencies in the database of past incidents (which was presented 
before in sections 5.5 and 6.2). The frequencies were compared as percentages of the 
total and in absolute numbers. Then, the incident scenarios of the case organisation were 
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placed on the risk map (Figure 6-26) to compare them with the positions of the 
scenarios that were forecasted. 
7.3.1 Comparison of frequencies of risk factors 
The classification of security risk and incident factors (Table 5.6) contains 5 main 
categories: threat; method; weakness; event and damage. For each category, the relative 
frequency of occurrence of each sub-category (the percentage of the total incidents that 
would fall into the shown sub-categories) was calculated from the numerical counts 
(frequencies). These percentages express the frequency as a proportion of the whole. 
Percentages tend to be easy to interpret and a good way to compare between categories. 
The distribution of frequencies in the incident database was compared with the 
distribution in the case organisation.  
For the categories threat, method, weaknesses and events, the case organisation showed 
a similar distribution of sub-categories as the database (Figure 7-1 to 7-4).  
The distribution of threat categories in the database was presented before in Figure 6-2 
as a pie-chart. Figure 7-1 now visualises the same proportions of frequencies in the 
database, and compares them with distribution of the categories in the case organisation. 
The case-organisation shows a very similar distribution of proportions. For instance, the 
sub-category internal employee was involved in 76% of all incidents in the past. In the 
case organisation, 80% of the incidents involved internal employees. The other sub-
categories showed that the case organisation experienced very similar relative reported 
frequencies as compared to the database.  
Equal patters are shown for method, weakness and event (Figures 7-2 to 7-4). The 
categories for damage could not be compared, as the case organisation did not register 
details about the damage that was suffered. Most incidents would classify as near 
misses or very low impact incidents and were therefore registered within the sub-
category of 0-9 records affected.  
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Figure 7-1 Distribution of threat categories  
 
One noticeable difference between the database and the case organisation is that the 
case organisation did not register any unknown methods (Figure 7-2). This may be 
caused by the professionalism of the registration of incident by the service desk. The 
description of security events was complete in all of 503 analysed events, while the 
database of past incidents contained some unknown methods when the registering 
organisation did not know (or did not investigate) what caused the incident.  
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Figure 7-2 Distribution of method categories 
 
The distribution of weakness categories (Figure 7-3) shows that human vulnerabilities 
are the largest portion in both datasets, but that the case organisation registered 
relatively more human vulnerabilities than the average in the database. The sub-
category human vulnerability can be broken down into further detail to evaluate more 
precisely what caused this higher proportion. Table 7.1 shows the sub-categories and 
indicates that the largest proportion can be found in procedure/policy not followed. 
For the case organisation this could be important management information to relate to 
measures of control, such as process improvement plans, audits and information 
security awareness.  
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Figure 7-3 Distribution of weakness categories 
 
Table 7.1 Details of human vulnerability categories in case study 
Human vulnerabilities Percentage 
Procedure/policy not followed (n=410) 
- Unattended asset or record (86) 
- Security facility not used (0) 
- Sharing of password or access token (71) 
- Sharing personal details with IT support (218) 
- Unsecure disposal of data carrying assets (1) 
- Other (34) 
91% 
Situational circumstances (1) 0% 
Mistakes (42) 1% 
Mental state of staff 0% 
Unknown 0% 
 
Database Case organisation
Physical security vulnerability 0 0
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The distribution of event categories (Figure 7-4) again shows a similar distribution, with 
a slightly smaller portion in the category availability affected. This is caused by a 
lower frequency of loss of data/asset (a sub-category of availability) in the case 
organisation, as compared to other organisations in the database. 
 
Figure 7-4 Distribution of event categories 
 
The comparison of the distribution of categories showed that the distribution of 
frequencies over the categories showed similar patterns in the case organisation and in 
the database with incident data from a large group of comparable organisations. This 
could indicate that policy makers and healthcare organisations are likely to benefit from 
sharing and aggregating information security incident data, and use data analysis to 
decide on which areas should get priority when investing in risk controls. 
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The HI-risk model not only gathered incident data from a group of organisations, it also 
uses expert knowledge to further improve the reliability and to make forecasts. As we 
have seen, by means of a three-round Delphi study, an expert panel analysed the 
knowledge from the database and the two sources were combined to form a forecast on 
a risk map. The next section reports from the test that aimed to prove that this combined 
knowledge risk map delivers an accurate risk forecast. 
7.3.2 Risk map test 
The map of risk scenario forecasts (described in section 6.3 of this thesis) was compared 
with the case organisation’s incident registers of 2011 and 2012. The aim was to test the 
hypothesis that:  
The frequency of occurrence of the incident scenarios in the case organisation 
falls within the same range of expected frequencies generated by the HI-risk 
method. 
The positions of the scenarios on the risk map study were compared with the positions 
of the scenarios from the case organisation. The results are presented on the risk map in 
Figure 7-5. The scenarios from the case organisation are presented by a square and the 
original forecasts are shown in circles. The numbers in the circles/squares refer back to 
the numbers of the scenarios listed in section 6.3. It is visible that there occurs some 
overlap and some differences. 
Not all scenarios from the map occurred in the case organisation. Only scenarios 1 to 6 
and 16 (as listed in section 6.3.3) could be compared. The scenarios 5, 6, and 16 are 
positioned in the expected range. It is clear that scenarios 2, 3 and 4 happened more 
frequently than expected and scenario 1 occurred less frequently. Scenario 4 and 16 had 
a lower number of records affected, but this is explained by the fact that the case 
organisation did not register the damage and therefore all incidents fell in the ‘0-9 
records affected’ category. The differences of the scenarios 1 to 4 are discussed in the 
next sections. 
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Figure 7-5 Case organisation’s incident scenarios positioned on risk map  
  
7.3.2.1 Discussion of scenario 1 and 4 
The scenario where unattended assets go missing (scenario 1) occurred less frequently 
than expected in the case organisation, while scenario 4 (theft of assets) occurred more 
frequently. The case organisation made a distinction in their incident register between 
burglary from the premises and missing assets and that made it clear to make the 
distinction between these scenarios. This is also shown in the organisation’s data breach 
policy, the policy in which it is explained to staff what to do in case of an incident, as it 
mentions the loss or theft of data as one type of incident that needs to be reported: 
The loss or theft of personal identifiable data, whether held on paper or 
electronic form must immediately be reported to your Line Manager/Director 
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and notified to the Information Governance Department […] in the first instance 
(p.5 section 4). 
However, in an earlier stage of the research, the expert panel pointed out that it is often 
difficult to identify a missing asset as stolen or being lost. They stated that in many 
organisations these incidents are being treated as one scenario. For that reason, it could 
be that the database of past incidents is somewhat ‘soiled’ because the data that was put 
in was not always completely certain if an asset was simply mislaid or stolen from the 
premises. That could be an explanation for the ‘gone missing’ category having 
somewhat higher frequencies than it should have as it includes unclear cases as well.  
To rule out this distortion, a recalculation was done by treating scenario 1 and 4 as one 
scenario. After combining the two possible scenarios into one, the combined scenario 
(assets going missing or being stolen from premises) from the database would be placed 
in the ‘very frequently’ grid (18% of all incidents). A similar result would happen for 
the case organisation, as the combination of the scenarios places it in the ‘very 
frequently’ grid as well (15%).  In Figure 7-5 this combined scenario is indicated with 
blue figures with the number 1 / 4.  
7.3.2.2 Discussion of scenario 2 
Scenario 2 (password, user ID or access token sharing) happened more frequently in the 
case organisation. The organisation is aware of that risk and it is being reported 
frequently to the IT service desk. From the interviews, it was learned that a possible 
explanation of this higher occurrence could be the recent history of merging 9 
organisations together, leading to the current situation where the IT systems are not yet 
fully integrated and subject to migrations and changes: 
We are a conglomerate of 9 organisations. Each organisation had its own IT 
people and policies and procedures. We are still trying to integrate different 
areas. Our organisation is so big and some controls are fundamentally missing. 
We have no HR system; we don’t know who is who. That is why we have no 
single-sign on. Once our systems are better we will be able to know our 
organisation better, and then we will be able to understand our risks better. In 
healthcare we need access to many more different systems than in other types of 
organisations and users find it difficult to remember all the different passwords 
(IT Security Manager in interview).  
The higher frequency of occurrence of scenario 2 in the case organisation is explainable 
due to temporary circumstances after organisational changes. It is expected that the 
scenario will occur less in the future, when all changes stabilise. For future estimations, 
it remains important for the expert panel to be knowledgeable of changes in the 
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healthcare system and of any foreseen mergers of health boards. Plans for large scale 
changes influence scenarios like these, and should affect the experts’ estimated 
frequency.  
Within the SLT department, this scenario was also recognised. There had been some 
password sharing in the past:  
There has been some password sharing at times in the past, but not to access 
patient information. It was to access our stats. But I am aware that there is a risk 
if you have a culture of password sharing (Interviewee 1). 
The department is also aware that the risk remains high in the near future: 
We are moving very soon to an electronic case note record. Some principles 
about security will still maintain but they will be interpreted differently within 
an electronic record than they would be with a paper record. That will be a big 
change for our security management. There will be a different emphasis; we will 
look at logging off and passwords instead of locking case notes at night 
(Interviewee 2). 
This scenario is likely to be temporarily regarded as a higher risk in the case 
organisation than was forecasted by the HI-risk method, and it is expected to lower once 
the new organisation has settled down. 
7.3.2.3 Discussion scenario 3 
Scenario 3 (email to unauthorised recipient) occurred more frequently in the case 
organisation. Staff report system or user errors to the service desk by email. In the email 
they explain that there is a problem with a record of a patient and they include the name, 
number and sometimes diagnoses in the email. The organisation is aware of that 
scenario and the service desk staff register these as events as security incidents. The IT 
security manager always talks to the staff involved, with the aim of educating them and 
to prevent it from happening again. The high frequency in this case is very likely caused 
by concise registration and high awareness of this specific event. 
One of the most frustrating things that keeps happening is that our Service Desk 
is an external company. When something is faulty with a record, staff is not 
allowed to share this information with the Service Desk, but they do. The 
Information Commissioner has said we can’t do it, the Caldicott Guardian has 
said we can’t do it and they still do it (IT Security Manager).  
Scenario 3 includes all situations where confidential information is sent to persons who 
are not authorised to receive that information. The scenario in the case organisation, 
where the email was sent to a specific unauthorised group of people (the IT service 
desk) also occurred in the database of security incidents from the NHS organisations (as 
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discussed in section 6.2 of this thesis). This led to the conclusion that scenario 3 could 
be split into two scenarios:  
1. Email containing confidential or personal identifying data sent to IT 
service desk (scenario 20).  
2. Email containing confidential or personal identifying data sent to 
other unauthorised recipients (scenario 3).  
After this correction, scenario 3 fell in a closer range to the expected frequency. The 
new scenario, numbered as 20, is a security risks scenario that could provide interesting 
feedback to other organisations. The fact that the case organisation registers these 
scenarios separately might trigger other organisations to evaluate the situation at their 
IT service desk, and to analyse if they experience identical breaches of the Data 
Protection Act but just have not realised that yet. 
7.4 Test of the classification of security risk and incident factors 
The classification of security risk and incident factors (as shown in Table 5.6) was 
evaluated for its completeness and usability during the observations, interviews and a 
review of the organisation’s security policies. These research activities provided the 
model with important additions and healthcare specific vocabulary for the classification. 
Every change to the classification was compared to the classification requirements of 
Amaroso (1994), as listed in section 5.4 of this thesis.  
7.4.1 Findings from observations 
During the observations on site 1, a post-it was observed on the wall behind a computer 
in a consultation room. It had a user ID written on it and a combination of 
numbers/letters written underneath it (resembling very much a password). If this was a 
real and working user ID/password combination, this particular event would fit into the 
existing classification under the existing element: ‘sharing of user ID, password or 
access token’. Furthermore, this event would also fit in the category ‘procedure not 
followed’ as the organisation has a policy against sharing passwords and against writing 
them down. To improve the classification and to ensure that the categories are mutually 
exclusive, it was decided that ‘policy or procedure not followed’ is a sub-category of 
‘human vulnerability’ and the sharing of passwords is an element within this sub-
category. This reorganisation improved the organisation of the whole ‘human 
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vulnerability’ category, as it forced the other elements to be regrouped into sub-
categories as well and improved the exhaustiveness of the sub-categories. 
Another observation on site 1 was that a staff member’s Personal Development Plan 
(PDP) folder was on the shelf in a shared staff room. A PDP folder typically includes 
personal data about skills development and personal strengths and weaknesses that are 
part of someone’s development and could be potentially considered private to the 
person involved. The data item type ‘Employee’s personal information’ exists in the 
model and storing this data item unsecured could lead to an incident when the folder 
goes missing or is accessed by someone. 
On site 1, storage boxes with patient case notes that had just been moved from another 
site were stored in an office that is not locked during working hours. There was no 
facility to store these paper records at the time of observation. The office is accessible 
by patients and staff and during the observations I could walk in and out of the room 
without being seen by staff. The category ‘physical security vulnerability’ did not 
include this element and ‘Storage facility’ was added as a sub-category with new 
elements: ‘lack of lockable space’, ‘lack of secure filing cabinets’. When a door lock is 
installed but not used by staff, this event would fall under the category ‘procedure not 
followed’. A general element was added: ‘security facility not used’. This observation 
also led to an adjustment in the category: ‘organisational weakness’ where ‘relocation to 
new site’ was added. Overall, this observation led to improvement of exhaustiveness of 
the physical security category.  
A final observation on site 1 was a computer that was not logged off or password 
locked. It displayed patient’s information on the screen and on the desk in the staff 
room, where I was able to walk in and out of the room without being seen by staff at 
that moment. I was alone in the room for about 5 minutes. Not adhering to clear desk 
policies falls under the existing category ‘procedure not followed’. Even if the user 
forgets to manually lock the screen when walking away for a short while, the computer 
should automatically lock itself when idle, which is a basic security control that can be 
set by any computer user. This event would fit into the new category mentioned about: 
‘security facility not used’. In combination with a lack of physical security controls, this 
event could potentially lead to a risk. As a result, the category ‘lack of visual control on 
entrance point’ was added as an element under ‘physical security vulnerability’, 
meaning that people could walk in and out of the area without being seen. Although 
CCTV was installed in the main corridor, there were no cameras after the entrance door 
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to the department. The absence of visual control on the door could also potentially cause 
a safety risk to staff.  
In the main entrance hall of site 1, there were many people walking in and out to 
different areas. I noticed volunteers and technicians walking around freely into different 
parts of the building and all sorts of people were carrying all kinds of documents and 
devices (papers, boxes, handheld devices). In the threat category ‘initiator’ added: 
‘volunteers’ to ‘internal staff’ as well as ‘technicians’, ‘cleaners’, ‘IT staff’ and 
‘restaurant/catering staff’. During the observations, I realised that I myself was a 
potential threat to the organisation as well. I had visible access to several weaknesses of 
the organisation. Therefore the element ‘researcher’ was added. Healthcare 
organisations and patients are constant topics of research and the integrity of the 
researchers and their manners to keep research data secure is an important element to 
information security. Adding these sub-categories is useful to gain insight in to 
initiators of threats and incidents.  
On site 2 the work environment looked messy as the building showed broken ceilings, 
buckets to catch water from leaks, tables and shelves full of papers and stuff. In a 
‘messy environment’ assets can be lost or damaged easily. A ‘messy environment’ can 
be caused by not adhering to clear desk policies, the individual’s work practices or by 
the deterioration of the physical space itself. The classification was expanded with 
‘untidiness’ to ‘human vulnerability’ and ‘lack of maintenance to building and facilities’ 
to ‘physical security vulnerability’. 
In the public entrance hall on site 2 there was an open door (held open by a door 
stopper), giving a visual of a corridor where paper patient records were piled up against 
the wall waist-high over a length of about 3 meters. There were numerous people in the 
corridor and the offices facing that corridor. With my sponsor [NHS term for contact 
person], we walked through the corridor without being stopped or questioned. This 
situation was not classifiable in the model before, but is now covered with the new 
elements that were added as noted above: in the category ‘physical security 
vulnerability’ as: ‘lack of lockable space’ and ‘lack of secure filing cabinets’ and in the 
category ‘human vulnerability’ as ‘security facility not used’. 
On both sites it was not always easy to identify visually who is staff, or who is a patient, 
carer, researcher, vendor and so on. This is a general security risk in public buildings 
that could have indirect implications for information security. When a healthcare 
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organisation is located in an area with high criminality levels, the characteristic 
openness of this organisation could make it an easily accessible target with many 
vulnerable people inside. The classification was lacking this element and therefore, in 
the treat category ‘social’ it was added: ‘regional/national security alert state’ and 
‘regional crime levels’.  
7.4.2 Findings from documents review 
Some changes were made to the classification after examination of the organisation’s 
policies. The case organisation allowed insight in a number of policy documents related 
to information security. These documents led to the addition of a few specific elements 
to make the classification more exhaustive. The social media policy led to the addition 
of the element ‘social media’ to ‘method’, as social media can be used as a method to 
disclose data. The ‘E-mail acceptable use policy’ led to some new elements. In the 
‘possible damage’ category: feelings of anxiety, humiliation, awkwardness or distress. 
Additional methods were added, such as: verbal threats, offensive jokes, offensive 
language, personal comments about a person’s physical appearance or character. 
Finally, to ‘event’ was added: ‘breach of ethical norms or code’, with sub-classes: 
spreading illegal material, publication of harmful material. In the background chapter of 
this thesis (chapter 2), these issues related to norms and values were already identified 
as influential to the perception of dangers and annoyances as information security risks.  
7.4.3 Findings from interviews 
A few final changes to the classification were made after the interviews to make the 
classification more useful for healthcare and better accepted. Some elements were 
added in the category ‘data item’: Medical recordings: illustrations, video, voice, scans, 
x-rays, photos, ultrasound picture. Furthermore, after one of the interviewees mentioned 
that ‘case notes were not delivered in the right location by the porters’, the new element 
‘porters’ was added to the threat category ‘human’. Finally, the interviews provided 
additional confirmation of the importance of security facilities and of the environment 
on information security risks: 
One of the reasons for different practices was also caused by the environment of 
the different buildings, some areas are very enclosed without other people 
walking in the area, but here with CCTV in the corridors and an extra external 
door it is not likely that anyone wanders in. We have been aware of where boxes 
of discharged case notes have been stored maybe not properly locked up, but we 
did not have anywhere to put them away properly in some sites (Interviewee 1).  
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We had an incident with an answering machine close to the waiting area for 
patients so when someone left a message it would have been possible for the 
patients to overhear that. That was typical for the site because of the building 
(Interviewee 2).  
7.5 The future of information security risks in healthcare 
Opinions from information security staff and information governance staff about 
emerging risks in healthcare and about some of the features of the HI-risk method were 
gathered during the interviews and through a short survey.  
Healthcare experiences many developments in systems for patients that are linked to the 
web and to devices that connect to it. Risks are foreseen in all stages of the lifecycle of 
these developments.  
Risks can be controlled as well as triggered from national policies. Changes in national 
policies cause changes in the healthcare organisation and staff has to adapt to each 
change. Furthermore, on a national level is where ‘thinking ahead’ is important so that 
healthcare can prepare for future developments in technology and policy. Future-
proofed, clearly described, international, and tougher national information security 
policy is deemed needed to form a foundation for risk management in healthcare.  
We have not been thinking ahead enough. Nationally we are not quite there. 
National policies are a risk in a way as well; if policies change we will have to 
tell the staff. The names that are used in the new marking scheme (as imposed 
from national level) are inconsistent and different from ours. It will have 
repercussions for us, as it will change how we handle information. It was 
protected and suddenly it is not protected (IT Security manager in interview). 
Government is likely to merge health boards. If this happens the information 
about each patient will be accessible by a significant number of people. This is 
both good and bad - good that the patient can be treated in a wider range of 
locations and their records more readily shared by the staff looking after the 
patients, but bad in that the information may be inappropriately accessed 
(Respondent A, survey). 
Tougher regulation regime, increase in fines available to the ICO 
Inspection/audit regime of IT for healthcare organisations, similar to financial 
audits. Tougher penalties for those convicted of breaching data 
protection/computer misuse acts. More international cooperation on cybercrime, 
scope needs to be global (Respondent B, survey).  
Government policy is encouraging systems to open up to allow patients to see 
information but not on how much or where or how (Respondent C, survey). 
Budgets allocated to health boards are seen as an important factor to manage 
information security risks. 
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The risks depend on the finances of the health board (Interviewee 1). 
On the organisational level, information security policies, budget and time continuously 
influence compliance and risks in the departments.  
We were trying to harmonise procedures, they had been risk assessed some time 
ago and not in line as we were doing it. And we did it in a period that a lot of 
new policies were coming out: as soon as we finished one there appeared 
another new policy (Interviewee 1). 
If staff could have time, there are competing pressures. The priority for 
information security varies from person to person. Rather than just giving the 
folders and taking a part of the time in a meeting, if we could spend more time 
we could get their buy-in more. Ideally, people are more likely to use the good 
practice if they understand the risks. It has to be embedded in their thinking 
(Interviewee 1)  
Security risks need to be assessed and solved during the development phase of new 
technological solutions to support care processes. However, some security risks cannot 
always be solved.  
Many developments are happening in systems for patients that have to access 
their data in order to monitor their test results and to manage their way of living. 
That is published on the Internet in a way they can have access and of course 
that will bring risks. There is more and more of that coming along. Tele-health is 
particularly important in the Highlands where there is no easy access to 
healthcare. There are a number of pilots going on. There are risks that go with 
that and not all of them can be solved (IT Security Manager).  
All interviewees and survey respondents mentioned the same possible future risk: 
mobile devices, or i-things, or Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). These devices support 
the care processes in many ways and they may carry personal identifiable information, 
or have the potential to connect to the national network and systems in the organisation.  
Mobile devices and i-things will become an issue as well. We have things 
connecting to the national system as well and these have interesting security 
complications. Doctors have sometimes two devices, and this has not been 
addressed yet (IT Security Manager).  
Mobile devices, especially BYOD. I do not think that management will be able 
to differentiate between a specific mobile device being secure for one 
application but not another. In Scotland we are seeing systems being shared 
across health boards and between health boards. This is to the benefit of the 
patients, however it introduces a greater risk of information being 
inappropriately accessed. Monitoring the access will become more difficult 
(Respondent A, survey). 
Increasing use of BYOD, where users are wanting to use their own choice of 
computing platform Agile/flexible working, where sensitive information is with 
the worker, rather than kept at a place of work (Respondent B, survey).  
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As more data is being made available for mobile devices, the security or loss of 
the device will be more significant than when it not is just about a phone or 
laptop with the data on it, but about the data it can get to (Respondent C, 
survey). 
That probably depends on the finances of the health board and what systems 
they have. They used to talk about people walking around with tablets and 
walking around making notes as they go from ward to ward. I suspect loss or 
theft of mobile devices could be the risk (Interviewee 1). 
The outsourcing partners who support the IT processes in the organisation are a source 
of possible risks as well. It is not always clear where responsibilities lie and which 
controls partners have implemented. Furthermore, some technological solutions are hard 
to grasp: 
Cloud computing - outsourcing data to 3rd party providers, hard to identify any 
physical resource where the data resides (Respondent B, survey).  
At the end of a lifecycle of a system or device, there is a risk that personal data remains 
in the memory of the asset. This causes a risk if the asset is not properly disposed of at 
the end of the lifecycle:  
IT Asset disposal - increasing number of devices have potential to hold data, 
either physical hard disk or flash memory - .e.g. tablets, smartphones, USB 
memory sticks, printers/MFD's, PDA's, etc. More important therefore to have 
adequate control on what is being passed for disposal/recycling and that any 3rd 
party involved is appropriately regulated and monitored (Respondent B, survey).  
In the situation where a risk has materialised (an incident has occurred), it is considered 
important to investigate what went wrong, how it went wrong and who was responsible. 
This is not only important to prevent it from happening again, but vital in the situation 
where legal steps need to be taken: 
For exceptional circumstances in the future, we need a proper forensic 
investigation approach. When one person is misbehaving in one area, there are 
usually a lot of things going on. The way we now investigate things is not able 
to stand in a criminal court (IT Security Manager).  
Auditing is also seen as a means to improve awareness and to prevent incidents: 
And time to audit, to look at how people make decisions on site and to make 
sure that it is continuing. That would take it forward. We are responsible for 
audit and it is part of the role that we have been given (Interviewee 2).  
The future of risk management is seen in technological solutions, where the technology 
itself takes audit trails and can trace and erase assets.  
Databases/Clinical systems may start to have monitoring software to check on 
who and where rather than once you have logged in (Respondent B). 
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 Increasing use of ‘smart’ technologies:  
- Network tools such as SCCM alerting to mobile assets not connecting for 
extended period, ‘fixed’ assets such as desktop PCs changing location as 
defined by IP subnet.  
- RFID tagging - Mobile devices with 3G tracked and if necessary remotely 
erased over mobile network (Respondent C).  
Ideally in the future you would have some the system saying: this patient is in 
your hospital and now you can access his record and if the patient is somewhere 
else, then that hospital can access the record (IT Security Manager).  
We have a system that takes audit trails. It can say who has looked at a health 
record of somebody (IT Security Manager). 
I would love a system; we are primarily clinicians and not experts in information 
security. If there was a tool that is user friendly and that would be better than our 
approach (Interviewee 1).  
However, the boundaries, rules and policies that need to be defined before such tools 
are implemented, are human decisions made by management or governments, based on 
possible risks. To support those decisions, a formal risk management approach and 
mandate to take measures is still required.  
More formal risk management will be introduced and resourced. Currently there 
is in real terms little more than lip service offered. The powers of the Information 
Commissioner will increase and this will force the hand of management 
(Respondent A, survey). 
The HI-risk method is characterised by certain features that could support a national risk 
management policy as well as an individual healthcare organisation. Table 7.2 
illustrates how the respondents (n=3, as described in section 4.4.4 of this thesis) showed 
some interest in these characteristics.  
Table 7.2 Survey results risk assessment features 
Which of the following characteristics would you be 
interested in adding to the information risk assessment 
approach? 
  
Interested Neutral 
Not 
interested 
A comparison against risks identified by other organisations. 
2 
 
1 
  
A comparison of each risk register against the actual suffered 
incidents. 
3 
   
A comparison against the opinions of security experts and 
trend watchers. 
2 
 
1 
  
A special list of human and organisation-related risks. 
2 
 
1 
  
A healthcare sector wide risk overview. 
2 
 
1 
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A final remark is that all survey respondents and interviewees agreed that the 
information security risks in the case organisation are expected to be similar to the risks 
in any other NHS organisation. 
We all have the same worries, we share the same issues. Our risks are similar, 
our incidents are similar (IT Security Manager). 
There is certainly common ground within the profession; we all have the same 
worries about storing case notes and so on (Interviewee 1).  
This enforces one of the basic concepts behind the HI-risk method: the assumption that 
healthcare organisations face similar risks and therefore can learn from sharing 
information about risks, incidents and possible controls. 
7.6 Findings related to research literature 
In chapter 2 it was argued that information security risks in society could be identified 
and better understood by studying information society discourse. From studying the 
works of information society thinkers such as Beck, Castells and Lyon, it was argued 
that the scope of information security risks is global and infinite, through the 
connections in socio-technical networks. Healthcare organisations in the United 
Kingdom are strongly networked through their national governance and the national 
infrastructure for health ICT systems. There are many regional collaboration structures 
between primary and secondary health and social care institutions. Their importance in 
society is felt by a number of groups such as patients, politicians, insurance companies, 
businesses and so on. For these groups it is not always easy to differentiate between 
individual healthcare organisations. For instance, patients might blame the NHS for a 
confidentiality issue that occurred at a local dentist. The survey respondents and 
interviewees in the case study confirmed this perception that related organisations deal 
with very similar risks and that a security event in one organisation may affect others. 
This was also reinforced by the similarity between the incident scenarios from the 
Delphi study and the security incidents suffered by the case organisation. 
The background chapter also argued that traditional information security risk 
perceptions are limited in explaining risks that affect more than an organisation and its 
business, ICTs and staff. The global entanglement of people, ICTs, organisations and 
cultural norms and ethics calls for risk approaches that are wider than technology or 
business risks. An information security risk is not ‘a thing’ that can be singled out and 
contained. It is partly related to perception of dangers, norms, and values. This 
perception is socially constructed by international power systems and struggles, (lack 
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of) public information policy, mass media and culture. Interviewees in the case study 
added the economic factor to risk perception. Time and budget allocated to healthcare 
staff are short and it was suggested that additional time to train staff in information 
security procedures and risk management contributes to more awareness and knowledge 
and thus helps to prevent incidents. 
The conclusions of the literature review suggested that risks associated with information 
security in healthcare are not being systematically and consistently assessed beyond the 
scale of specific contexts. This was confirmed in the case study organisation: the IT 
department assesses the risks of certain systems and the clinicians assess the risks in the 
operational procedure. However, they do not bring these together nor do they compare 
their findings with other departments. Analysing risks within the context of a system or 
one asset is not meaningful in modern networked organisations. The context is infinite 
and includes technical, environmental and social (including people, organisation, 
society) factors.  
Risk information is currently not gathered collectively, and the knowledge of healthcare 
staff and patients, security experts, and data from past incidents is not a part of the risk 
analysis scope of best practice methods. Participants in the case study indicated an 
interest in a collective registration and analysis and confirmed a shared exposure to 
similar risks.  
The review of the literature about issues with confidentiality, availability and integrity 
of information provided some insight into negative information security events in 
healthcare. These were summarised in the traditional confidentiality, integrity and 
availability triad of information security:  
1. Confidentiality events: patients avoiding care, financial loss, 
embarrassment/stigma or discrimination; 
2. Integrity events: issues with quality of care, billing and patient safety; 
3. Availability events: constraints to self-determination and patient empowerment, 
aging technology, information ownership and responsibility. 
The findings from the analysis of the information security incident data, one of the 
conclusions of the background chapter (information security risk is partly related to 
perception of dangers and annoyances and norms and values) and the review of policy 
documents in the case study added a possible fourth negative event to the risk factor 
classification: 
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4.    Breach of ethical norms or code: harm to the feelings of an individual as a result 
of the spreading or publication of illegal or harmful material. 
Information security risks include technology risks, business risks and society risks and 
these risks influence and complement each other. This thesis took a socio-technical 
view on information security risks. The focus was on human factors influencing security 
(e.g. behaviour, motivation, ICT skills and so on) and it included factors from the 
environment that influence security (such as public policy, social norms and ethics, 
crime rates, building or neighbourhood security, and so on). These factors were 
identified by evaluating existing classifications of information security threat and 
vulnerabilities models and through interviews and observations of healthcare staff and 
their environment. In the interviews it was confirmed that environmental vulnerabilities 
could cause information security incidents. 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter reported the case study that included interviews, observations, a survey, 
and an analysis of the information security incident register. The observations and 
interviews led to a number of improvements to classification of information security 
risk factors. These improvements were mainly related to exhaustiveness of the 
categories, as some situations could not be fitted in the categories, and to the usefulness 
of the categories by adding healthcare-specific terminology. The analysis of the 
information security incident register made it possible to evaluate the forecasting ability 
of the method. It was shown that benchmarking of the incidents, which occurred in the 
case organisation, against the collective database of incidents support the analysis of the 
proportional contributions of variables to the total of incidents, but it cannot predict the 
absolute frequencies.  
A more reliable forecast occurred after the combination of experts’ knowledge with the 
knowledge derived from the collective database of past incidents. The expected and 
observed frequencies of occurrence were very similar. There were some minor 
differences in the expected risk scenarios. The differences could be explained by 
influences of the data collection method and the incident registration procedure in the 
case organisation. 
The case study proved to be an important step in the research. The observations and 
interviews on locations gave additional insight in the reality of healthcare information 
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security. It provided the ability to test the value of the HI-risk method and contributed 
significantly to its quality. 
The subsequent chapter will conclude this thesis and describe potential future research 
directions. 
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8 Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis and evaluates the progress towards achieving the 
objectives. The main findings of the research are pointed out as well as some 
conclusions on the research process itself. Lastly, suggestions for the focus of future 
research and development are given. 
8.2 Evaluation of research objectives  
This thesis explored information security risks in healthcare. The aim was to investigate 
the possibility of designing a novel approach that would enable organisations to learn 
lessons from each other and to unite in the prevention of recurring breaches. The 
requirements and objectives of the new approach were not clear at the beginning of the 
research project. The objectives were identified by the exploration of the problems with 
current traditional information security practice. Information security is a diverse 
discipline and the definition and scope vary amongst practitioners. A literature study 
into different lines of thinking was helpful to define the information security philosophy 
that forms the foundation of the new approach. Furthermore, healthcare is an industry 
that may encounter different information security problems than for instance the 
financial sector. Specific information security risks and issues in healthcare were 
researched by a second literature study and the results of both studies led to the 
specification of objectives of the new approach to information security risks in 
healthcare.    
The first objective was to gather and evaluate information security incidents from 
multiple organisations and to discover the most frequently occurring scenarios. It was 
learned that it was not possible to use secondary incident databases for this purpose. 
There was not enough healthcare data available and the more generic reports about data 
breaches and survey reports that were collected with different classifications and 
taxonomies lacked detail. Eventually, this objective was met by an alternative approach 
to collect incident data from NHS organisations directly. The incident data was 
requested with reference to the FOI act. This led to a good response rate, but the 
researcher is aware that without the support of this legislation, it would have been very 
difficult to gather this data. The calculation of the most frequent scenarios was largely 
done in a spreadsheet, which was a laborious and slow process. The number of 
scenarios allowed this method, but in future situations when larger sets of data need to 
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be analysed, this process should be automated to prevent calculation errors and to save 
time. 
The second objective was to analyse and relate the contribution of social, technical and 
environmental risk factors to information security incidents. It was learned that a 
detailed analysis of incidents can only be performed if the incidents are investigated and 
reported in detail as well. From the 132 incident registers that were sent to the 
researcher, only 83 could be used in the analysis. Hundreds of incidents could not be 
added to the register because of the lack of detail in the reporting.   
The method was able to analyse risk factors from different categories that occurred 
together. For instance, it was possible in most cases to count the co-occurrence of a 
single threat category, a single weakness, a single method, event and the damage. 
However, the method could not adequately analyse the co-occurrence of multiple sub-
categories within the main categories of threat, weakness, method, event and damage. 
For instance, in the case that multiple threat factors occur at the same time, with 
multiple weaknesses, the frequency could not be calculated using the manual method. 
Furthermore, the incident registers were not detailed enough to actually discover any 
simultaneously occurring sub-categories, and in a future situation this limitation could 
create less accurate forecasts. 
The third objective to involve experts in the forecasting was achieved through the 
Delphi study. The composition of the expert panel is an important factor in delivering 
reliable results. The panel was composed of 12 experts in information security, with 
many years of experience in healthcare, risk management and information governance. 
The selection of the panel was the most difficult objective to achieve, as the quality and 
enthusiasm of the experts is essential for the success of the approach. Most experts 
perform senior positions in organisations and it is a lot to ask for their commitment over 
three surveys. Fortunately, 10 experts completed all three rounds and they delivered a 
reasonably reliable forecast. 
The last objective was to explicate risks in a clear and understandable manner. 
Describing risks in scenarios prove to be useful during the Delphi study. For two 
scenarios it became clear that several organisations find it difficult to differentiate 
between them. This concerned the example of scenarios when assets disappear and it is 
not clear if an item was stolen or just misplaced. For the purposes of the research project 
it was decided to combine these two different scenarios, but in reality this practice 
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proves the above-mentioned issue with the lack of detail in the reporting of incidents. 
When a situation is not clear, an organisation should try to investigate in more detail 
what caused the incident, and not try to combine scenarios because it is easier.  
The overall conclusion is that the main objectives were achieved at a reasonable level, 
mainly because of the reliance of legislation to gather the incident data, and because of 
the quality and commitment of the experts in the Delphi panel. A point of attention for 
the future is the often-lacking detailing in the incident investigation and reporting in 
organisations. 
8.3 Evaluation of the research process 
The HI-risk method was designed following the rigorous process of design science 
research. Hevner at al. (2004) state that for design science research to be effective, it 
must provide clear contributions in the areas of the designed artefact, design 
construction knowledge, and/or design evaluation knowledge (such as methodologies). 
Design science research holds the potential for 3 types of research contributions based 
on the novelty, generality, and significance of the designed artefact. According to the 
authors, one or more of these contributions must be found in a given research project. 
The following list shows these three types of contributions and relates them to the HI-
risk method: 
1. The designed artefact. The contribution of the design science research presented in 
this thesis is the artefact itself: the HI-risk method. This method provides a solution 
to learn from information security incidents, to share these lessons and enables 
policymaking and cooperation between related organisations.  
2. Foundations. The creative development of novel, appropriately evaluated 
constructs, models, methods, or instantiations that extend and improve the existing 
foundations in the knowledge base are also important contributions. In the HI-risk 
classification of information security risk factors, existing knowledge is presented in 
a novel way and combined with new risk factors that were found in related 
disciplines and during observations of real environments.  
3. Methodologies. Finally, the creative development and use of evaluation methods 
(e.g., experimental, analytical, observational, testing, and descriptive) and new 
evaluation metrics provide design science research contributions. The HI-risk 
method combines data analysis of past information security incidents with the 
Delphi method for experts’ forecasting of future incidents.   
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8.4 Main findings and contribution to knowledge 
This research designed a new method to assess information security risks. The literature 
review had showed that few information security risk assessment methods developed 
specifically for healthcare exist (Appari & Johnson, 2010). Furthermore, at the start of 
the dissertation, a specific classification for healthcare that included social, technical 
and environmental risk factors could not be retrieved. In chapter 5 it had shown how a 
new classification was created to include these different conceptions of risk factors. The 
classification in the HI-risk method is based on a combination of existing classifications 
and improvements from interviews and observations in the case study. This part of the 
research has delivered a contribution to the existing range of information security risk 
classifications.  
The classification is a tool that can be used to report and analyse the socio-technical 
information security incidents in healthcare. It can be used to compare the frequency of 
occurrence of a risk factor in an individual organisation with the average frequency of 
occurrence in similar organisations. It was found that counting frequencies of single 
security elements from a collective incident database forms a reasonable foundation to 
make indications of occurrence of these elements in an individual organisation. This 
insight can be used to evaluate why a certain incident occurs more or less often in one 
organisation, as compared to others and what measures of control should be invested in.  
It was also found that the most frequently occurring threats came from either a member 
of staff or unidentified persons within the premises of the organisation. Accidental 
human mistake, theft of assets and unauthorised access to information were the most 
frequently reported methods in incident scenarios. Regular weaknesses that were 
exploited were unattended assets, issues with emails (technical security and user errors) 
and procedures that were not followed. Most of the negative outcomes of incidents 
could be related to confidentiality issues (disclosure of information); availability issues 
(loss of data or assets) and integrity issues (faulty data and contamination of systems 
with malicious software). The majority of the incidents (93%) led to compromises of 
the personal data of less than 10 patients, while incidents affecting huge amounts of 
personal data were reported to be very rare (0.14%).  
A collective incident register can provide input for national or regional information 
policy. The classification in HI-risk included numerous people-related and organisation-
related threats, methods and vulnerabilities. It did not include details for the computer 
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and network security categories. As many good existing technical classifications exist, 
in the future these can be added to HI-risk without much effort.  
A three-round Delphi study was conducted to gather experts’ opinions about 
information security risk scenarios in healthcare. The estimations of the panel appear to 
agree with a number of future risks highlighted in industry reports. The most frequent 
scenarios are directly caused by human actions and related to human behaviour, 
management style, organisational culture and personal motivation. The risks associated 
with sharing data with third parties such as suppliers, outsourcing partners or other 
healthcare providers are on the experts’ radar, thus showing a form of awareness of 
networked organisations and interconnectivity. One observation from the comments 
made by the experts and the scenarios they added in the blank sheet, is that none of the 
panel members indicated any risks linked to society, public policy or human-artefact 
integration (such as online patient monitoring systems, RFID chips or implants). This is 
surprising, as it was shown in chapter 3 that researchers have indicated that this is where 
information security experts should engage.  
The Delphi study also appeared to be a learning curve for the participants. The 
combination of being informed from incidents in the past with continuous input from 
other experts in the field caused the opinions of the participants to converge over the 
rounds. This was visible in the frequency estimations they made as well as in the 
comments. Where in some scenarios the comments in Round 1 were very diverse, in 
Rounds 2 and 3 they showed more understanding of other opinions and some 
participants changed their own opinions. Delphi has proven to be a useful technique to 
support learning about emerging risks and could be used in a risk monitoring system 
that continuously is updated with the data from incidents and expert opinions.  
The five most frequent information security risk scenarios that were found are:  
1. Unattended asset goes missing: an internal employee located on the premises leaves 
an asset unattended and consequently the asset goes missing. The asset contains 
personal information of a few patients.  
2. Password, user ID or access token sharing: an internal employee located on the 
premises shares his log on credentials leading to disclosure of patient information to 
an unauthorised person. 
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3. Email to unauthorised recipient: an internal employee located on the premises sends 
an email to an addressee unauthorised to access the patient data included, and 
consequently discloses the personal details of a few patients. 
4. Theft on the premises: the theft of assets from the premises, containing personal 
data from 10-99 patients. 
5. Procedure not followed: an internal employee located on the premises does not 
follow the formal procedures leading to disclosure of patient information. 
Combining the scenarios with the experts’ input created the risk map. The map forms a 
partially reasonable foundation to make predictions of the frequency of occurrence of 
these scenarios in an individual organisation. It was argued in chapter 7 that healthcare 
organisations face similar risks and incidents, while the frequency of occurrence differs 
in some cases. However, even with deviations in the forecast, the results of the risk map 
can still be inspirational to participants. Deviations can trigger an individual 
organisation to analyse why they have a deviation. It could mean that it is an area that 
they could improve on, or it concerns an area specific to other organisations that they 
have not identified yet and can learn from.  
Overall, the HI-risk method has the potential to contribute to information security 
practice in healthcare because of the following characteristics: 
1. It enables the benchmarking of information security events in one organisation 
against a group of similar and related organisations. 
2. It provides a collective information security incident register. 
3. It enables regional and sectorial information security incident analysis. 
4. It methodologically gathers the knowledge of experts to identify future trends. 
5. It provides input for organisational information security policy and for policy 
that covers a wider context.  
8.5 Suggestions for future work 
The HI-risk method shows some promising results as well as some indicators for 
improvement and future work. The activities were performed with the support of basic 
software such as Access and Excel, as no existing tool was either suitable or available to 
support the data analysis. This problem was overcome by a lot of manual data entry and 
manual data analysis by the researcher. Future work will focus on the development of 
an automated system for data entry and analysis.  
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The automated system could for example be used by information security officers, a 
panel of experts, or by policy makers. Figure 8-1 illustrates how these different users 
could be related to the system. In a participating organisation, the security officer 
registers all information security incidents in the system. This registration would follow 
the classification of risk factors that was presented in chapter 5. The system could 
provide reports and list of the organisation’s incidents to the security officer for internal 
use in the organisation. The method assumes that multiple organisations use the system. 
The system automatically calculates the most frequent scenarios of the aggregated list 
incidents (from all participating organisations) to present to a panel of experts. The 
panel of experts could be experts from the participating organisations, as well as experts 
from the government, researchers or specialists in related organisations. The experts 
rank the scenarios and add possible new scenarios. The system generates a risk map that 
can be retrieved by managers and policy makers to use for policy planning and 
decision-making.  
 
 
Figure 8-1 Risk forecasting system and its users 
 
The system design will have to consider the following unsolved issues with the HI-risk 
method: 
1. Time: the research made a snapshot of information security risks at the time of the 
research. This took several years to complete, while risks appear, change or disappear 
every moment. The design of the future expert systems should incorporate the 
continuous deletion or reduce the importance of past incidents after a certain period, and 
provide updates of new incidents. 
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2. Simultaneous occurrence of multiple sub-categories within one scenario could not be 
modelled with the basic supporting software in the simulation. A future system must 
build in this feature where multiple threats co-occur with multiple vulnerabilities, 
methods, events, and damage. 
3. To prevent personal interpretations and errors during the incident registration, the 
registration process must be supported with clear instructions and a possibility for 
feedback from participants when a category is not clear. There is also a direct 
relationship with the forensic investigation process in the organisation. For the success 
of the HI-risk method, incidents should be carefully investigated and reported. The 
better the quality of the data during the input, the better the forecast will be.  
For future academic studies of information security risks in general, it is suggested to 
focus on the gap in knowledge about environmental risk factors. Knowledge about 
security within disciplines such as building architecture, health and safety, social 
geography, or urban planning might be able to contribute significantly to environmental 
risk factor classifications, as might sociology, political science and legal studies.  
Furthermore, a suggestion for future research is to include Library and Information 
Science (LIS) in information security research. Information Security Management 
Systems require organisations to create a classification of sensitive information with the 
aim to balance the level of access to data and the strength of security controls with the 
level of sensitivity of that information. However, humans conceptualise sensitivity in 
different ways. LIS research investigates tagging and categorizing as central issues in 
the organisation of information, and this work supports classifications. This field has 
particular relevance to the understanding of sensitivity classifications and security 
decision-making. 
Finally, studies of human behaviour and norms and values may contribute to a better 
understanding of security behaviour and perception of risks. These studies have been 
mainly conducted in western cultures. ICT services outsourced to Asian and eastern 
European countries, for example, involve cultural differences and different 
interpretations of tasks and management style. Crossler et al. (2013) have recently 
suggested that future information security studies may need to include cross-cultural 
differences such as uncertainty avoidance, issues of collectivism versus individualism, 
and power distance relationships. Regional and country level cultural assessments could 
provide findings that may be helpful to understanding how people perceive information 
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security in a certain region. The understanding and management of information security 
risks will become increasingly important in a networked, global information society. 
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Appendix A: List of FOI requests 
The following NHS organisations were part of the survey described in the thesis section 
6.2: Data collection for the incident database. 
Name Reply in 
County Durham  07/10/2010 
Ashton Leigh And Wigan  01/10/2010 
Barking & Dagenham  20/10/2010 
Barnet  05/10/2010 
Barnsley 
 
Bath And North East Somerset 13/10/2010 
Bedfordshire 22/10/2010 
Berkshire East  20/09/2010 
Berkshire West  08/10/2010 
Birmingham East And North  15/10/2010 
Blackburn With Darwen  28/10/2010 
Blackpool  
 
Bolton  18/10/2010 
Bournemouth And Poole  14/10/2010 
Bradford & Airedale  18/10/2010 
Brent  
 
Brighton And Hove City  24/09/2010 
Bristol  12/10/2010 
Bromley  11/10/2010 
Buckinghamshire  14/10/2010 
Bury  
 
Calderdale 15/10/2010 
Cambridgeshire  18/10/2010 
Camden  03/02/2011 
Central And Eastern Cheshire  
 
Central Lancs  19/10/2010 
City And Hackney  16/11/2011 
Cornwall & Isles Of Scilly  18/10/2010 
Croydon  11/10/2010 
Cumbria  14/10/2010 
Darlington  04/11/2010 
Derby City  18/10/2010 
Derbyshire County  18/10/2010 
Devon  30/09/2010 
Doncaster  15/10/2010 
Dorset  
 
Dudley  
 
Ealing  19/10/2010 
East & North Hertfordshire  13/01/2011 
East Lancs  18/10/2010 
East Riding Of Yorkshire  18/10/2010 
East Sussex Downs & Weald  
 
Enfield  18/10/2010 
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Gateshead  
 
Gloucestershire  
Great Yarmouth And Waveney  11/02/2011 
Halton & St Helens  15/10/2010 
Hammersmith & Fulham  23/09/2010 
Hampshire  
 
Haringey  12/10/2010 
Harrow  
 
Hartlepool  18/10/2010 
Hastings & Rother  
 
Havering  15/10/2010 
Heart Of Birmingham  22/10/2010 
Hertfordshire  19/10/2010 
Heywood Middleton & Rochdale  15/10/2010 
Hillingdon  21/10/2010 
Hounslow  15/10/2010 
Hull  
 
Islington  14/10/2010 
Kensington And Chelsea  10/11/2010 
Kingston 21/10/2010 
Kirklees  23/09/2010 
Knowsley 23/09/2010 
Lambeth  25/01/2010 
Leeds  18/10/2010 
Leicester City  14/10/2010 
Leicestershire County & Rutland  
Lewisham  
Lincolnshire  
 
Liverpool  
 
Luton 
Manchester  
Mid Essex  01/10/2010 
Middlesbrough  18/10/2010 
Milton Keynes  20/10/2010 
Newcastle Upon Tyne  28/09/2011 
Newham  19/10/2010 
Bexley 19/10/2010 
Eastern & Coastal Kent 23/11/2010 
Greenwich 12/10/2010 
Isle Of Wight 
 
Medway 13/10/2010 
Nottinghamshire County 20/10/2010 
West Kent 22/10/2010 
Norfolk  25/10/2010 
North East Essex  21/10/2010 
North East Lincolnshire Care Trust Plus 
North Lancs  19/10/2010 
North Somerset  13/10/2010 
North Staffordshire  
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North Tyneside  28/09/2011 
North Yorkshire And York  26/10/2010 
Northamptonshire  17/12/2010 
Northumberland  28/09/2011 
Nottingham City  27/10/2010 
Oldham  21/10/2010 
Oxfordshire  15/10/2010 
Peterborough  25/10/2010 
Plymouth  20/10/2010 
Portsmouth City  22/10/2010 
Redbridge  13/10/2010 
Redcar And Cleveland  18/10/2010 
Richmond & Twickenham 27/10/2010 
Rotherham  14/10/2010 
Salford  07/01/2011 
Sandwell  22/12/2010 
Sefton  19/10/2010 
Sheffield  05/10/2010 
Shropshire County  21/10/2010 
Solihull  23/10/2010 
Somerset  28/09/2010 
South Birmingham  25/10/2010 
South East Essex  21/12/2010 
South Gloucestershire  02/01/2011 
South Staffordshire  22/03/2011 
South Tyneside  04/01/2011 
South West Essex  22/12/2010 
Southampton City  06/01/2011 
Southwark  
 
Stockport  
 
Stockton On Tees  18/10/2010 
Stoke-On-Trent  06/01/2011 
Suffolk  05/01/2011 
Sunderland  
 
Surrey  
 
Sutton & Merton  30/12/2010 
Swindon  04/01/2011 
Tameside And Glossop  14/12/2010 
Telford & Wrekin  22/12/2010 
Torbay  10/01/2011 
Tower Hamlets  12/01/2010 
Trafford  20/12/2010 
Wakefield District  15/12/2010 
Walsall Teaching  11/01/2011 
Waltham Forest  13/01/2011 
Wandsworth  
 
Warrington  29/12/2010 
Warwickshire  18/01/2010 
West Essex  21/12/2010 
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West Hertfordshire  13/01/2011 
West Sussex  17/12/2010 
Western Cheshire  05/01/2011 
Westminster  30/12/2010 
Wiltshire  
 
Wirral  12/01/2010 
Wolverhampton City  10/01/2010 
Worcestershire  06/01/2011 
Ayrshire & Arran 
 
Borders yes 
Dumfries & Galloway yes 
Fife yes 
Forth Valley yes 
Grampian yes 
Greater Glasgow & Clyde yes 
Highland yes 
Lothian yes 
Lanarkshire yes 
Orkney 
 
Shetland 
 
Tayside yes 
Western Isles  yes 
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Appendix B: Scenarios retrieved from NHS incidents 
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building 3 0.00 on the 
premises 
3 1.00 unknown 1 0.333 other building 
vulnerabilities 
1 1.00 observe personal data 1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
      water 1 0.333 other building 
vulnerabilities 
1 1.00 damage personal data 1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
      other 1 0.333 other building 
vulnerabilities 
1 1.00 expose to loss 1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
business 
partner 
46 0.02 on the 
premises 
4 0.09 human error 2 0.5 email not protected 1 0.50 possible disclosure of 
data 
1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
         lack of training 1 0.50 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
      script or program 1 0.25 computer vulnerability 1 1.00 contamination 1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
      unauthorised access 1 0.25 unattended asset/paper 1 1.00 observe personal data 1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
   other 42 0.91 human error 41 0.976 email not protected 11 0.27 possible disclosure of 
data 
9 0.82  0-9  8 0.89 0.00 
                10-99  1 0.11 0.00 
            disclosure of 
information 
2 0.18  0-9  2 1.00 0.00 
         transportation 3 0.07 expose to loss 1 0.33  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
            possible disclosure of 
data 
2 0.67  0-9  2 1.00 0.00 
         paper in post or 
internal mail 
20 0.49 possible disclosure of 
data 
19 0.95  0-9  19 1.00 0.01 
            expose to loss 1 0.05  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
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         user entry errors 4 0.10 possible disclosure of 
data 
4 1.00  0-9  4 1.00 0.00 
         lack of training 2 0.05 data on stick exposed 
to loss 
1 0.50  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
            patient filmed without 
permission 
1 0.50  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
         procedure not followed 1 0.02 possible disclosure of 
data 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
      fraud 1 0.024 insufficient supervision 1 1.00 record not available 
when needed 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
hardware 4 0.00 other 1 0.25 it-enabled process 1 1 design 1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
   on the 
premises 
3 0.75 system error 3 1 other 2 0.67 delay process 1 0.50  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
            loss of data/asset 1 0.50  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
        1 system error 1 0.33 record not available 
when needed 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
internal 
employee 
1569 0.74 on the 
premises 
1127 0.72 unauthorised 
accessing 
252 0.224 privileges 139 0.55 disclosure of 
information 
134 0.96  0-9  127 0.95 0.06 
                10-99  5 0.04 0.00 
                100-999  2 0.01 0.00 
            removal of information 2 0.01  0-9  1 0.50 0.00 
                10-99  1 0.50 0.00 
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            modify information 1 0.01  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
            other 1 0.01  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
            acquire copyright 
material 
1 0.01  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
         password/access token 
sharing 
113 0.45 disclosure of 
information 
113 1.00  0-9  89 0.79 0.04 
                10-99  18 0.16 0.01 
                100-999  4 0.04 0.00 
                >1000  2 0.02 0.00 
      human error 793 0.70 unattended asset/paper 235 0.30 records damaged 1 0.00  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
            disclosure of 
information 
15 0.06  0-9  12 0.80 0.01 
                10-99  2 0.13 0.00 
                100-999  1 0.07 0.00 
            expose to loss 2 0.01  10-99  2 1.00 0.00 
            loss of data/asset 217 0.92  0-9  194 0.89 0.09 
                10-99  11 0.05 0.01 
                100-999  5 0.02 0.00 
                1000-
9999  
7 0.03 0.00 
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         email entry errors 221 0.28 disclosure of 
information 
221 1.00  0-9  208 0.94 0.10 
               10-99  7 0.03 0.00 
               100-999  4 0.02 0.00 
               1000-
9999  
2 0.01 0.00 
         email not protected 17 0.02 disclosure of 
information 
17 1  0-9  17 1 0.01 
         paper in post or 
internal mail 
52 0.07 disclosure of 
information 
52 1  0-9  52 1 0.02 
         procedure not followed 128 0.16 disclosure of 
information 
94 0.73  0-9  94 1 0.04 
            expose to loss 34 0.27  0-9  34 1 0.02 
         fax entry errors 39 0.05 disclosure of 
information 
39 1.00  0-9  39 1 0.02 
         informal conversation 1 0.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1 0.00 
         telephone conversation 4 0.01 disclosure of 
information 
4 1.00  0-9  4 1 0.00 
         lack of training 37 0.05 disclosure of 
information 
34 0.92  0-9  34 1 0.02 
            delay process 1 0.03  0-9  1 1 0.00 
            removal of information 1 0.03  0-9  1 1 0.00 
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            contaminated 
equipment 
1 0.03  0-9  1 1 0.00 
         user entry errors 44 0.06 misrepresent 14 0.32  0-9  14 1 0.01 
            misplace of record 12 0.27  0-9  12 1 0.01 
          44 0.06 disclosure of 
information 
17 0.39  0-9  17 1 0.01 
          44 0.06 loss of data/asset 1 0.02  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
         unknown 15 0.02 disclosure of 
information 
13 0.87  0-9  5 0.38 0.00 
               10-99  8 0.62 0.00 
            unknown 1 0.07  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
            misrepresent 1 0.07  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
      employee 
manipulation and 
malfeasance 
1 0.00 guards 1 1.00 take control of asset 1 1.00  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
      manual process 26 0.02 unattended asset/paper 1 0.04 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
         organisational changes 1 0.04 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
         improper disposal 24 0.92 disclosure of 
information 
24 1.00  0-9  21 0.88 0.01 
                10-99  3 0.13 0.00 
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      unknown 7 0.01 unknown 7 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
7 1.00  0-9  4 0.57 0.00 
               10-99  2 0.29 0.00 
               100-999  1 0.14 0.00 
      theft 1 0.00 unattended asset/paper 1 1.00 acquire data/asset 1 1.00  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
      it-enabled process 46 0.04 configuration 37 0.80 disclosure of 
information 
34 0.92  0-9  30 0.88 0.01 
               10-99  2 0.06 0.00 
               100-999  1 0.03 0.00 
                >1000  1 0.03 0.00 
            contamination 1 0.03  >10.000  1 1.00 0.00 
            network, other 1 0.03  0-9  1 1 0.00 
            delay process 1 0.03  10-99  1 1 0.00 
         organisational changes 1 0.02 delay process 1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
         unknown 1 0.02 unknown 1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
         changes 7 0.15 disclosure of 
information 
1 0.14 100-999  1 1 0.00 
            removal of information 5 0.71  0-9  4 0.8 0.00 
               10-99  1 0.2 0.00 
            record not available 1 0.14  0-9  1 1 0.00 
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when needed 
      unauthorised access 1 0.00 doors 1 1.00 use of secure area 1 1.00  0-9  1 1 0.00 
   staff 
home 
11 0.01 it-enabled process 1 0.09 remote working 
environment 
1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1 0.00 
      human error 8 0.73 fax entry errors 1 0.13 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1 0.00 
         unattended asset/paper 6 0.75 loss of data/asset 5 0.83  0-9  5 1 0.00 
            expose to loss 1 0.17  0-9  1 1 0.00 
         paper in post or 
internal mail 
1 0.13 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1 0.00 
      manual process 1 0.09 privileges 1 1.00 use data for personal 
gain 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1 0.00 
      unauthorised 
accessing 
1 0.09 privileges 1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1 0.00 
   patient 
home 
14 0.01 human error 14 1.00 fax entry errors 1 0.07 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1 0.00 
         paper in post or 
internal mail 
4 0.29 disclosure of 
information 
4 1.00  0-9  4 1 0.00 
         procedure not followed 1 0.07 record not available 
when needed 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1 0.00 
         unattended asset/paper 5 0.36 loss of data/asset 5 1.00  0-9  5 1 0.00 
         unknown 1 0.07 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1 0.00 
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         user entry errors 2 0.14 misrepresent 1 0.50  0-9  1 1 0.00 
            disclosure of 
information 
1 0.50  0-9  1 1 0.00 
   unknown 175 0.11 unauthorised 
accessing 
8 0.05 privileges 7 0.88 disclosure of 
information 
7 1.00  0-9  6 0.86 0.00 
         privileges 7 0.88 disclosure of 
information 
7 1.00  10-99  1 0.14 0.00 
         password/access token 
sharing 
1 0.13 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1 0.00 
      human error 165 0.94 procedure not followed 1 0.01 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1 0.00 
         unattended asset/paper 128 0.78 disclosure of 
information 
1 0.01  0-9  1 1 0.00 
            loss of data/asset 127 0.99  0-9  124 0.98 0.06 
                10-99  3 0.02 0.00 
         fax entry errors 6 0.04 disclosure of 
information 
6 1.00  0-9  4 0.67 0.00 
                10-99  2 0.33 0.00 
         email entry errors 30 0.18 disclosure of 
information 
30 1.00  0-9  30 1 0.01 
      manual process 2 0.01 improper disposal 2 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
2 1.00  0-9  2 1 0.00 
   other 242 0.15 it-enabled process 1 0.00 configuration 1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1 0.00 
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      human error 233 0.96 unattended asset/paper 138 0.59 loss of data/asset 138 1.00  0-9  119 0.86 0.06 
                10-99  14 0.10 0.01 
                100-999  3 0.02 0.00 
                >1000  1 0.01 0.00 
                >10.000  1 0.01 0.00 
         telephone conversation 1 0.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1.00  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
         paper in post or 
internal mail 
31 0.13 disclosure of 
information 
31 1.00  0-9  31 1 0.01 
         procedure not followed 26 0.11 disclosure of 
information 
26 1  0-9  26 1 0.01 
         fax entry errors 17 0.07 disclosure of 
information 
17 1  0-9  17 1 0.01 
         email not protected 1 0.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
         email entry errors 14 0.06 disclosure of 
information 
14 1  0-9  12 0.86 0.01 
                10-99  2 0.14 0.00 
         user entry errors 5 0.02 disclosure of 
information 
2 0.4  0-9  2 1.00 0.00 
            misrepresent 3 0.6  0-9  3 1.00 0.00 
      manual process 3 0.01 improper disposal 3 1.00 disclosure of 3 1  0-9  3 1.00 0.00 
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information 
      unknown 3 0.01 unknown 3 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
3 1  0-9  3 1.00 0.00 
      physical damage 1 0.00 paper in post or 
internal mail 
1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
      unauthorised 
accessing 
1 0.00 password/access token 
sharing 
1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
patient 13 0.01 on the 
premises 
10 0.77 physical attack 2 0.20 other 2 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
2 1  0-9  2 1.00 0.00 
      eavesdropping 2 0.20 other 2 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
2 1  0-9  2 1.00 0.00 
      employee 
manipulation and 
malfeasance 
1 0.10 other 1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
      manual process 1 0.10 procedure not followed 1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
      theft 1 0.10 unattended asset/paper 1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
      fraud 1 0.10 procedure not followed 1 1.00 misrepresentation of 
identity 
1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
      human error 1 0.10 unattended asset/paper 1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
      other 1 0.10 other 1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
   patient 3 0.23 eavesdropping 1 0.33 other 1 1.00 disclosure of 1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
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home information 
      manual process 1 0.33 other 1 1.00 copy information 1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
      physical attack 1 0.33 other 1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
software 96 0.05 on the 
premises 
90 0.94 script or program 11 0.12 configuration 11 1.00 contamination 11 1  0-9  10 0.91 0.00 
      script or program 11 0.12 configuration 11 1.00 contamination 11 1  >1000  1 0.09 0.00 
      system error 79 0.88 other 79 1.00 other 62 0.78  0-9  62 1.00 0.03 
            record not available 
when needed 
8 0.10  0-9  8 1 0.00 
            destroy data 4 0.05  0-9  4 1 0.00 
            delay process 2 0.03  0-9  2 1 0.00 
            reorder data 2 0.03  0-9  2 1 0.00 
            disclosure of 
information 
1 0.01  0-9  1 1 0.00 
   other 3 0.03 system error 3 1 other 3 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 0.33  0-9  1 1 0.00 
            other 2 0.67  0-9  1 0.5 0.00 
                10-99  1 0.5 0.00 
   staff 
home 
3 0.03 system error 3 1 other 3 1.00 other 3 1.00  0-9  3 1 0.00 
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unknown 373 0.18 on the 
premises 
155.0
00 
0.42 human error 8 0.05 unknown 5 0.63 unknown 5 1  0-9  5 1 0.00 
         unattended asset/paper 3 0.38 loss of data/asset 3 1  0-9  3 1 0.00 
      script or program 1 0.01 website 1 1.00 contamination 1 1  10-99  1 1 0.00 
      theft 145 0.94 unattended asset/paper 145 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
145 1  0-9  130 0.90 0.06 
                10-99  13 0.09 0.01 
                100-999  1 0.01 0.00 
                >10.000  1 0.01 0.00 
      unknown 1 0.01 unknown 1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
   other 65 0.17 theft 63 0.97 unattended asset/paper 63 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
63 1  0-9  58 0.92 0.03 
                10-99  4 0.06 0.00 
                100-999  1 0.02 0.00 
      human error 2 0.03 procedure not followed 1 0.50 misrepresent 1 1  0-9 1 1.00 0.00 
         unknown 1 0.50 loss of data/asset 1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
   unknown 134 0.36 theft 56 0.42 unattended asset/paper 56 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
56 1  0-9  56 1.00 0.03 
      human error 1 0.01 unattended asset/paper 1 1.00 loss of data/asset 1 1  0-9  1 1.00 0.00 
      unknown 77 0.57 unknown 77 1.00 disclosure of 77 1  0-9  71 0.92 0.03 
 254 
th
r
e
a
t 
fr
eq
u
en
cy
 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
lo
c
a
ti
o
n
 
fr
eq
u
en
cy
 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
m
e
th
o
d
 
fr
eq
u
en
cy
 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
w
e
a
k
n
e
ss
 
fr
eq
u
en
cy
 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
e
v
e
n
t 
fr
eq
u
en
cy
 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
(n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
af
fe
ct
ed
 
re
co
rd
s)
 
fr
eq
u
en
cy
 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
T
o
ta
l 
%
 
information 
                10-99  5 0.06 0.00 
                >1000  1 0.01 0.00 
   staff 
home 
19 0.05 theft 19 1.00 unattended asset/paper 19 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
19 1  10-99  2 0.11 0.00 
                0-9  17 0.89 0.01 
family 
member 
1 0.00 on the 
premises 
1 1.00 manual process 1 1.00 procedure not followed 1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
external 
human 
3 0.00 on the 
premises 
2 0.67 unauthorised access 1 0.50 privileges 1 1.00 misrepresent 1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
      employee 
manipulation and 
malfeasance 
1 0.50 telephone conversation 1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
   other 1 0.33 physical damage 1 1.00 paper in post or 
internal mail 
1 1.00 disclosure of 
information 
1 1  0-9  1 1 0.00 
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Appendix C: Delphi study questionnaires  
 
Round 1 
Which area(s) of expertise applies best to you?* 
 
Expertise level 
Information security ___  
Healthcare/medical ___  
Caldicott guardian/data protection ___  
Risk management ___  
IT Security ___  
Information governance ___  
Other ___  
 
 
Scenarios based on incident registers  
 
An analysis of 2108 information security incidents registered over 5 years in healthcare 
organisations in the UK delivered a top 5 of the most frequent incident scenarios and 
one scenario that affected the highest number of patient records.  
 
These 6 scenarios are now presented to you. Please state your opinion about the 
expected frequency of these scenarios.  
 
In your opinion, how frequent will this scenario occur?* 
[ ] Very rarely: it will happen in less than 5 per 1,000 incidents. 
[ ] Rarely: 5 to 10 times per 1,000 incidents 
[ ] Sometimes: 10 to 50 times per 1,000 incidents 
[ ] Frequently: 50 to 100 times per 1,000 incidents 
[ ] Very frequently: more than 100 times per 1,000 incidents 
 
Please try to estimate more specific how many out of 1,000 incidents will fit this 
scenario. 
Please add your motivation or comments here: 
 
 
Scenario 1. Email to wrong recipient.  
 
100 out of 1,000 incidents (10% of past incidents)  
involve an internal employee located on the premises who sends an email to the wrong 
addressee and consequently discloses the personal details of a few patients (less than 10 
patients).  
 
 
Scenario 2. Unattended asset goes missing.  
 
90 out of 1,000 of the incidents (9% of past incidents) 
involve an internal employee located on the premises leaving an asset unattended and 
consequently the asset goes missing. The asset contained personal information of a few 
patients (less than 10). 
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Scenario 3. Wrong privileges set.  
 
60 out of 1,000 incidents (6% of past incidents) 
involved an internal employee on the premises who unintentionally was given the 
wrong privileges or authorisations, causing disclosure of personal patient information to 
unauthorised persons. 
 
 
Scenario 4. Password or access token sharing.  
 
50 out of 1,000 incidents (5% of past incidents) 
involve an internal employee sharing his password or access token leading to disclosure 
of patient information to unauthorised persons. 
 
 
Scenario 5. Procedure not followed.  
 
40 out of 1,000 incidents (4% of past incidents) 
involve an internal employee located on the premises who does not follow the formal 
procedures leading to disclosure of patient information. 
 
 
Scenario 6. More than 10,000 patient records affected.  
 
1.5 out of 1,000 incidents (0.15% of past incidents) 
involved the loss of a portable backup medium, affecting more than 10,000 patient 
records. 
 
 
Create your scenario. 
Please now create 2 information security incident scenarios in healthcare organisations 
for the near future. The scenarios should include only the human factors involved with 
information security risks.  
 
The first scenario should be the one that you consider the most likely to happen. What is 
the risk scenario that healthcare organisations should be aware of? What kind of 
incident scenario do you think happens the most frequent?  
 
The second scenario should be the one that you expect to affect the largest number of 
patient records. What will be a risk scenario that potentially has the most damaging 
effect? 
 
In your opinion, what could be the most likely information security incident scenario in 
healthcare in the near future? 
 
An initiator (human threat agent) such as:* 
[ ] Medical staff 
[ ] Financial administration staff 
[ ] Other internal staff 
[ ] Trainee 
[ ] Personal assistant/secretary/admin support 
[ ] Ex-employee 
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[ ] Employee in partner organisation or related healthcare provider 
[ ] Employee in third party supplier or subcontractor 
[ ] Patient 
[ ] Family or carer/representative of patient 
[ ] External group or activists 
[ ] Other: 
[ ] Unknown 
Wanting (motive):* 
[ ] No motive, unintentional action 
[ ] Other 
[ ] Justice 
[ ] Satisfaction 
[ ] Resignation 
[ ] Knowledge 
[ ] Financial gain 
[ ] Emotional gain 
[ ] Political gain 
[ ] Covering up errors 
[ ] Convenience 
[ ] Thrill 
[ ] Status 
[ ] Challenge 
[ ] Unknown 
At the following location:* 
[ ] On the premises of the organisation 
[ ] At the patient's home 
[ ] At the staff member's home 
[ ] Public transport 
[ ] On the premises of other healthcare provider or related organisation 
[ ] In a public place (bar, restaurant, social club,.....) 
[ ] Unknown 
[ ] Other 
Using the following method:* 
[ ] Making a mistake 
[ ] Stealing 
[ ] Copying 
[ ] Unauthorised accessing 
[ ] Damaging/breaking 
[ ] Manipulating 
[ ] Abusing ICT facilities 
[ ] Inserting a script/program 
[ ] Physical attack 
[ ] Overhearing/eavesdropping 
[ ] Unknown 
[ ] Other 
And abusing the vulnerability or weakness:* 
[ ] Unattended asset or record 
[ ] Email recipient entry errors 
[ ] Lack of internal control in procedure 
[ ] Insufficient supervision 
[ ] Lack of skills/training 
[ ] Data entry errors 
[ ] Procedure not followed 
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[ ] Informal conversation in public area 
[ ] Telephone conversation in public area 
[ ] Flaws in settings in authorisations/privileges 
[ ] Sharing of password or access token 
[ ] Paper record in internal post 
[ ] Paper record in external post 
[ ] Organisational changes, new procedures or routines 
[ ] Transportation of storage medium 
[ ] Security flaw in storage of data 
[ ] Lack of security in email application 
[ ] Fax to wrong recipient 
[ ] Fax received in unsecured physical environment 
[ ] Printer in unsecured environment 
[ ] Hasty working 
[ ] Unsecured remote working environment 
[ ] Computer/network vulnerabilities 
[ ] Physical security vulnerabilities 
[ ] Unknown 
[ ] Other 
Leading to the event:* 
[ ] Confidentiality breach: disclose personal data 
[ ] Confidentiality breach: read/observe/hear personal data 
[ ] Confidentiality breach: copy personal data 
[ ] Confidentiality breach: acquire personal data 
[ ] Confidentiality breach: locate personal data 
[ ] Confidentiality breach: other 
[ ] Availability breach: data lost or gone missing 
[ ] Availability breach: destroy personal data 
[ ] Availability breach: damage personal data or facilities 
[ ] Availability breach: delay the process 
[ ] Availability breach: other 
[ ] Availability breach: data, notes or reports not available when needed 
[ ] Integrity breach: insert false data, notes or reports 
[ ] Integrity breach: modify notes, data or reports 
[ ] Integrity breach: remove parts of data, notes or reports 
[ ] Integrity breach: other 
[ ] Unknown 
[ ] Other 
At the cost of:* 
[ ] Repair costs 
[ ] Mailing expenses 
[ ] Replacement costs 
[ ] Fines or penalties 
[ ] Legal costs 
[ ] Consultancy costs 
[ ] Research or investigation costs 
[ ] Call centre costs 
[ ] Unknown 
[ ] Other 
Indirectly causing:* 
[ ] Embarrassment to the organisation or medical staff 
[ ] Affecting reputation of organisation or medical staff 
[ ] Patients choosing for other healthcare providers 
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[ ] Loss of health or life of patient 
[ ] Other 
[ ] Discrimination 
[ ] Quality of care affected 
[ ] Compliance to regulation affected 
[ ] Unknown 
And affecting the following number of patient records:* 
[ ] 0 - 9 
[ ] 10 - 99 
[ ] 100 - 999 
[ ] 1,000 - 9,999 
[ ] More than 10,000 
 
 
Please add your motivation or comments here: 
 
Delphi study questionnaire Round 2 
 
 
For each scenario please answer these questions: 
 
  
1) Please try to estimate (again) more specific how many out of 1,000 incidents will fit 
this scenario. 
2) Please add your motivation or comments here: 
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Delphi study questionnaire Round 3 
For each scenario: 
Please give your final estimation how many times out of 1,000 incidents this scenario 
will occur in the near future. After 2 survey rounds, the combined estimation of all 
experts is 88.5 times per 1,000 incidents.* 
 
 
Password or access token sharing 
In this scenario, an employee shares a password or access token with someone and as a 
consequence patient information is disclosed to an unauthorised person. 66% of the 
expert panel agreed in Round 2 that this scenario is likely to occur more frequently than 
the incident registers had shown. The panel estimates that the frequency will be between 
50 and 100 times out of a 1,000 incidents (past experience showed 50 times out of 
1,000). The comment from the expert who estimated the lowest frequency, suggests that 
‘there is no evidence that this happens’. The experts rating the frequency the highest 
suggest that ‘it is not possible for staff to work without sharing passwords’. 
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Password-access token sharing (link opens PDF). 
 
 
Theft on the premises 
This was a scenario created by an expert in Round 1. The scenario involves the theft of 
devices with personal data stored on it from the premises of the organisation. The 
scenario was also reported frequently in the incident registers although the experts 
together estimate the frequency a little lower (the combined experts estimation is 50 
times per 1,000 incidents), and the past experience frequency is 63 times). 
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56% of the experts agree that this scenario happens sometimes. One expert suggests that 
this scenario could be combined with lost assets, as it is often not clear whether an item 
was lost or stolen. Another expert estimates the frequency of this scenario as very low, 
suggesting that ‘people are becoming more aware’.  
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Theft on the premises (link opens PFD). 
 
 
 
Procedure not followed 
Not following the formal procedures could lead to the disclosure of patient information. 
The experts estimated the possible frequency of occurrence of this scenario as similar to 
the frequency of past incidents (40 times out of 1,000 incidents). 
Half of the experts in the panel estimate the frequency to be between 10 and 50 times 
per 1,000 incidents. Round 2 showed outliers with higher estimations and lower 
estimations. Most of the comments made by the experts refer to staff often breaching 
policy and procedures but ‘this is not always reported as an incident’.  
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Procedure not followed (link opens PDF). 
 
 
Mistakes 
A little less than 400 out of 1,000 scenarios in the register of past incidents were due to 
mistakes made by internal staff. Most frequently, these mistakes affected less than 10 
patient records per incident. Incidents that affected more than 1,000 records occured 
rarely (2 times out of 1,000). 
In contrast, mistakes affecting a low number of records occurred 371 times out of 1,000 
in the past, and there are many possible sub-scenarios within these 371. Some of these 
sub-scenarios involve the leaving of assets or paper records unattended or sending 
emails to the wrong recipient. These sub-scenarios are described below.  
Mistakes affecting more than 1,000 records  
Only a few incidents affected more than 1,000 patient records (2 times out of 1,000 in 
contrast to the more frequent (371.5) mistakes affecting less than 10 records). The 
experts appear to agree that the mistakes impacting a high number of records occur 
more frequently than 2 times out of 1,000 (35 times).  
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Mistakes affecting high number of records (link opens PDF). 
  
Email to wrong recipient 
This scenario was reported the most frequent in the registers of past incidents. It 
involves emails containing personal data of patients being sent to either the wrong 
recipients and/or to persons not authorised to receive that information. The experts did 
not estimate the possible frequency of occurrence to be as high as it occured in the 
registers, although the estimations in Round 1 varied within a range of 99. The range of 
answers declined in Round 2. The consensus rate went up from 42% to 70%. 
70% of the experts expect the frequency of occurrence of this scenario to be between 10 
and 50 times per 1,000 incidents (this scenario will happen sometimes), in contrast to 
past experience which was 100. Round 2 showed only outliers on the lower side. From 
the comments made by one of these experts, this lower estimation could be explained by 
the different solution that the expert's organisation uses instead of email.  
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Email to wrong recipient (link opens PDF). 
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Unattended asset goes missing 
This scenario was reported as the second most frequent in the registers of past incidents 
(90 times out of 1,000 incidents). The experts estimate the possible frequency of 
occurrence lower (45), although there seems to some disagreement. Reading through the 
comments, the diversity could be explained by lower estimations from experts working 
in organisations where there is no storage of patient data possible on smaller devices 
such as memory sticks and portable devices, where the comments from experts who are 
rating the frequency higher refer to the use of sticks, phones and other small devices to 
store data. However, this scenario refers to paper records as well as electronic assets. 
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Unattended asset goes missing (link opens PDF). 
 
 
 
Business partner, supplier or contractor discloses patient data 
The scenario where a third party causes a data breach was mentioned by 3 experts in 
Round 1 and their scenarios were combined into one. After Round 2, all experts agree 
that the frequency of occurrence is less than 10 times out of 1,000 incidents with a 
combined estimated frequency of 5. With a range of answers of 7, and a small standard 
deviation, this is the scenario with the best consensus.  
However, this scenario is at a high abstraction level and many sub-scenarios can be 
identified within this scenario.  
One of them is a more specific scenario that was suggested by one of the experts in 
Round 1 of the survey, where the third party causes a breach through an unsecure 
remote working environment. There were no reports of this kind of incidents in the 
register of incidents that was used for this study but in Round 2 of the survey some 
experts estimated the frequency of this scenario higher than the 5 that was given for the 
more general scenario above.  
A second possible sub-scenario is the improper disposal of paper records by a third 
party. This scenario was suggested by an expert in Round 1 and in Round 2 all experts 
estimated the frequency of this scenario as less than 10 times out 1,000 incidents. 
Comments made in Round 2 indicate that it could happen rather often when buildings 
are cleared or when old paper files are archived before disposal by third parties. 
The register of past incidents showed that the most frequent reported type of incidents 
caused by third parties was the loss of paper records or reports with personal data 
through the post and the second most frequent was unsecured emailing. The frequencies 
of these incidents were very low so they were not included as scenarios in the Delphi 
study.  
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Business partner discloses data (link opens PDF). 
 
 
Wrong privileges or authorisations set 
This scenario describes how confidentiality breaches are caused by flaws in the settings 
of authorisations and privileges, causing unauthorised access to patient data. The 
experts estimate the possible frequency of occurrence lower than the frequency of past 
incidents showed (60 times per 1,000 incidents). The range of expert estimations 
decreased in Round 2 and 60% now estimate that this scenario will occur 10 to 50 times 
out of 1,000 incidents. Round 2 showed a few outlying answers. From the comments 
made by the experts who estimate the frequency of occurrence as high, it seems that, 
according to their opinion, ‘identity and access management are not often implemented 
successfully in organisations’. The profiles of these experts (ID14, ID15, and ID17 in 
Round 1) show that these are the panel members with the highest expertise level in IT 
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security. On the contrary, the experts who rated the frequency the lowest, refer in their 
comments’ to be confident that the procedures should cover this risk and to have 
confidence in the IT staff’.  
 
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Wrong privileges set (link opens PDF). 
 
 
Working in a public place 
This was a scenario created by an expert in Round 1. It suggests that medical staff can 
be overheard when they discuss a patient over the phone in a public place, or that it can 
be seen by others what they are working on when they work on a laptop, leading to a 
confidentiality breach. In Round 2, the respondents estimated the frequency for this 
scenario quite differently. In most of comments that were made, it is suggested that this 
scenario is likely to be related to awareness and attitude of medical staff and the 
environment that they work in. 
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Working in a public place (link opens PDF). 
 
 
Backup goes missing scenario 
Backup medium goes missing 
This is the 'disaster' scenario, the one that caused the highest number of patient records 
exposed in the register of past incidents. It happened 1.5 times out of 1,000 incidents 
and the experts seem to rate the frequency of this kind of scenario slightly higher. The 
scenario refers to the main system backups with the full database of patient records and 
not to portable 'convenience' backup devices which a smaller number of patient data. 
The comments in Round 2 made by experts who used the correct interpretation referred 
to encryption and cloud computing as emerging standard practice that will prevent this 
incident from happening in the future. After Round 2, the expert's estimations are still 
very diverse, possibly caused by the misinterpretation of this scenario. 
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Backup goes missing (link opens PDF). 
 
 
Copy data to portable storage medium 
This scenario occurs when a person copies personal data on a portable storage medium 
for convenience and transports it anywhere. The breach is the act of copying the data, 
which could affect personal details of 100 to 999 patients. The scenario was created in 
Round 1 and there were only a few comments on this scenario, varying from ‘we are not 
aware of this happening’ to ‘it is happening’. 
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Copy data to storage medium (link opens PDF). 
 
 
Family of patient accesses patient’s record 
This scenario occurs when a family member, a representative or carer of the patient 
accesses the unattended record. This rare scenario (0.5 times out of 1,000 incidents in 
the register of past incidents) was suggested by an expert in Round 1 and most experts 
agree that the frequency of occurrence will be fewer than 10 out of 1,000 incidents. One 
of the comments shows a different interpretation of this scenario, where the family 
member discloses information about the patient to a third person. However, this point of 
view is a different scenario and not the one meant here. 
 274 
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Family accesses record (link opens PDF). 
 
 
Unsecured remote working  
This scenario was proposed as an emerging risk as remote working for hospital 
employees is growing. The scenario not only applies to the digital connection to the 
organisation’s network, but also to the paper based data and memory sticks that are 
being taken to the external location and could get lost or gone missing. The expert's 
estimations varied in Round 2 but most seem to estimate this scenario as a very rare 
one. 
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Unsecured remote working (link opens PDF). 
 
 
Trainee breaching confidentiality  
This scenario was proposed by one expert in Round 1 and it involves a trainee accessing 
a patient record without authorisation. Possible causes could be telling about their new 
job to friends or looking up a celebrity’s status. It could also be unintentional when a 
name is mistyped and another data set is accessed. Most experts expect that this 
scenario happens less than 5 times out of 1,000 incidents. 
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Trainee breaching confidentiality (link opens PDF). 
 
 
 
External groups  
This scenario was proposed by 2 experts in Round 1. It involves external groups or 
activists abusing several vulnerabilities to gain access to data to destroy it, change it or 
otherwise abuse, publish or damage it. In Round 2 this was mostly evaluated as a very 
rare scenario. The comments vary from the opinion that it will happen for sure to that it 
is very unlikely to happen at all in healthcare.  
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: External groups (link opens PDF). 
 
 
 
Covering up errors  
A scenario where medical staff making changes in data, reports or notes to gain status 
or to cover up errors occurred in register of past incidents, although very rarely (0.7 
times out of 1,000 incidents). In Round 2, the combined estimation by the experts is 2.5. 
The comments that were made by experts in Round 2 varied from ‘this is not 
applicable’ to ‘this happens more often than perceived’.  
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Covering up errors (link opens PDF) 
 
 
Breach at a patient’s home 
This scenario was suggested in Round 1 by one expert, who estimated the frequency of 
this scenario to be about 75 times out of 1,000 incidents. Breaches of confidentiality at a 
patient’s home were reported in the register of past incidents with a frequency of 2.5 
times out of 1,000 incidents.  
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In Round 2, the comments about this scenario are very diverse but all expected 
frequencies are lower than 51. It has been suggested that since the impact is low, it is 
not a very important scenario. Another comment states that data is being updated by 
staff at the patient’s home and the informal environment influences security awareness 
and records are not always marked as confidential.  
Read all details from Round 2 (statistics, all comments, all estimated frequencies) in this 
document: Breach at a patient's home (link opens PFD). 
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Appendix D: Interview questions 
 
IT Security Manager 
Introduction (5 minutes) 
 
Introduce self. 
Describe research and goals. 
Explain consent form and sign.  
Interview will be semi structured. The questions below are representative of what I will 
ask, but I expect other questions to emerge during the course of the interviews.  
 
General (10 minutes) 
 
How are information security related responsibilities (IT security, Caldicott Guardian, 
Data Protection, Freedom of information, Records management, risk management, and 
quality management) organised? 
How do these roles link into each other and to the Scottish Information Governance 
Board? 
Are the NHS Scotland Information Governance Standards (September 2007) leading in 
the way GGC has organised information governance? 
How does your organisation position Information Security (is it mainly an ICT ‘thing’ 
or does it have a wider scope)? 
Which developments in society or politics will influence the NHS’s approach to 
information security in the future? 
 
Information security risk assessment approach in the organisation (30 minutes) 
 
Which method and techniques for Information Security Risk Assessment are used in the 
organisation?  
 a. How often are information security risk assessments performed?  
 b. How long does one assessment take to complete (average)? 
 c. Which tools are used? 
d. Who participates? (List of names & job title, these persons will be asked to 
complete a survey).  
 e. Do business partners, subcontractors or other organisations participate? 
f. What is the scope/are the scopes of individual risk assessments (system, 
department, process, location, paper-based records/electronic records)? 
 g. How do you define the boundaries of the scope (where does a ‘system’ end?)? 
 h. How are results documented?  
 i. Who receives a copy of the risk register/report?  
How does the risk register influence decision making? 
How is the quality of the results evaluated?  
How do you know that your risk forecasts are correct? 
How is staff encouraged to report a risk when they perceive one during their daily 
routines?  
If you have ever compared the results with the information security incident register, 
what was the conclusion? 
If you have ever compared the results with other organisations, how did you do that and 
did it add value to you? 
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If you have ever evaluated the usability and quality of the method with the participants, 
what were the opinions?  
What do you think could be improved on your method? 
How do you think information security risks will be monitored in 2023? 
What do you generally see as the biggest risks to information security today and in the 
future? 
 
Incident reporting (10 minutes) 
 
Apart from the existing procedures for incident reporting, how are employees 
encouraged to report an incident or near miss?  
How often do you get such information?  
Have you ever compared the incident register with other organisations (benchmarking)?  
If yes: how, how often, did it add value to you?  
If not: why not and would you want to? 
 
Close interview (5 minutes) 
 
Thank for participation.  
The report of this interview will be emailed shortly. 
Discuss next step (survey & document review of risk and incident registers). 
 
Information Governance 
 
Introduction (5 minutes) 
 
Introduce self. 
Describe research and goals. 
Explain consent form and sign.  
Interview will be semi structured. The questions below are representative of what I will 
ask, but I expect other questions to emerge during the course of the interviews.  
 
General (10 minutes) 
 
How is Information governance organised within your department and how is that 
related to other responsibilities (IT security, Caldicott Guardian, Data Protection, 
Freedom of information, Records management, risk management, and quality 
management)?   
Which developments in society or politics will influence the NHS’s approach to 
information governance in the future? 
How does your organisation position Information Security (is it mainly an ICT ‘thing’ 
or does it have a wider scope)? 
 
Information security risk assessment approach in the organisation (20 minutes) 
 
How are risks to the security of personal and other important information identified 
within the department?  
How often do you participate in information security risk assessments organised by or 
organised together with other departments? 
How does the risk register/report influence decision making? 
How do you know that your risk forecasts are correct? 
How is staff encouraged to report any risks they may suspect? 
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How is staff trained/educated in information security risk awareness? 
What do you generally see as the biggest risks to information security today and in the 
future? 
How do you think information security risks will be monitored in 2023? 
 
Information security incident reporting (10 minutes) 
 
How can staff report an incident? 
What is your risk and incident reporting culture like? (are employees encouraged to 
report?)  
How often do you receive such information?  
Have you ever compared your incident register with other departments? 
(benchmarking)?  
If yes: how, how often, did it add value to you?  
If not: why not and would you want to? 
Risk model (10 minutes) 
Look at the classification of risk factors from the HI-risk model (will be provided 
during interview), are there any factor that could be added? Special attention to 
organisational and individual vulnerabilities. 
Please comment on the top 10 of risk scenarios that were created in the HI-risk model 
(will be shown in separate document).   
 
Close interview (5 minutes) 
 
Thank for participation.  
The report of this interview will be emailed shortly. 
Discuss next step (observations). 
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Appendix E: Case study survey questions 
 
1. Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements. 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Our organisation assesses 
information security risks with a 
practical approach. 
     
Our approach delivers reliable 
results. 
     
Our approach is the best possible 
way to assess risks. 
     
Our management is aware of the 
most important information security 
risks. 
     
The scope of our risk assessments is 
wide enough. 
     
The frequency of our risk 
assessment is enough. 
     
Our approach contributes positively 
to risk awareness in the organisation. 
     
The results give me what I need to 
mitigate risks in my daily work. 
     
The risk reports are used to make 
management decisions. 
     
Our risks are similar to those in any 
other NHS organisation. 
     
Our risks are similar to any other 
organisation in different industries. 
     
 
2. In your opinion, what could potentially be improved in the current approach that is 
used in your organisation? 
3. Which of the following characteristics would you be interested in adding to the 
information risk assessment approach? 
 Interested Neutral 
Not 
interested 
Not 
sure 
A comparison against risks identified by other 
organisations. 
    
A comparison of each risk register against the 
actual suffered incidents. 
    
A comparison against the opinions of security 
experts and trend watchers. 
    
A special list of human and organisation-related 
risks. 
    
A healthcare sector wide risk overview.     
 
1. An analysis performed in healthcare organisations resulted in a list of expected risk 
scenarios for the future. Below is a list of 5 possible risk scenarios (presented here 
in random order). Please rank them in order of the highest expected frequency of 
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occurrence in the near future (this year). The scenario that you would expect to 
occur the most often goes on top. 
 
Drag items from the left-hand list into the right-hand list to order them. 
 Assets (equipment, records, mobile phones and so on) go missing from the 
premises. 
 Staff using each other's user account and password. 
 Staff making mistakes with e-mail recipients or using private e-mail accounts to 
send patient information. 
 Staff causes a security breach by not following the formal procedures. 
 Staff gains access to data they should not have access to, caused by wrongly set 
or out-dated authorisations and privileges in the system. 
 
5. Please describe which other significant risk(s) to the security of information you see 
occurring in your organisation? 
6. What do you expect to become the biggest risk(s) to information security in 
healthcare in the next years? 
7. How do you expect that information risks will be monitored 10 years from now? 
8. How do you expect cybercrime to affect the healthcare infrastructure in the future? 
9. How do you expect government policy to influence information security in the 
healthcare sector? 
 
 
